A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The decision in Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. & Anr. recalibrates trial‑stage discretion under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by restoring a summoning order that the High Court had quashed. The Supreme Court finds that the High Court slid into a “mini‑trial” by weighing affidavits and drawing merits‑based conclusions at an interlocutory stage. The Court reiterates the constitutional bench approach from Hardeep Singh that “evidence” in Section 319(1) includes examination‑in‑chief and that the threshold is stronger than mere prima facie but short of conviction. Applying this to the record, the Court stresses that the respondent though not charge‑sheeted—was named in the FIR, was consistently identified by three alleged eyewitnesses, and was assigned a specific role present at the scene, armed with a stick/baton. This, the Court holds, supplies the necessary cogent material to summon him for joint trial with co‑accused already on the anvil. The judgment extracts the statute, recaps controlling precedents (Hardeep Singh, Labhuji Amratji Thakor, Ramesh Chandra Srivastava, S. Mohammed Ispahani, Omi, Brijendra Singh), and distills working principles for trial courts on Section 319. The Court emphasizes restraint but makes clear that where trial evidence discloses complicity, the power becomes obligatory. Summons are therefore restored; parties are directed to cooperate, and the trial is expedited.

Keywords: Section 319 CrPC; Mini‑trial standard; Examination‑in‑chief as evidence; Non‑charge‑sheeted accused named in FIR; Common intention; Stick/baton as weapon; Threshold more than prima facie.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal is anchored in the narrow yet recurring zone of Section 319 CrPC, which enables a criminal court to proceed against any person not being the accused if it appears from evidence during inquiry or trial that such person has committed an offence which could be tried with the accused already before the court. The Supreme Court painstakingly reproduces Section 319 and parses its design: an enabling power, animated by the maxim judex damnatur cum nocens absolviture, and yoked to the duty to ensure that the real culprit does not escape. The Court underlines that while the power must be exercised with utmost caution—never casually or as a device to harass—it is nonetheless part of the architecture of a fair trial, to be deployed when cogent material emerges at trial. The constitutional bench in Hardeep Singh is the compass: examination‑in‑chief is “evidence” for the purposes of Section 319; a mini‑trial is forbidden; and the measure of satisfaction lies between prima facie and guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These controlling strands frame the controversy. The High Court had quashed the trial court’s summoning order against a non‑charge‑sheeted respondent by relying on affidavits before the Superintendent of Police, by reading omissions on motive, common intention, and sequence of events as fatal, and by stating that the injured eyewitness did not name the respondent. The Supreme Court holds these premises to be flawed. It notes that the respondent was named in the FIR, that three alleged eyewitnesses assigned him a specific role—armed with a stick/baton—and that the High Court misapplied a final‑trial standard at an interlocutory stage. The Court therefore restores the summons and lays down distilled principles for future guidance.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Two connected FIRs were registered regarding an incident on 29 November 2017. In the first, the appellant‑complainant (Shiv Baran) alleged that four persons—Rahul, Dinesh, Rajendra, and Shiv Moorat—entered his house with sticks, batons and axes, abused the family, assaulted his brother, who later succumbed to injuries, and injured others. Investigation followed. The Investigating Officer concluded that Rajendra Prasad had no role in the alleged crime and filed a chargesheet (24 February 2018) only against Dinesh Yadav and Shiv Murat Yadav for offences under Sections 302, 307, 504, 506 read with Section 34 IPC. During trial in Sessions Trial No. 109/2018, the depositions of PW‑1 Shiv Baran Yadav, PW‑2 Raj Baran, and PW‑3 Subhash Yadav attributed a role to Rajendra Prasad Yadav. The complainant moved an application under Section 319 CrPC to add Rajendra as co‑accused. This application was initially rejected on 31 January 2022; upon remand by the High Court, it was allowed by the trial court on 28 September 2023. The respondent then filed a revision, and the High Court set aside the summoning order on the reasoning that PW‑1 had not ascribed any role; PWs 2 and 3 did not implicate him with specificity about manner/description; there was no motive; and that, absent strong motive evidence, one cannot be summoned. