A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal challenges the High Court of Madras’ affirmation of a trial court conviction and life sentence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 for allegedly setting the deceased (his wife) on fire by pouring kerosene over her on 12 September 2008. The prosecution relied heavily on a statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate on 18 September 2008 treated as a dying declaration, together with oral testimony by the deceased’s parents.

The record, however, contains two earlier and materially different statements by the deceased both given on the day of the incident in which she said she had caught fire while cooking. Medical evidence did not support presence of kerosene smell when the deceased reached hospital. Seizure-based corroboration (Observation Mahazar) proved weak: seizure witnesses turned hostile and there was delay in producing the Mahazar.

The Supreme Court applied the settled principle that a dying declaration may, in appropriate circumstances, sustain a conviction, but that rule is contingent on the quality of the dying declaration and corroboration when declarations are inconsistent. Relying on Uttam v. State of Maharashtra and the record’s internal inconsistencies and surrounding circumstances, the Court held the dying declaration to be unreliable as the sole basis for conviction and acquitted the appellant.

Keywords: dying declaration, corroboration, benefit of doubt, observation mahazar, inconsistent statements.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case tests the limits of reliance on a dying declaration where earlier contemporaneous statements contradict the later statement. The accused was convicted for causing the death of his wife by allegedly pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze.

The prosecution’s core proof consisted of:

(a) a statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate on 18.09.2008 treated as a dying declaration, and

(b) testimony of the deceased’s parents asserting the accused’s culpability.

On the contrary, immediate statements recorded on 12.09.2008 from the doctor and a police constable attributed the fire to an accident while the deceased was cooking. Medical evidence at the hospital (attendance doctor) was inconsistent with the presence of a kerosene smell. The seizure exercise (Observation Mahazar) which purportedly recovered a kerosene can and matchstick had investigational gaps: witnesses to seizure recanted and the mahazar was delayed in production.

Additional contextual fact: strained inter-family relations dating to earlier criminal litigation between the families, which raised the possibility of afterthought or tutoring. The High Court affirmed conviction without adequately interrogating contradictions and corroborative gaps. The Supreme Court thus re-examined the weight to be attached to the dying declaration in light of surrounding facts, judicial questioning of the Magistrate’s procedure and corroborative deficits, and relevant precedent on inconsistent dying statements.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The accused and deceased lived with their young son in Tuticorin. On 12.09.2008 at about 6 pm the deceased caught fire and was taken first to a nearby hospital and then to a Government Hospital at Thoothukudi, later succumbing on 02.10.2008. On the night of the incident the deceased made a contemporaneous statement to a police constable (PW-9) saying she caught fire while working in the kitchen and that the husband was asleep and woke only when she screamed.

On 15.09.2008 a police investigation converted the event from an accidental fire to an offence under Section 307 IPC after the deceased allegedly told the investigating officer (and others) that the appellant had set her on fire; this was followed by a statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate on 18.09.2008 which attributed the crime squarely to the appellant that he poured kerosene and set her alight. The prosecution produced an Observation Mahazar prepared by PW-15 purporting to show recovery of an empty kerosene can and matchstick at the scene and described smell of burnt kerosene; however seizure witnesses (PW-5, PW-6) were hostile and denied the seizure narrative.

Medical evidence from the attending doctor (PW-13) recorded the deceased’s account of an accident and explicitly denied any smell of kerosene on the body at admission. The post-mortem (PW-11) recorded death from burn injuries but no external non-burn injuries. PW-1 and PW-2 (parents of the deceased) deposed that the accused did not attempt to douse the fire or accompany them, but other witnesses (PW-3, PW-4) who would have supported rescue efforts turned hostile.

