A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal challenges concurrent convictions under Sections 306 and 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 of the appellant the deceased’s brother-in-law for alleged abetment of suicide and cruelty in connection with dowry demands. The prosecution case rested on the deceased setting herself ablaze on 27 September 1990 after alleged harassment and dowry demands by her husband and in-laws; a First Information Report was lodged by her father on the same day accusing four family members. The trial court acquitted the accused for Section 304B IPC (dowry death) but convicted for Sections 306 and 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; the High Court affirmed.

Before the Supreme Court the principal question was whether the conviction of the appellant could stand in the absence of cogent evidence tying him to harassment or instigation and whether Section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872 (presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman) could be invoked. The Court held that Section 113A is not to be invoked mechanically; it requires cogent material showing cruelty or harassment by the accused. Where such evidence is absent, the Court cannot draw a presumption of abetment. Applying this principle the Supreme Court found no evidence that the appellant aided, instigated or abetted the suicide and set aside his conviction, discharging his bonds.

Keywords: Abetment to suicide; Presumption under Section 113A; Dowry death vs. abetment; Cogent evidence of cruelty; 498-A IPC.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The deceased, Kusum Devi, married to Ram Sajeevan, returned to her matrimonial home on 25 September 1990. On the night of 26–27 September 1990 she doused herself with kerosene and set herself on fire, later succumbing to severe burn injuries. Her father immediately lodged a complaint alleging harassment and explicit dowry demands specifically disclosure of demands for a buffalo and a gold chain and accused four family members, including the appellant Ram Pyare (the brother-in-law). The police investigated and a chargesheet was filed initially for dowry death (Section 304B IPC) against the four accused.

At trial the court, while acquitting the accused of 304B, convicted them for abetment of suicide (Section 306 IPC) and cruelty (Section 498-A IPC) and linked Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act as well. The High Court dismissed appeals and affirmed convictions. The present appeal by the appellant focused on whether the evidence supported a finding that he had subjected the deceased to cruelty or had in any manner abetted her suicide a question tied intimately to the correctness of invoking the presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act. The Supreme Court examined the record to see if there was cogent evidence of harassment or abetment by the appellant sufficient to permit drawing the statutory presumption and sustaining criminal liability.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The contemporaneous complaint by the deceased’s father states that on 25 September 1990 the deceased was taken to her matrimonial house by her father-in-law and that within hours she was killed by burning. The complaint names Lal Bahadur (father-in-law), Ram Sajeevan (husband), Ram Pyare (appellant – brother-in-law) and Sonawati (mother-in-law) and alleges prior demands for a buffalo and a gold chain as dowry and threats that she would be killed if she did not comply. The medical fact is that the deceased died from severe burn injuries after setting herself on fire. The police registered the FIR on 27.09.1990 and proceeded to investigate.

The charge-sheet initially framed for Section 304B proceeded to trial in Sessions. At trial the court after assessing oral evidence found the ingredients of dowry death not proved but convicted the accused for abetment of suicide (Section 306) and 498-A for cruelty. The appellate record shows that the father-in-law and mother-in-law died during pendency of the appeal; the husband had already served sentence and did not appeal further. The appellant maintained that no material linked him to either harassment, instigation, aiding or abetment and there was no direct evidence of his participation in any threatening conduct leading to the suicide. The courts below relied on presumptions under Sections 113A/113B, Evidence Act in varying measure when upholding convictions.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether conviction under Section 306 IPC can be sustained against the appellant in absence of cogent evidence that he subjected the deceased to cruelty or abetted her suicide?
ii. Whether Section 113A, Evidence Act may be invoked to draw presumption of abetment of suicide against a husband’s relative where the statutory pre-conditions (cruelty within seven years, etc.) are not established by cogent proof?
iii. Whether presumption under Section 113B (dowry death) differs in effect and mandate from Section 113A, and what consequences flow for proof and conviction?
iv. Whether acquittal under Section 304B IPC is consistent with conviction under Section 306 IPC against the same accused in the absence of direct evidence?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsel for the appellant submitted that no direct or circumstantial evidence implicates the appellant in harassment, instigation, aiding or abetting the deceased’s suicide.
ii. The trial and High Court erred in drawing presumptions under Section 113A without first establishing cogent evidence of cruelty or harassment attributable to the appellant.
iii. The appellant’s presence in the household or mere membership of the in-laws’ family cannot substitute for proof of mens rea or overt acts necessary to sustain Section 306 culpability.
iv. Reliance on the FIR alone and on generalized allegations of dowry demand does not satisfy the statutory threshold for presumption of abetment.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsel for the State submitted that the totality of the prosecution material, including the FIR and surrounding circumstances, established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and dowry demands by the family and that once cruelty is shown the statutory presumption in Section 113A could be drawn against relatives.
ii. The State argued that the accused being members of the matrimonial household bore responsibility and that the court may, having regard to all circumstances, infer abetment.
iii. The respondent relied on the consistency of trial findings and the High Court’s assessment of evidence to justify the conviction.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court examined oral testimony, the FIR, and the legal framework governing presumptions. A central analytical strand was the distinction between Section 113A and Section 113B, Evidence Act: Section 113B mandates that the Court shall presume dowry death when the statutory facts are proved, whereas Section 113A states that the Court may presume abetment of suicide if it is shown the woman committed suicide within seven years of marriage and that her husband or relative subjected her to cruelty.