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court extracts the FIR naming Rajendra and reproduces PW‑1’s statements (including an initial reference to “Rajesh”—later clarified as “Rajendra”), and notes both PW‑2 and PW‑3 spoke to Rajendra being present with a stick and participating in the assault. On this body of trial evidence, the Court addresses the Section 319 threshold and the High Court’s approach.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether evidence in examination‑in‑chief during trial suffices under Section 319(1) CrPC to summon a person not charge‑sheeted but named in the FIR, or whether courts must wait for cross‑examination. ii. Whether the High Court erred by treating affidavits before the Superintendent of Police and the asserted absence of motive/common intention/sequence clarity as grounds to quash a Section 319 summons. iii. What is the threshold of satisfaction under Section 319 CrPC—“more than prima facie but short of conviction”—and how should it be applied to PW‑1, PW‑2, PW‑3 depositions that assign a specific role (stick/baton) to the proposed accused. iv. Whether a person dropped from the chargesheet but named in the FIR can be summoned during trial upon emergence of strong and cogent evidence in court testimony. v. Whether the trial court’s order, tested against Hardeep Singh; Labhuji Amratji Thakor; Ramesh Chandra Srivastava; S. Mohammed Ispahani; Omi; Brijendra Singh, met the principled constraints on invoking Section 319.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant urged that Section 319 is squarely engaged because the trial evidence (not merely the case diary or Section 161 CrPC statements) demonstrates the complicity of Rajendra Prasad. They relied on the FIR that names Rajendra with others as assailants carrying sticks, batons and axes, and on PW‑1’s two statements and the corroboration by PW‑2 and PW‑3, each assigning Rajendra the specific role of being present with a stick/baton and participating in the assault that culminated in homicidal death and injuries. They emphasized the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh—that examination‑in‑chief is “evidence” and that courts must not conduct a mini‑trial at this stage. Thus, once strong and cogent trial evidence surfaces, the trial court has jurisdiction—indeed, a duty—to summon. The appellant urged that Labhuji Amratji Thakor clarifies the threshold: more than prima facie yet below proof leading to conviction; Ramesh Chandra Srivastava reiterates that strong and cogent material is needed; S. Mohammed Ispahani affirms that persons named in the FIR but not charge‑sheeted may still be summoned upon trial evidence; Omi synthesizes the principles, cautioning courts against placing determinative weight on investigating officer satisfaction or charge‑sheet columns. On this footing, quashing by the High Court—based on affidavits before the SP and on perceived gaps in motive or sequence—was said to be a misdirection contrary to Hardeep Singh’s ban on mini‑trials. The appellant stressed that Section 319 uses “could be tried” and not “could be convicted”, and that sub‑section (4) protects the added accused by fresh proceedings and re‑hearing of witnesses.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent contended, as recorded in the High Court’s order and addressed by the Supreme Court, that the trial court overreached Section 319 by summoning Rajendra in the absence of specific, consistent, and credible implicatory material. They argued that PW‑1 did not ascribe a role and that PWs 2 and 3 failed to describe the manner or sequence of occurrence with the precision required to summon; they further insisted that there was no evidence of motive, and that without a strong motive a person cannot be summoned as accused. They pointed to the investigating officer’s conclusion dropping Rajendra from the chargesheet, and to affidavits before the Superintendent of Police attesting to his innocence. These features, in their submission, demonstrated that the threshold under Section 319—as articulated in Hardeep Singh and Labhuji—was not crossed. The quashing of summons by the High Court, they urged, correctly guarded against abuse of process and against subjecting a citizen to a fresh trial in the absence of cogent trial evidence. They read Brijendra Singh as counseling scrutiny where the so‑called “evidence” at trial merely reproduces Section 161 narratives; they submitted that the addition of an accused must not be routine. While Omi recognizes the court’s power, they argued it does not license post‑investigation substitution of the police’s judgement without robust in‑court evidence. The respondent’s stance, as summarized and then rejected by the Supreme Court, thus turned on lack of motive, vagueness of roles, and investigative exoneration.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