The accused had a documented physical disability (40% disability from polio) and witnesses placed him at the hospital with the deceased, contradicting the suggestion he absented himself. The trial court convicted primarily on the dying declaration and parents’ testimony; the High Court affirmed. The Supreme Court assiduously mapped the chronological statements, evidentiary lacunae in the Mahazar, and medical testimony to test whether the dying declaration could be the sole basis for conviction.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a dying declaration recorded on 18.09.2008 can be relied upon as the sole basis for convicting the accused under Section 302 IPC where the deceased made materially inconsistent statements earlier on the day of the incident?

ii. Whether the Observation Mahazar and alleged recovery of kerosene can and matchstick constitute reliable corroboration in view of hostile seizure witnesses and delay in production?

iii. Whether medical evidence denying the presence of kerosene smell at hospital admission undermines the prosecution’s case that kerosene was used to set the deceased alight?

iv. Whether strained inter-family relations and possible tutoring can vitiate reliance on a subsequent dying declaration?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the trial and High Court erred in treating the 18.09.2008 statement as unimpeachable dying declaration despite earlier consistent and contemporaneous statements to the doctor (PW-13) and police constable (PW-9) that the fire was accidental while cooking.

It was urged that medical evidence disproved kerosene use, seizure evidence was unreliable because seizure witnesses turned hostile and the mahazar was belatedly produced, and that the accused’s physical disability and presence at the hospital contradicted the prosecution’s narrative that he abandoned the deceased.

Counsel further submitted that the deceased did not inform the Magistrate of earlier statements nor explain why she lied earlier, thus casting doubt on the genuineness of the later statement and suggesting tutoring by her parents given prior enmity between families.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate is a declaration by a person conscious of impending death and is entitled to great weight. The prosecution argued that later admission before the Magistrate that the husband poured kerosene and burnt her must be accepted unless convincingly impeached. Reliance was placed on the Observation Mahazar describing kerosene smell and recovery of can and match, and on deposition of PW-1 and PW-2 implicating the accused. The State contended that discrepancies between statements were explainable by fear of the appellant’s presence at the earlier recordings and did not sufficiently weaken the later recorded dying declaration.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 (punishment for murder).
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — procedural provisions governing recording of statements and evidence, and rules on admissibility of dying declarations.
iii. Evidentiary principle: a dying declaration may be sole basis for conviction but courts must examine its quality, surrounding circumstances and seek corroboration when inconsistencies exist. (See Uttam v. State of Maharashtra.)

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court examined the record and reiterated the settled principle that a dying declaration is an important piece of evidence and, in suitable cases, may sustain conviction even without corroboration. However, the Court emphasized that courts must scrutinize the quality of such a declaration, especially where earlier statements by the deceased contradict the later declaration.

The Court carefully analysed three discrete strands:

(a) the deceased’s contemporaneous statements on 12.09.2008 to the attending doctor (PW-13) and police constable (PW-9) stating the fire was accidental;

(b) the later judicial statement of 18.09.2008 attributing culpability to the appellant; and

(c) corroborative material including the Observation Mahazar and medical testimony.

On the first strand the Court highlighted that the earliest accounts were given when the deceased was fresh from the incident. PW-13’s evidence that the deceased told him she caught fire while cooking and the absence of kerosene smell at admission were treated as materially probative in assessing veracity. The Court remarked that a smell of kerosene would ordinarily persist for hours where kerosene is used to set fire; the attending doctor’s denial of such smell undercuts the kerosene theory.

Regarding the dying declaration the Court observed the Judicial Magistrate (PW-12) did not question the deceased about her earlier statements nor elicit reasons attempting to explain inconsistencies. The deceased did not volunteer that she had earlier lied because the husband was present. The Court held that such lacunae in the recording procedure and the deceased’s failure to mention previous versions reduced the evidential value of the dying declaration.

On corroboration, the Court found the Observation Mahazar’s probative force weak. Seizure witnesses turned hostile and there was an inordinate delay in placing the mahazar before the Court. No independent witness (including PW-1 and PW-2) supported discovery of kerosene can or matchstick at the scene. Taken together the Court concluded that the dying declaration stood uncorroborated and was inconsistent with earlier contemporaneous accounts and medical evidence.

