A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Jamin & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1184 of 2025 (J.B. Pardiwala & Manoj Misra, JJ., 06 Mar. 2025) examines the scope, object and procedural safeguards of Section 319 CrPC when a superior court (High Court) in revision sets aside a trial-court order rejecting a s.319 application and directs reconsideration — including whether such revisional relief can “relate back” so that a later summoning order operates as if made before conclusion of the original trial.

The Bench restates that s.319 exists to prevent real perpetrators escaping punishment and identifies three statutory preconditions for its exercise:

(i) an ongoing inquiry/trial;

(ii) evidence in the course of proceedings showing another person appears to have committed an offence; and

(iii) that such person could be tried together with the accused.

The Court holds a High Court exercising revisional powers under ss.397/401 CrPC may rectify a patent illegality in the trial court; such rectification is to be treated like appellate substitution and therefore relates back to the date of the subordinate court’s order enabling a later summoning order (to give effect to revision) to stand even if passed after trial conclusion.

The decision clarifies that a person not previously arraigned need not be heard before summons under s.319 (unless previously discharged and the revisional order prejudices that accrued benefit), and affirms the mandatory de novo trial requirement of s.319(4) if a person is added. The judgment reconciles Sukhpal Singh Khaira and other precedents, carving out how revisional relief must operate to avoid miscarriages of justice.

Keywords: Section 319 CrPC; revisional jurisdiction; relates back; de novo trial; right to be heard; functus officio.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arises from a s.482 challenge to a summoning order under s.319 CrPC issued in Sessions Trial No. 582 of 2009 after the original trial had concluded (conviction of two accused on 19.10.2011). The complainant had filed multiple s.319 applications; the trial court first rejected an initial application (29.01.2010) and the High Court directed reconsideration after cross-examination; a second s.319 application was rejected on merits by the trial court (19.07.2010).

A revision (No. 400/2010) remained pending many years and, in 2021, the High Court allowed revision, set aside the trial court’s 19.07.2010 order and directed reconsideration notwithstanding the main trial had already concluded. Pursuant to that revisional order, the trial court issued a summoning order on 21.02.2024 adding the two appellants as accused; the High Court dismissed their s.482 petition and they appealed to this Court.

The Supreme Court was asked to resolve whether the High Court could exercise revisional jurisdiction to set aside the earlier rejection, whether the later summoning order could relate back and the legality of summoning after trial conclusion, and whether the proposed accused were entitled to a hearing before the High Court passed the revisional order.

The Court framed the conflict between purposive application of s.319 (to catch true culprits) and procedural safeguards (stage of exercise; functus officio; right to be heard) and proceeded to analyse legislative history and precedent before applying law to facts.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 14.04.2009 an FIR (No. 99/2009) alleged murder by firing; five persons were named, including the present appellants Jamin and Akil, who were accused of exhorting others to kill the deceased. Investigation led to a chargesheet dated 14.07.2009 naming only Irshad and Irfan; the police noted investigation against others continued. Charges were framed (27.10.2009) and the complainant (respondent-2) filed s.319 to summon the omitted persons.

Trial court refused (29.01.2010) because key witness cross-examinations were incomplete and investigation was ongoing. High Court ordered reconsideration after cross-examination (14.05.2010). A second s.319 filed (10.06.2010) was rejected on merits (19.07.2010). The trial concluded with conviction of the chargesheeted accused (19.10.2011). Revision (400/2010) lay pending; in 2021 the High Court allowed revision and ordered reconsideration within three months, recording that the trial court’s rejection involved patent illegality.

Thereafter (22.09.2021 application renewed) the trial court, pursuant to the High Court directive, summoned appellants on 21.02.2024 (one proposed accused deceased). The appellants’ s.482 challenge failed before the High Court (01.04.2024) which upheld summoning on the basis that s.319(4) mandates fresh proceedings and re-hearing of witnesses, thus safeguarding rights despite trial having concluded earlier. This factual sequence is central to the Court’s analysis on relation-back and revisional efficacy.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court rightly exercised revisional jurisdiction under ss.397/401 CrPC to set aside the trial court’s order rejecting the second s.319 application?
ii. Whether the trial court’s summoning order dated 21.02.2024 (to implement revision) can relate back and replace its earlier order dated 19.07.2010?
iii. Whether the trial court could entertain s.319 applications after the main trial concluded (when no stay was granted)?
iv. Whether proposed accused must be given hearing before a High Court passes revision that prejudices accrued benefits (e.g., post-rejection); if so, was the 14.09.2021 High Court order passed without notice?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants argued the trial court became functus officio on pronouncement of judgment (19.10.2011) and thus had no jurisdiction to summon in 2024; s.319 power must be exercised prior to sentence/conviction (relying on Sukhpal Singh Khaira). They contended the High Court’s revisional order (14.09.2021) was passed without joining or hearing them after an 11-year pendency breaching s.401(2) and precedents recognizing right to be heard in revisional proceedings.

