A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal concerns whether the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 which reduced the period for claiming refund of stamp duty on a registered cancellation deed from two years to six months (counted from date of registration) could be applied to bar a refund claim where the cancellation deed was executed on 17.03.2015 but registered only on 28.04.2015 (post-amendment). The appellants had paid ₹27,34,500 stamp duty under an Agreement to Sell (registered 18.09.2014), executed a cancellation on grounds of delay and developer default, applied for refund on 06.08.2016, and obtained an initial sanction from the CCRA (08.01.2018).

The CCRA later recalled that order and rejected the refund as time-barred; successive statutory and writ proceedings followed, culminating in the High Court dismissing the writ petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the cause of action to claim a refund accrued on the date of valid execution of the cancellation deed (17.03.2015), so the appellants fell within the unamended two-year window and could not be defeated by a later curtailment of limitation. The Court further held that the CCRA had no statutory power to review/recall its earlier final order granting refund and therefore its recall-orders were invalid. Direction was given to refund the amount with simple interest at 6% p.a. from 08.01.2018 until payment, with higher punitive interest for further delay.

Keywords: Section 48(1) Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958; refund of stamp duty; accrued cause of action; limitation amendment; registration v. execution; CCRA review power; M.P. Steel Corporation; Bano Saiyed Parwaz.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The dispute arises where an instrument a registered cancellation deed sits astride two different statutory regimes due to timing of execution and timing of registration. The legislative amendment of 24.04.2015 truncated a two-year remedial window to a six-month window measured from registration, thereby engaging classic rules on whether amendments that shorten limitation operate against already-accrued causes of action. The appellants entered into an Agreement to Sell (30.08.2014), paid stamp duty and registered the agreement; due to the developer’s admitted delay and inability to deliver possession they executed a cancellation deed (17.03.2015) but the deed was registered after the amendment (28.04.2015).

The administrative route produced a grant of refund by the CCRA which was thereafter recalled, producing litigation that posed two core legal questions:

(i) does a limitation curtailment (post-execution but pre-registration) apply to a right which had already crystallised on execution; and

(ii) can the CCRA exercise a statutory review power to recall its final order when no express power exists.

The Supreme Court’s analysis navigates settled principles that limitation provisions are generally procedural but cannot be applied to snuff out vested rights when an amendment shortens the previously available period, and reiterates limits on quasi-judicial functions a statutory body can exercise only powers conferred by statute. The Court applied precedents on accrued causes of action and the equities of stamp refund jurisprudence to restore the appellants’ refund and direct interest.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants executed an Agreement to Sell on 30.08.2014 for a Mumbai flat (consideration ₹5.46 crores) and paid ₹27,34,500 as stamp duty; the Agreement was registered 18.09.2014. The developer thereafter communicated delays (05.11.2014) in handing possession originally promised for 31.03.2017, and offered alternatives; the appellants chose cancellation and executed a Cancellation Deed on 17.03.2015. That deed was registered on 28.04.2015. A Deed of Rectification was executed on 23.05.2016 to clarify refund particulars. Meanwhile the Maharashtra legislature, on 24.04.2015, amended Section 48(1) to reduce refund limitation to six months from registration.

The appellants sought refund on 06.08.2016. The CCRA initially allowed refund (08.01.2018) but later recalled that grant and rejected the claim (03.03.2018). Procedural appeals and writs proceeded; the Bombay High Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition (18.04.2024), treating registration date as determinative. On appeal to the Supreme Court the core contention was that the right to claim accrued on execution (17.03.2015) within the unamended two-year period and that the CCRA lacked power to review/recall its original order.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) (reducing refund period to six months from registration) applies to a cancellation deed executed prior to the amendment but registered after; i.e., did the appellants’ right to claim refund accrue on execution or only on registration?

2. Whether an administrative/quasi-judicial authority such as the CCRA has statutory power to review or recall its own final order in the absence of express provision under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958?

3. Whether technical delay in registration or in administrative processing should defeat a bona fide refund claim where the underlying transaction was rescinded for developer default?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for appellants submitted that the cause of action to claim refund accrued on the date of valid execution of the Cancellation Deed (17.03.2015), relying on Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 (operation of registered documents from the time they would have commenced to operate) and established principles that a curtailment of limitation cannot oust a vested remedy. They argued the legislature’s curtailment effected on 24.04.2015 cannot be applied retrospectively to render their accrued right time-barred, and that equitable considerations weigh in favour of refund because the cancellation arose from developer’s defaults. Further, they contended that once the CCRA had passed a final order allowing refund (08.01.2018), it lacked power to reopen or recall that order in the absence of an express statutory review power under the Act.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for respondents contended that the text of Section 48(1), as amended, measures limitation from the date of registration of a cancellation deed and that registration occurred on 28.04.2015 after amendment thereby attracting the truncated six-month window; hence the refund application filed in 2016 was time-barred. They maintained that administrative authorities may revisit prior orders where procedural lapses or wider fiscal concerns arise, and reliance was placed upon the High Court’s view that registration date is determinative in the statutory matrix.