The controlling text is Section 319 CrPC, verbatim reproduced by the Court, which authorizes the court—upon evidence adduced in the inquiry or trial—to proceed against any person not being the accused for any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. Sub‑sections (2) and (3) permit summons/arrest or detention for trial purposes; sub‑section (4) mandates that proceedings commence afresh and that witnesses be re‑heard, thereby protecting the added accused’s fair‑trial rights. The underlying doctrinal purpose is summed through the maxim judex damnatur cum nocens absolviture, anchoring the duty not to let the guilty escape, yet cabined by caution to avoid harassment. On standard, the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh clarifies that examination‑in‑chief is evidence; the court need not wait for cross‑examination; and the law eschews any mini‑trial at this stage. Labhuji Amratji Thakor calibrates the threshold: more than prima facie but less than satisfaction for conviction. Ramesh Chandra Srivastava reiterates the need for strong and cogent evidence. S. Mohammed Ispahani affirms the power to summon persons named in the FIR but not charge‑sheeted once trial evidence surfaces. Omi collects the principles and cautions against deferring to the investigating officer’s satisfaction as determinative. Brijendra Singh reminds that trial courts should hew to trial evidence in court and be alive to its quality when it mirrors Section 161 statements.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court allows the appeal, sets aside the High Court’s 23 July 2024 order of quashment, and restores the summoning order dated 28 September 2023. It first marks the statutory requisites for summoning under Section 319: (a) commission of an offence by the proposed accused; (b) complicity revealed from trial/inquiry evidence; and (c) that the person could be tried together with the accused already facing trial. It then crystallizes operational principles: Section 319 protects victims and society; the trial court’s power is broad but not unbridled; it must act only on evidence adduced before it, not on investigation‑stage material; it is not powerless to summon an individual not named in FIR or chargesheet if evidence adduced inculpates him; the power is to be used sparingly when strong/cogent evidence exists; the standard of satisfaction is stricter than that at framing of charge; and courts must avoid a mini‑trial. Applying these to the record, the Court reproduces the FIR that explicitly names Rajendra, cites PW‑1’s statements (with a clarification that “Rajesh” and “Rajendra” refer to the same person), and notes that PW‑2 and PW‑3 consistently place Rajendra at the scene, armed with a stick, participating in the assault that caused death and injuries. The Supreme Court holds that the High Court erred by relying on affidavits to the SP and by insisting on motive/sequence/common intention proof at a Section 319 stage, thereby applying a final‑trial yardstick. The Court reiterates that, given this trial evidence, summoning was warranted; questions about motive, aggressor, or sequence are to be resolved at final adjudication. Directions follow for appearance on 28 August 2025 and for expeditious conclusion of the trial within 18 months.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The core ratio is twofold. First, the meaning of “evidence” in Section 319(1) CrPC embraces examination‑in‑chief; the court need not await cross‑examination to act. This flows directly from Hardeep Singh, which the Supreme Court quotes: once examination‑in‑chief is recorded, the statement is part of the record; it is evidence (albeit rebuttable), and, if it prima facie necessitates bringing another person to face trial, the court can summon them, avoiding a mini‑trial and relying on Section 319(4)’s protections. Second, the degree of satisfaction is more than prima facie but short of conviction, as clarified in Labhuji Amratji Thakor and reiterated in Ramesh Chandra Srivastava. On the facts, three alleged eyewitnesses—PW‑1, PW‑2, PW‑3—consistently name Rajendra and ascribe to him a specific role—armed with a stick/baton, present and participating. That he was not charge‑sheeted is not a legal impediment; S. Mohammed Ispahani confirms that persons dropped during investigation may yet be summoned if trial evidence surfaces; Omi further instructs that the trial court must look only at evidence adduced before it and not treat the investigating officer’s satisfaction as dispositive. Hence, the High Court’s quashment—premised on affidavits before the SP and the perceived absence of motive/common intention/sequence—amounted to an impermissible mini‑trial and a misapplication of the standard. The ratio thus restores the trial court’s summons on the strength of in‑court evidence.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court uses the occasion to reiterate the protective architecture within Section 319 as part of a victim‑protection and societal‑interest framework. It reminds trial courts that the power is to be exercised with utmost caution, not casually, callously, or cavalierly, for it must never be a tool to harass an individual or to abuse process. Yet, when trial evidence discloses complicity, courts should not be hesitant; the provision is an instrumentality of a fair trial, intended to prevent the guilty from evading accountability. The Court also delineates the statutory requisites and principles as a structured checklist for trial courts: focus on evidence adduced before the court; avoid reliance on case diary/charge‑sheet material; appreciate that the expression is “could be tried” and not “should be tried”; and respect that questions of motive, aggressor, and sequence typically belong to final adjudication. While these observations are embedded in the holding, their generality furnishes forward‑looking guidance to trial courts managing Section 319 motions in multi‑accused prosecutions with non‑charge‑sheeted persons named in FIRs. These dicta supply a corrective to a trend of premature merits‑weighing, especially where affidavits or investigative opinions risk displacing trial testimony for the limited purpose of summoning decisions.