They emphasized absence of chargesheet and investigative closure against them, weak oral testimony (PW-1 disclaimed knowledge of villagers), and prosecutorial decision not to charge them all indicating insufficient material to summon.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

State relied on purposive object of s.319 and the mandatory de novo trial in s.319(4), arguing that fresh proceedings cure prejudice from late summoning. It cited Sukhpal Singh Khaira guidelines but submitted they permit separate trials where appropriate and do not render revisional interference nugatory. The State urged revisional powers are plenary to correct patent illegality and ensure perpetrators are not shielded by procedural lapses.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Court upheld the High Court’s revisional interference, holding the trial court’s rejection suffered patent illegality and revision under ss.397/401 could properly set that right. Relying on Maru Ram and Shankar Abhyankar v. Bapat, it held rectifications by a superior court in revision must be treated like appellate rectifications and therefore relate back to the date of the original order; consequently the trial court’s subsequent summoning order (21.02.2024) must be read as replacing the 19.07.2010 rejection, and thus as if made before trial conclusion.

The Court carefully distinguished Sukhpal Singh Khaira: where s.319 is decided for the first time after trial, summoning may be unsustainable; but where a revisional court corrects a prior erroneous rejection, the revisional order operates retrospectively and a later implementing summoning order is sustainable and will normally result in a separate (de novo) trial for the newly added accused (guided by Sukhpal on split trials). The Court reaffirmed s.319(4) mandates a fresh trial and not merely cross-examination of already examined witnesses.

On hearing rights it held that s.319 does not require a pre-summons hearing for a person not previously discharged; however, once an application is rejected, the rejected party acquires a right that cannot be prejudiced by revisional orders without affording opportunity to be heard and s.401(2) requires notice when an order will be prejudicial. In the present facts the record showed appellants were respondents before the High Court and thus were not deprived of hearing; the High Court had not acted without notice.

The Court therefore dismissed the appeal and upheld the summoning order subject to de novo trial protections. Key reasoning is supported throughout by citations to Hardeep Singh, Maru Ram, Shankar Abhyankar, Mun. Corpn. of Delhi v. Rohtagi, and other authorities.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal propositions are:

(i) s.319 is remedial and purposive to bring real perpetrators to trial;

(ii) three statutory preconditions in s.319(1) must be met;

(iii) a revisional order under ss.397/401 that rectifies a patent illegality in a Trial Court’s s.319 rejection is to be treated like appellate substitution and relates back to the original order;

(iv) where revisional relief relates back but the earlier trial has concluded, the newly added accused must be proceeded against by a de novo separate trial to protect fair-trial rights.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed obiter that s.319 powers must be exercised sparingly and require stronger evidence than mere probability the test is more than prima facie but less than satisfaction required for conviction; and that where a person has earlier been discharged, additional safeguards of hearing are necessary in revisional proceedings. It also remarked on interplay with remission jurisprudence and appellate substitution (citing Maru Ram).

c. GUIDELINES 

1. s.319(1) threefold test must be strictly applied.

2. Where s.319 is exercised after evidence is recorded but before judgment, court should decide s.319 application before proceeding to judgment (per Sukhpal Khaira principles) unless revisional correction requires retrospective operation.

3. If revision sets aside a pre-judgment rejection, the revisional order relates back and an implementing summoning order is valid though passed after trial; the newly summoned person must be tried de novo.

4. Right of hearing: proposed accused are not granted a pre-summons hearing under s.319 ordinarily; but if they had an accrued benefit (e.g., a prior rejection), the revisional court must give opportunity before making an order prejudicial to that benefit (in obedience to s.401(2)).

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment strikes a balanced, purposive path: it protects the legislative aim of s.319 to catch true culprits while embedding procedural safeguards to prevent unfair surprise. Treating revisional rectifications as relating back is a principled approach to avoid miscarriages of justice where trial courts commit patent illegality that allows culprits to escape.

The insistence on de novo trials for newly added accused preserves fair trial standards. Practically, the judgment places an obligation on trial courts and High Courts to be vigilant:

(i) s.319 applications should be decided at the proper stage;

(ii) prosecuting agencies should transparently record reasons for non-arrayal;

(iii) revisional courts must ensure parties who will be prejudiced by their orders are afforded opportunity to be heard.

For practitioners, the decision underscores that where revision seeks to unsettle an accrued benefit, immediate joinder/notice is essential; conversely, where a revision corrects a clear error, remedy will not be defeated by mere lapse of time if effect can be given by relation-back and separate trial.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92.
2. Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab, (2023) 1 SCC 289.
3. Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107.
4. Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74.
5. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 319, Section 401, Section 397, Section 482.