H) JUDGMENT

The Court accepted the appellants’ position. Emphasising legal principle, the Court observed that limitation provisions are generally procedural but an amendment that shortens limitation cannot be applied to extinguish a vested right in respect of a cause of action which accrued prior to amendment a principle grounded in M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise and earlier precedents such as New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra. The Court analysed Section 48(1)’s proviso and held that the right to claim refund crystallised on execution of the cancellation deed because the deed was validly executed pre-amendment; registration, in that circumstance, did not operate to create a new accrual date to the detriment of the claimants.

The Court also relied on equitable considerations and revenue jurisprudence (notably Bano Saiyed Parwaz and Libra Buildtech decisions) stressing that the State should not rely on technicalities where the citizen’s case is just. On the CCRA’s recall, the Court held a quasi-judicial authority can exercise only powers conferred by statute; absent an express review power in the Act, the CCRA’s purported recall of its own final order was ultra vires and void. Consequently the CCRA’s order of 08.01.2018 allowing refund was restored, subsequent recall orders quashed, and refund directed with simple interest @ 6% p.a. from 08.01.2018 until payment (with 12% p.a. for further delay). The High Court’s focus on registration date was reversed as a misapplication of accrual principles.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold:

(i) where a statutory amendment reduces the period of limitation, that shorter period cannot be applied to bar an accrued cause of action which crystallised before the amendment; therefore a cancellation deed executed before the amendment attracts the unamended (two-year) period even if registration is subsequent; and

(ii) a statutory/quasi-judicial body such as the CCRA cannot recall its own final order in the absence of express statutory power to review jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or participation. The Court anchored these holdings on authorities that preserve vested causes of action from retroactive curtailment of remedial windows and fundamentals of administrative law restricting powers to those conferred by statute.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed, by way of obiter, that fiscal tribunals and revenue authorities should avoid relying on technicalities where the citizen acts in good faith and where the State has no merit beyond limitation; this salutary principle of equitable administration was endorsed by citing Firm Kaluram Sitaram and subsequent stamp refund jurisprudence. The Court also noted that mere procedural errors or participatory conduct by a litigant cannot validate an otherwise non-existent statutory power of review. These remarks guide administration of revenue statutes and reinforce fairness in refund claims.

c. GUIDELINES

1. When a statute changing limitation shortens the remedial period, authorities and courts must determine the date of accrual of the cause of action; if accrual pre-dates amendment, the pre-amendment period governs.

2. Registration of a deed does not automatically shift accrual if the underlying operative act (execution) predates amendment; Section 47, Registration Act may support retrospective operation of registered instruments but cannot be used to defeat vested rights.

3. Quasi-judicial revenue authorities must not exercise review powers unless expressly conferred; where an authority has granted relief through a final order, it cannot unilaterally recall that order in absence of statutory locus.

4. Administrative bodies should apply principles of equity in stamp refund matters and avoid rejecting bona fide claims on purely technical limitation grounds where injustice would follow.

5. Where a refund is finally allowed but retained by the State due to invalid recall, courts should order refund with appropriate interest to compensate the citizen.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision realigns stamp refund law with settled accrual and limitation principles: procedural amendments reducing limitations must yield where they would extinguish vested remedies that accrued earlier. The Court’s insistence that the execution date governs accrual (in the circumstances of this case) protects the substantive remedial right of purchasers who acted in good faith and were compelled to rescind due to developer default. The ruling also curbs administrative overreach by emphasizing that quasi-judicial authorities cannot assume review jurisdiction in the absence of statutory mandate; this reinforces rule-of-law constraints on fiscal administration.

For practitioners, the judgment is a significant authority to resist post-factum curtailments of remedy, to invoke accrual-date analysis in limitation disputes, and to challenge unlawful recalls by revenue bodies. The interest award and directions for prompt disbursal underscore the Court’s remedial disposition to ensure effective relief where an administrative error has caused prolonged detention of taxpayer funds.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 934 : 2025 INSC 104.

2. M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 S.C.C. 58; [2015] 7 S.C.R. 291.

3. Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Inspector General of Registration & Controller of Stamps, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 979; [2024] 5 S.C.R. 730.

4. New India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 S.C.C. 840 : (1976) 2 S.C.R. 266.

5. Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (1991) 4 S.C.C. 333.

6. Union of India v. Harnam Singh, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 162.

7. Libra Buildtech / Committee–GFIL (referenced in judgment — see official report cited in the judgment).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 — Section 48(1) (pre- and post-amendment wording).

2. Registration Act, 1908 — Section 47.

3. Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 30(a) (principle on shorter periods).