A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. v. GRSE Limited Workmens Union & Ors., decided by the Supreme Court on 25 February 2025, addresses a narrow but constitutionally significant question: whether adjudication by a bench of the High Court which was not allocated the matter by the Chief Justice (the master of the roster) can validly exercise jurisdiction in respect of writ petitions and intra-court appeals under the Letters Patent.

The Court examined the Appellate Side Rules of the High Court at Calcutta, 1966 particularly r.26 and the Letters Patent clause 15, and underscored the primacy of the Chief Justice’s roster allocation. On the facts, a Single Judge had de-listed a writ petition pending a reference in this Court; despite that, a Division Bench (by consent of parties and subsequent placement of records before it) heard and finally decided the writ petition and intra-court appeal.

The Supreme Court held that “consent does not confer jurisdiction”, reiterated the settled principle that the Chief Justice’s roster and determinations are final and binding on companion judges, and declared adjudications made beyond allocation to be void and a nullity. The impugned Division Bench order was set aside and the matter remanded to the High Court for re-assignment to an appropriate bench by the Chief Justice.

Key holdings reaffirm judicial discipline on roster allocations, limit intra-court interventions where no authorized bench exists, and emphasize that parties’ consent cannot cure jurisdictional defects.

Keywords: Intra-court appeal; Letters Patent; Roster; Chief Justice (master of roster); Consent does not confer jurisdiction; Appellate Side Rules (r.26); Delisting; Compassionate appointment.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arises from a Division Bench order of the Calcutta High Court which, in the course of an intra-court appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, heard and finally disposed of a writ petition concerning compassionate appointments. The history important for present analysis begins with a Single Judge who, on 21 February 2022, de-listed the writ petition pending the outcome of a reference pending in the Supreme Court on a related legal issue; the Single Judge recorded liberty to mention after the reference is answered.

Despite indications that the legal position on compassionate appointment policy had been settled by prior three-Judge decisions, the Single Judge refrained from delivering final adjudication and instead delisted the matter awaiting clearance. The intra-court appeal was thereafter placed before a Division Bench which on the parties’ suggestion and with apparent consent from counsel for the appellant agreed to take up and adjudicate the writ petition. Records were placed before that Division Bench which proceeded, after hearing, to allow the writ and direct large-scale appointments.

The Supreme Court was confronted not with the substantive merits of compassionate appointment but with a foundational procedural and jurisdictional question: whether a Division Bench could hear and decide a matter not allocated to it by the Chief Justice and, relatedly, whether party consent or an intra-court arrangement could validate such jurisdictional gaps. The Court focused on r.26 of the Appellate Side Rules and authoritative precedents affirming the Chief Justice’s role as primus inter pares and master of the roster, and resolved the appeal on jurisdictional grounds without entering merits.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The material facts, as recounted in the judgment, are succinct. A group of writ petitioners challenged GRSE Ltd.’s refusal to offer compassionate appointment following service-related claims. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court by order dated 21 February 2022 de-listed the writ petition pending the outcome of a reference before the Supreme Court (arising from State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari), granting liberty to mention after that reference is decided.

The Single Judge’s order cited the three-Judge decision in N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka but nonetheless opted to await the pending reference. Thereupon an intra-court appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was filed before a Division Bench. On 11 March 2024, the predecessor Division Bench recorded a determination on its cause-list (stating it had Appeal From order relating to Service (Group VI) including Applications connected thereto), and counsel including senior counsel for GRSE Ltd. consented to the Division Bench disposing of the writ petition.

The Division Bench received the records and subsequently, after hearing, allowed the writ petition on 4 September 2024, directing appointment of 48 out of 51 petitioners. The appellant challenged this adjudication before the Supreme Court contending that the Division Bench lacked jurisdiction because the Chief Justice had not allocated the matter to that bench, and that party consent could not confer jurisdiction. The Supreme Court confined itself to the roster/allocation question and remanded the matter for proper assignment by the Chief Justice.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a bench of the High Court can validly adjudicate a writ petition which has not been placed before it by the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions?

ii. Whether consent of the parties or an intra-court suggestion can confer jurisdiction on a Division Bench to hear a writ petition when the roster/allocation does not vest the matter in that bench?

iii. Whether an order of de-listing by a Single Judge with liberty to mention can be converted, by intra-court proceedings, into a valid basis for appellate disposal by a Division Bench not authorized by the Chief Justice?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsel for the Appellant (GRSE Ltd.) submitted that the Division Bench lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the writ petition because the matter was not allocated to that bench by the Chief Justice; roster determinations are binding and non-derogable.

ii. The Appellant contended that party consent cannot cure a jurisdictional defect; consent does not confer jurisdiction and the writ rules and Letters Patent preclude ad hoc assumption of jurisdiction by companion benches.

iii. It was further urged that the Single Judge’s de-listing left the writ pending and therefore the proper course was to request the Single Judge to decide or for re-allocation by the Chief Justice rather than intra-court disposals by an unallocated Division Bench.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the Respondents submitted that the predecessor Division Bench had on 11 March 2024 recorded a determination on its cause-list and that counsel for GRSE Ltd. consented to disposal by the appellate court, thus rendering the hearing proper and not susceptible to collateral attack.