c. GUIDELINES 

The judgment crystallizes functional guidelines for Section 319 practice. First, trial courts should verify three requisites: that the proposed person appears, from trial/inquiry evidence, to have committed an offence; that such complicity is revealed by in‑court evidence; and that the person could be tried together with the existing accused. Second, trial courts must confine themselves to evidence adduced before them, not to the case diary or the chargesheet’s columnar choices, and must not let the investigating officer’s satisfaction control the judicial inquiry. Third, courts should apply the threshold carefully: something stronger than prima facie but short of conviction, mindful that examination‑in‑chief is sufficient “evidence” to act; cross‑examination need not be awaited. Fourth, courts are warned to avoid a mini‑trial; they should not require demonstration of motive, airtight sequence of events, or resolution of aggressor questions at this stage; such matters are for final adjudication. Fifth, when a person is named in the FIR but dropped in the chargesheet, courts remain empowered to summon upon trial evidence surfacing; the presence of Section 319(4) assures a fresh commencement and re‑hearing of witnesses, preserving fairness to the added accused. Sixth, the power must be used sparingly, never as a device for harassment, but it becomes obligatory to exercise where cogent trial evidence points to complicity. These steps align with Hardeep Singh, Labhuji Amratji Thakor, Ramesh Chandra Srivastava, S. Mohammed Ispahani, Omi, and Brijendra Singh.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision ties doctrinal clarity to practical rigor. It reinforces that Section 319 CrPC is a fair‑trial instrument serving the victim’s and society’s interest that the “real culprit” not slip past the dock, yet emphasizes judicial restraint to prevent abuse. The Court’s application is methodical: it does not presume guilt; it merely finds sufficient trial evidence to warrant summoning. The FIR naming Rajendra, PW‑1’s depositions (with identity clarification), and corroboration by PW‑2 and PW‑3 together meet the “more than prima facie” threshold without converting the proceeding into a mini‑trial. The High Court’s reliance on affidavits before the SP and its insistence on motive/sequence/common intention at this interlocutory stage misapplied Hardeep Singh and Labhuji. The renewed emphasis that the phrase is “could be tried,” not “could be convicted,” matters; it delineates the limited horizon of the court’s inquiry at the Section 319 stage. The directions for appearance and an expedited timeline remind all stakeholders that summoning should not morph into a tool for delay or attrition. For trial courts, the judgment functions as a bench‑book page: use trial evidence; avoid mini‑trials; deploy the power sparingly yet firmly where the record warrants; and always preserve fair‑trial safeguards under Section 319(4). The restored summons returns the case to its proper procedural track.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, [2014] 2 SCR 1; (2014) 3 SCC 92. Quoted on examination‑in‑chief as “evidence” and on the no mini‑trial mandate; also on “could be tried.”

ii. Labhuji Amratji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, [2018] 13 SCR 822; (2019) 12 SCC 644. Threshold more than prima facie but short of conviction.

iii. Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2021) 12 SCC 608. Reiterates strong and cogent evidence standard under Section 319.

iv. S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak, (2017) 16 SCC 226. Affirms summoning of person named in FIR but not charge‑sheeted upon trial evidence.

v. Omi v. State of M.P., (2025) 2 SCC 621. Summarizes principles; cautions against relying on investigation records rather than trial evidence.

vi. Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706. Notes relationship between trial evidence and Section 161 CrPC statements.

vii. Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. & Anr., [2025] 8 S.C.R. 229; 2025 INSC 860. Case under analysis; restores Section 319 summons and frames principles.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 319 (full text reproduced; sub‑sections (1)–(4)).

ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 302, 307, 504, 506, with Section 34 (as invoked in the chargesheet); Sections 452, 323, 325 (as per second FIR context).