Finally the Court noted the family feud between parties and earlier criminal litigations which made a tutoring hypothesis plausible. While not deciding positively that tutoring occurred, the Court held that the possibility could not be ruled out given the evidentiary picture. Applying the cautious approach mandated by precedent, including Uttam v. State of Maharashtra, the Court concluded that reliance solely on the later dying declaration would be misplaced. Accordingly the appeal was allowed, conviction and sentence set aside and the appellant acquitted.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal proposition is that while a dying declaration is powerful, it cannot automatically be allowed to stand as the sole basis for conviction where:

(i) there exist earlier contemporaneous statements materially inconsistent with the later dying declaration;

(ii) procedural deficiencies exist in the recording of the dying declaration (failure to confront the declarant with prior versions);

(iii) corroborative physical and testimonial evidence is either absent or unreliable (hostile seizure witnesses, delayed mahazar); and

(iv) medical evidence points away from the mode of commission alleged in the dying declaration.

In such circumstances courts must scrutinise the overall fabric of evidence and, if reasonable doubt persists, extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. This approach follows the reasoning in Uttam v. State of Maharashtra and harmonises the twin imperatives of respecting dying declarations and guarding against wrongful convictions.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court commented obiter that credibility assessments must be rooted in chronology of statements and clinical immediacy. Where a declarant’s earliest statements, made immediately after the incident, contradict a later narrative given under possible external influences, courts should prefer contemporaneous accounts unless the later account is buttressed by compelling independent corroboration. The Court also observed that the presence of significant animosity between families and prior convictions in related disputes is a contextual circumstance relevant to assessing the likelihood of tutoring or fabrication.

c. GUIDELINES

i. When multiple statements by a deceased exist, courts must analyse the sequence, setting, and circumstances of each statement to determine their relative reliability.
ii. A Judicial Magistrate recording a dying declaration should, as far as practicable, elicit whether prior statements exist and enquire why the declarant did not earlier disclose the truth. That will assist in gauging whether the cardinal features of voluntariness and truthfulness are present.
iii. Physical corroboration (seizure items, smell, independent witnesses) must be produced promptly; delay and hostile witnesses weaken the evidentiary value of such material.
iv. Medical evidence has high probative value in burn cases and must be given due weight when it bears on the mode of burning or presence of accelerants.
v. Where contradictions remain unexplained and reasonable doubt persists, courts should not convict solely on the basis of a later dying declaration. Courts should prefer acquittal over speculative inference.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision exemplifies measured application of evidentiary principles in criminal law. The judgment underscores that the sanctity of a dying declaration is not a licence for uncritical acceptance. The decision safeguards the fundamental criminal jurisprudential value that convictions must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Practically, this case teaches investigators and trial courts two operational lessons: first, contemporaneous recording of all statements and strict medical documentation at first contact are indispensable; second, judicial officers recording dying declarations must probe for previous inconsistent statements and record explanations, if any, for earlier silence. From a jurisprudential perspective the Court balanced the need to give effect to solemn dying assertions against the need to prevent miscarriages of justice arising from afterthoughts, tutoring or weak corroboration.

The judgment follows precedent (notably Uttam v. State of Maharashtra), but it is noteworthy for its insistence on treating the totality of circumstances as determinative rather than elevating a single piece of evidence. In effect the Court reaffirmed that where evidence forms a mosaic that produces reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal. This approach preserves the guardrails against wrongful conviction while leaving open the possibility that a well-tested dying declaration, recorded with procedural care and supported by reliable corroboration, will continue to be decisive.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Suresh v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police, Criminal Appeal No. 540 of 2013, Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 04 March 2025, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 317 : 2025 INSC 318.
ii. Uttam v. State of Maharashtra, (2022) 8 SCC 576; [2022] 5 SCR 863.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 302.
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.