ii. It was submitted that technical objections should not defeat substantive justice and that the Division Bench, having heard the parties, could be permitted to dispose of the writ petition on merits.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Article 225, Constitution of India — Power of High Courts to make rules for practice and procedure of the court (including Appellate Side Rules).

ii. Article 226, Constitution of India — Writ jurisdiction of High Courts.

iii. Appellate Side Rules of the High Court at Calcutta, 1966 — r.26 — Power of a Judge to refer matters or make them returnable before a Division Bench; the rule limits bench re-assignment to avenues prescribed.

iv. Letters Patent — clause 15 — Intra-court appeal provisions (as the vehicle for challenge within the High Court).

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on a purely jurisdictional and administrative law ground. The Court held that the Chief Justice of a High Court, as primus inter pares, has the exclusive authority to set the roster and allocate matters; that roster is final and binding on companion judges. Any adjudication by a bench not so allocated or lacking authorization from the Chief Justice is without jurisdiction and therefore void.

The Court relied on Sohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal (Calcutta High Court decision) as authoritatively applied in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and subsequently in Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India to reinforce the principle that allocation is sacrosanct. The Court emphasized r.26 which contemplates that a Judge may refer a matter to a Division Bench but does not permit unilateral assumption by a Division Bench of jurisdiction where no allocation exists.

On the facts, although it was debatable whether an intra-court appeal against de-listing was maintainable, the higher point was that the predecessor Division Bench accepted the parties’ suggestion to dispose of the writ without any authorization from the Chief Justice — a step the Court found impermissible. The Court reiterated the axiom “consent does not confer jurisdiction” and therefore declared both the predecessor Division Bench order dated 11 March 2024 and the impugned Division Bench decision of 4 September 2024 to be without jurisdiction and a nullity.

Consequently the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the writ petition to the High Court for re-assignment by the Chief Justice to an appropriate bench for fresh consideration. The Court recorded a protective undertaking by counsel for GRSE Ltd. that no appointments would be made so as to render the writ petition infructuous during re-adjudication, and the Court refrained from making any interim orders, leaving the matter to the High Court’s prompt reallocation preferably within six months. The appeal was allowed on these terms.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold. First, the Chief Justice’s roster allocation is a jurisdictional prerequisite: benches must act only on matters allocated by the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions; otherwise their adjudication is void. Second, party consent cannot cure a want of jurisdiction a judicial order obtained by consent that overrides the roster is contrary to writ rules and cannot validate the bench’s jurisdiction.

These principles together made the impugned Division Bench decision unsustainable. The Court placed reliance on the High Court’s own precedent, and subsequent Supreme Court treatments, to articulate the doctrine of allocation and primacy of the Chief Justice.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed, obiter, that even if an intra-court appeal were maintainable against a de-listing order, the appropriate corrective measure ordinarily available would be limited such as requesting the Single Judge to decide the petition according to law rather than permitting an unallocated Division Bench to assume jurisdiction. The Court also noted the puzzlement at the Single Judge’s decision to await the reference despite existing precedents holding the issue substantially settled, but declined to decide merits in light of the jurisdictional disposition.

c. GUIDELINES

i. High Courts must respect roster allocations made by the Chief Justice; companion judges must not hear matters outside such allocation.

ii. Where a Single Judge has de-listed with liberty to mention, intra-court remedy must not be used to bypass allocation; the correct route is to seek allocation or for the Single Judge to refer the matter under r.26.

iii. Consent of parties cannot be invoked to validate jurisdictional defects; judicial discipline requires adherence to writ rules and Letters Patent.

iv. Where jurisdictional infirmity infects prior orders, the Supreme Court may set aside and remit for re-allocation rather than decide merits to preserve institutional propriety.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces institutional discipline in judicial administration: the Chief Justice’s control over allocation is not a matter of convenience but of jurisdictional consequence. The Court’s strict stance protects the integrity of the judicial process against informal accretions achieved by party-consent or internecine bench arrangements. Practically, the decision curtails tactical forum management where parties may attempt to secure relief before an unallocated bench by mutual agreement.

For litigators, the lesson is clear ensure matters are properly placed before the designated bench or seek express allocation; reliance on consent or procedural expedients risks later nullification. The Court’s remedial approach remand for proper allocation while recording a protective undertaking balances respect for litigants’ interests with institutional propriety. The case will serve as an authoritative touchstone on roster discipline and intra-court jurisdiction for High Courts and litigants across jurisdictions.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Sohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1990 Calcutta 168 (as cited in the judgment).
ii. State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1 (relied upon).
iii. Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 196 (approved and followed).
iv. State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari, (2019) 5 SCC 600 (reference context).
v. N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 7 SCC 617 (three-Judge decision discussed).
vi. Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 (referred).

b. Important Statutes / Rules Referred

i. Constitution of India, Arts. 225 & 226.
ii. Appellate Side Rules of the High Court at Calcutta, 1966 — Rule 26.
iii. Letters Patent — clause 15 (Intra-court appeal).