A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v. Union of India & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 4229 of 2024, decided 8 January 2025 by M.M. Sundresh & Aravind Kumar, JJ., addresses the long-running failure of courts and executive authorities to apply juvenile-justice protections when a person accused of a 1994 homicide repeatedly asserted juvenility. The appellant originally gave inconsistent statements about age (a 2001 statement recording age as 20), was tried and sentenced (including death sentence later commuted), but subsequently after ossification testing conducted under later rules medical opinion indicated he was about 14 at the time of the offence.

This Court held that the procedural safeguards and the substantive protective scheme embodied in Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015 must be given full effect even after final disposal when the statutory procedure mandated for adjudication of juvenility has not been followed; courts must actively seek truth and cannot allow judicial mistakes to prejudice a person (principle actus curiae neminem gravabit).

The conviction was left intact but the sentence insofar as it exceeded the maximum under the juvenile regime was set aside and the appellant ordered released if not otherwise held; directions were given for state rehabilitation assistance. 

Keywords: plea of juvenility; Section 9(2) JJ Act 2015; ossification test; hierarchy of documents; actus curiae neminem gravabit; Article 72/161; judicial review; parens patriae.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal concerns entrenched institutional failures to respect the statutory and constitutional mandate to treat children in conflict with law as persons deserving special protection and procedure. The appellant was accused of culpable homicide (1994); over the decades he litigated through trial, appeals, review, curative petitions, mercy petitions to the Governor and President. At multiple stages the question of his age was handled inconsistently: a statement in 2001 recorded age as 20, he later orally claimed to be about 17 at sentencing, and after ossification testing pursuant to rules that post-dated the offence the medical certificate placed his age at around 14 at the time of the incident.

The President commuted the death sentence to life with a condition to remain until 60 years old; the High Court dismissed a writ petition seeking relief under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act on finality and limited judicial review grounds. This Court reviewed whether the procedural safeguards (statutory inquiry into juvenility, hierarchy of documents under Rule 12(3)) were followed, whether judicial/administrative acts should operate as bar when the statutory procedure was not invoked, and whether the constitutional courts retain a duty to ensure the remedial object of social-welfare statutes is realized.

The Court emphasised the teleology of juvenile law, the parens patriae role of courts, and the necessity of active judicial enquiry to ascertain truth rather than permitting past procedural lapses to negate statutory protection.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The factual matrix spans 1994–2025. The offence occurred in 1994; the appellant was tried and ultimately convicted for culpable homicide amounting to murder and initially sentenced to death. In 2001 the appellant’s recorded statement noted his age as 20 years. At sentencing he orally claimed juvenility (stated then as about 17). Courts relied on the earlier statements (including a reference to a bank account) to treat him as major; appellate and review processes upheld conviction and sentence. Mercy petitions to the Governor and President followed; while pending, Rule 12 (2007) and the 2015 Act came into force and an ossification (medical age) test was carried out; the medical certificate indicated age of around 14 at the time of commission of the offence.

The President commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment but added a non-release condition until sixty years. Subsequent curative and writ proceedings failed to secure relief; the High Court dismissed a writ under Article 226 holding proceedings had attained finality and executive exercise under Article 72 left limited scope for judicial review. The appellant persisted in raising juvenility at several stages; yet statutory procedure for age determination under JJ law was not followed properly at critical points. This Court found those procedural lapses, the failure to follow the hierarchy of documents, and dismissal of curative petitions without reason amounted to grave injustice.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a plea of juvenility under Section 9(2) of the JJ Act, 2015 can be entertained and adjudicated even after final disposal of criminal proceedings and executive clemency orders?
ii. What is the procedural obligation of courts under Section 9(2) and Rule 12(3) in determining age and the hierarchy of admissible documents?
iii. Whether prior judicial or executive action (including President’s commutation under Article 72) bars the constitutional courts from applying juvenile provisions where such procedure was never complied with?
iv. What relief flows when it is shown the accused was a child at the relevant time but earlier courts did not follow statutory procedure?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant contended that there was no dispute he was 14 at the time of the offence, that statutory procedure under successive juvenile laws (1986, 2000, 2015 Acts and Rule 12) was not followed, and therefore the protective regime must be applied. He argued Section 9(2) permits a claim at any stage, including after final disposal; reliance on a 2001 self-statement of age should not foreclose enquiry, particularly where later medical opinion establishes juvenility. He sought immediate release (subject to juvenile dispositional norms) and compensation for formative years lost.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State/respondents maintained that the issue had attained finality through judicial determinations and executive mercy; the President’s commutation and prior judicial findings made re-opening impermissible. They challenged the reliability of ossification testing as sole proof, stressed compliance with Rule 12(3) and submitted that reopening would unsettle finality and set undesirable precedent.

