A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This Supreme Court judgment in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan & Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 896, addresses two significant issues arising from the interpretation and application of amended provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter “the Act”). The case primarily concerns the rights of a landlord to seek eviction for reconstruction under Section 13(3)(a)(iii), and whether amendments introduced by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956, apply retrospectively to pending proceedings. The judgment clarifies that Section 15(5), which grants the High Court revisional powers, applies to appeals decided after the amendment. However, Section 13(3)(a)(iii), being a provision affecting substantive rights, does not apply retrospectively unless explicitly stated. This ruling upholds the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction while affirming that the unamended law governed the landlord’s substantive right to seek eviction. The Supreme Court upheld the eviction decree passed by the High Court under the old provision.

Keywords: Rent Control, Retrospective Operation, Revisional Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, East Punjab Urban Rent Act

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title: Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan & Others
ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 524 of 1959
iii) Judgment Date: February 3, 1960
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Justices P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, and K.C. Das Gupta
vi) Author: Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar
vii) Citation: [1960] 2 SCR 896
viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 13(3)(a)(iii) and Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949

• Section 15(5) as inserted by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956
  ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None
  x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Rent Control Law, Property Law, Constitutional Interpretation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT
The dispute involved the eviction of a tenant by a newly purchased landlord under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. Initially, the eviction was sought on multiple grounds including arrears of rent, personal use, and proposed reconstruction. The application was filed on August 28, 1956, before the amendment to the Act came into effect. The amendment, effective from September 24, 1956, significantly narrowed the scope of eviction for reconstruction. A crucial question before the Supreme Court was whether the amended provision, being more stringent, would apply to an application filed before the amendment. The High Court allowed the eviction under the unamended provision after reversing concurrent findings by the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority. The appeal before the Supreme Court examined both the retrospective applicability of the amended provisions and the extent of High Court’s revisional powers under Section 15(5).

D) FACTS OF THE CASE
Suraj Bhan, the respondent, purchased a shop on June 15, 1956, located in Gurgaon, which was in occupation of Moti Ram, the appellant, for over 20 years at Rs. 20 per month. Suraj Bhan filed an eviction petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act on August 28, 1956. He alleged habitual default in rent payment, inadequate return on investment, requirement for personal use, and an intention to reconstruct the shop. He claimed to have obtained necessary sanction and approval from the Municipal Committee for the proposed reconstruction. The Rent Controller rejected all grounds, holding that the claim of reconstruction was a “camouflage”. The District Judge on appeal affirmed this finding. Suraj Bhan then filed a revision under Section 15(5) of the Act (as amended), and the Punjab High Court reversed the lower courts, allowing the eviction based on reconstruction under the unamended Section 13(3)(a)(iii). The High Court held the revision maintainable under the amended Act. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the amendment to Section 15 of the Act, introducing revisional jurisdiction to the High Court, applies to appeals decided after the amendment’s commencement date?

ii) Whether the amended Section 13(3)(a)(iii), restricting eviction for reconstruction, applies retrospectively to pending applications filed before the amendment?

iii) Whether the High Court correctly exercised its revisional powers to reverse concurrent findings of fact?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the application for eviction was filed prior to the amendment, and hence the revisional power introduced by Section 15(5) could not be invoked in his case. They asserted a vested right of finality in the appellate decision based on the law prevailing at the time of filing. They contended that finality under Section 15(4), as it stood, prohibited any revision and that such a substantive right could not be taken away retroactively. They also argued that the High Court had exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in reappreciating evidence, contrary to the scope of review allowed under Section 115 CPC. On the merits, they contended that the lower authorities had found that the landlord’s need for reconstruction was a pretext and that these factual findings should not have been disturbed in revision.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Respondent submitted that the revision was maintainable as the appellate order was passed after the amending Act came into force, and Section 15(5) was already operative. They contended that finality attaches only after a decision is passed and not before, relying on the decision in Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, [1955] 2 SCR 1117. They further argued that Section 13(3)(a)(iii), as amended, did not have retrospective effect as it affected substantive rights of the landlord. They claimed that there was no express or implied legislative intent to apply the provision retrospectively. The respondent emphasized that the plan and sanction obtained for reconstruction demonstrated his genuine and bona fide requirement.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949:
Unamended: Permitted eviction if the landlord required the premises for reconstruction.
Amended (1956): Limited eviction to cases where reconstruction was mandated by public authorities or where the building was unfit for habitation.

ii) Section 15(4) & 15(5):
Before the amendment, Section 15(4) barred revision. After amendment, Section 15(5) introduced High Court’s power of revision in interest of justice.

I) JUDGMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Supreme Court held that Section 15(5) applies to all appellate decisions passed after the amendment came into force. Finality under the earlier Section 15(4) could not be claimed before the appellate decision was rendered. Hence, the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the revision. This reasoning followed Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, [1955] 2 SCR 1117, where it was held that finality attaches post-determination, not at the time of filing.

ii) The Court further held that Section 13(3)(a)(iii), as amended, did not apply retrospectively. Since it affects the landlord’s substantive right to eviction, it operates prospectively unless expressly stated. The amendment neither states nor implies retrospective operation. Thus, the respondent’s application would be governed by the unamended law.

b. OBITER DICTA 
i) The Court observed that if the amended provision were to apply retrospectively, it would unjustly defeat all pending applications by landlords. Such a drastic consequence would require explicit legislative language. This observation reinforces the rule that statutes affecting substantive rights do not operate retrospectively unless clearly intended.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Substantive amendments will not apply to pending cases unless expressly or necessarily implied as retrospective.

• Revisional powers under Section 15(5) apply to appellate orders passed after amendment’s commencement.

• Finality of appellate orders only arises after decision is rendered, not during pendency.

• High Court may interfere with findings if lower tribunals misapplied law or acted under a wrong assumption.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The judgment harmonizes procedural flexibility with protection of substantive rights. By drawing a clear line between retrospective and prospective application of amendments, it strengthens legal certainty. The affirmation of revisional powers under Section 15(5) post-amendment ensures oversight over subordinate tribunals. However, the Court’s upholding of High Court’s factual interference may blur the line between appellate and revisional review. Nonetheless, its reliance on precedent and statutory interpretation reaffirms the judiciary’s commitment to preserving fairness and legislative intent.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i) Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, [1955] 2 SCR 1117
ii) Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] SCR 488
iii) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, (1927) ILR 9 Lah 284
iv) Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) AC 369
v) Ram Parshad Halwai v. Mukhtiar Chand, ILR 1958 Punjab 1553

b. Important Statutes Referred
i) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
ii) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956
iii) General Clauses Act, 1897
iv) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 115)