The Court emphasised that invocation of Section 113A presupposes reliable evidence of cruelty or harassment attributable to the accused the provision cannot be used as a substitute for evidence. On the facts the Court found no cogent material that the appellant (brother-in-law) had engaged in acts of cruelty, made dowry threats, aided or instigated the self-immolation. Mere occurrence of suicide and an FIR naming family members did not supply the necessary evidentiary foundation for presumption. Given the absence of direct or strong circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the conduct alleged,the Court concluded that conviction under Section 306 IPC could not stand.

The judgment set aside the appellant’s conviction and discharged his bail bonds. The Court also noted the different burdens and the mandatory nature of the presumption under Section 113B as against the discretionary presumption under Section 113A, reinforcing that neither presumption can displace the requirement for cogent supporting evidence when the statutory threshold is not met.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is that Section 113A, Evidence Act cannot be mechanically invoked unless there exists cogent evidence demonstrating that the husband or his relative subjected the woman to cruelty or harassment. Where such material is absent, courts must not presume abetment of suicide merely because a married woman committed suicide within seven years of marriage. The presence of an FIR or general allegations, without corroborative testimony or circumstances that reasonably infer the accused’s participation in cruelty or instigation, is inadequate to sustain conviction under Section 306 IPC. Thus, presumption is conditional and subordinate to evidentiary proof.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed in obiter that Section 113B is stronger in language it creates a mandatory presumption upon proof of certain facts and that distinction underscores the legislature’s intent to treat dowry death presumptions more robustly. However, even mandatory presumptions cannot absolve courts from examining whether foundational facts have been properly established. The Court stressed careful judicial application of statutory presumptions to avoid injustice by imputing criminal culpability without adequate evidence.

c. GUIDELINES

i. A court must first look for cogent and admissible evidence of cruelty or harassment attributable specifically to the accused before invoking Section 113A.
ii. An FIR or untested allegation alone cannot substitute for proof of cruelty; corroborative testimony or reliable circumstances are necessary.
iii. Distinguish between the mandatory presumption in Section 113B (dowry death) and the discretionary presumption in Section 113A (abetment of suicide), and apply each strictly within its statutory bounds.
iv. Conviction for abetment of suicide requires proof of abetment by acts or omissions; mere membership of the matrimonial household is insufficient.
v. Trial and appellate courts must articulate the material facts that satisfy the statutory preconditions before drawing legal presumptions.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces the evidentiary discipline required when statutory presumptions are relied upon in offences connected to domestic cruelty and dowry. It protects accused persons against conviction based solely on inferences from the tragic fact of a married woman’s suicide; it simultaneously preserves the presumption mechanism where properly triggered by cogent and admissible evidence. For prosecutors, the decision signals the necessity to gather decisive material that links individual accused persons to cruelty or instigation rather than relying on household membership or generalized allegations.

For courts, the decision is a reminder to distinctly identify the evidential foundation for invoking presumptions and to avoid conflating Section 113A with the more coercive Section 113B. The ruling thus calibrates the balance between protecting vulnerable victims of dowry-related harassment and ensuring that criminal liability is not imposed in the absence of legally sufficient proof.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Ram Pyarey v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015 (Supreme Court of India, 9 January 2025) [2025] 1 S.C.R. 484 : 2025 INSC 71.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 304B, 306, 498-A).
ii. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Section 4).
iii. Evidence Act, 1872 (Sections 113A, 113B).
iv. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 209).