H) JUDGMENT 

The Court accepted that the appellant was only 14 at the time of the offence and found that across all stages courts and authorities either ignored or gave perfunctory attention to the age question. Emphasising truth-seeking and the teleology of social-welfare statutes, the Court held Section 9(2) embodies a substantive, continuing right to be recognized at any stage—where the statutory procedure has not been followed. The Court interpreted Rule 12(3) and Section 94(2) (2015 Act) as prescribing a document-hierarchy (matriculation/equivalent certificate; date-of-birth certificate from first school; municipal/panchayat birth certificate; only if unavailable then medical opinion).

The Court underscored that sub-rule (3) is a rule of evidence constraining reliance on medical tests where primary documentary proof exists; where no proper inquiry under earlier laws or rules took place, a fresh statutory inquiry is permissible retrospectively. The Court also held that an unequivocal admission of age is a strong evidentiary fact but must be seen contextually; an ambiguous or situational statement cannot be treated as estopping statutory protection.

The principle actus curiae neminem gravabit was applied to hold that a mistake by courts cannot prejudice the appellant; judicial and executive finality cannot be used to defeat a statutory protective right when statutory procedure was never complied with. On Article 72/161, the Court reiterated that pardon/remission is sovereign and subject to limited review for mala fide or lack of application of mind, but refusal of review of executive clemency does not extinguish an independent statutory claim under Section 9(2) for juvenility.

Remedy: conviction maintained; sentence insofar as it exceeded the juvenile upper limit set aside; appellant ordered released forthwith if not required in any other case; directions for State Legal Services Authority to identify rehabilitation/scheme assistance.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The dispositive legal reasoning is that Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act confers a continuing, enforceable right to raise juvenility at any stage and mandates an inquiry in accordance with statutory rules; where earlier courts never conducted the statutory inquiry, finality of prior proceedings (or executive clemency) does not defeat the statutory right. Rule 12(3) prescribes the documentary hierarchy and confines medical tests to cases where primary documents are unavailable; admission of age, if clear and unequivocal, is binding evidence. Courts must actively seek truth and correct institutional errors; mistakes of the judiciary should not cause prejudice to a litigant’s statutory right.

b. OBITER DICTA

Court observations stressed the parens patriae role, the social welfare teleology of juvenile law, and the moral imperative for courts to be active seekers of truth rather than passive recorders. The Bench noted the need for humane reintegration measures and urged rehabilitation as a constitutional imperative (Arts. 14, 15(3), 39(e),(f), 45, 47). The Court criticized mechanical reliance on procedural technicalities where doing so defeats protective legislation.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Section 9(2) claims must be treated as independent and adjudicable at any stage; courts should not brush aside such claims as barred by finality.

2. Apply Rule 12(3) / Section 94(2) hierarchy strictly: (i) matriculation/equivalent; (ii) school DOB; (iii) municipal/panchayat birth certificate; (iv) only then medical tests.

3. If medical tests required, conduct them under constituted Medical Board and record reasons; if documents exist, do not resort to medical opinion.

4. Where prior courts have erred in procedure, courts must correct injustice—actus curiae neminem gravabit applies when mistake is apparent.

5. Executive clemency orders are amenable to limited judicial review; however, a distinct statutory claim under JJ Act survives and must be adjudicated.

6. State Legal Services Authorities should facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration when juvenility relief is granted.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Court’s decision restores a child-protective reading of juvenile legislation and places an obligation on courts at every level to be proactive truth-seekers where juvenility is asserted. The judgment reaffirms the statutory hierarchy that limits medical tests to situations lacking primary documentary proof, warns against passive adjudication that lets procedural failures deny substantive rights, and clarifies the limited impact of executive clemency on statutory juvenility claims.

The remedy vacating sentence beyond juvenile limits while maintaining conviction strikes a balance between accountability and the special protective purpose of juvenile law; directions for rehabilitation operationalise the parens patriae and Article 21 obligations. Practitioners should ensure that a plea under Section 9(2) is promptly framed as an application invoking the statutory process, evidence sought per Rule 12(3), and courts must meticulously record reasons when choosing to rely on or repudiate admissions or medical opinion.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v. Union of India & Anr., Crim. App. No. 4229/2024 (S.C. Jan. 8, 2025).
2. Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand, (1977) 2 SCC 155.
3. Mohan Singh v. State of M.P., (1999) 2 SCC 428.
4. Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551.
5. Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 204.
6. Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1.
7. Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 17 SCC 699.
8. Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, §§ 2, 5, 6, 9(2), 94(2).
2. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, r.12(3).
3. Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, § 7A, § 20.
4. Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 15(3), 39(e),(f), 45, 47, 72, 161.