A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr., Civil Appeals Nos. 3640–3642 of 2025, decided by the Supreme Court on 06 March 2025. The Court analysed the scope of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the specific machinery in Order XXI, Rules 97–103 CPC for adjudicating objections to execution raised by third-party occupants here, persons claiming to be cultivating tenants under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955.

The primary questions were:

(i) whether the executing court (and appellate courts) rightly entertained applications by respondent-occupants under s.47/Or.XXI r.97 and

(ii) whether those occupants could invoke the special enactment of 1955 to render the underlying decree a nullity.

The Supreme Court emphasised a harmonised reading: s.47 is a general provision for questions arising in execution, while Or.XXI r.97/101 furnish a specific code to determine right, title or interest where obstruction occurs. The Court held that executing courts may adjudicate only those questions relevant to execution and generally limited to matters arising after the decree; they must not be a forum to re-open issues which should have been raised in the main suit.

The Court found material indicia of collusion and inadequate documentary proof of tenant status; it set aside the orders that had frustrated execution and directed remedial administrative steps to curb undue delay in execution proceedings.

Keywords: Execution petition; Order XXI r.97; Section 47 CPC; Cultivating tenants; Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955; Collusion; Possession; Decree for specific performance.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arose from an agreement of sale dated 30.06.1980 and subsequent suit for specific performance by the purchasers. The trial court decreed specific performance with possession in 1986; appellate processes culminated in confirmation and deposits, and ultimately the executing court executed a sale deed in favour of the decree-holders. Delivery of possession was later obstructed by two persons (respondent Nos.1 & 2) who were real-life occupants and alleged cultivating tenants.

They did not contest the original suit but later moved the executing court under s.47 CPC (in substance under Or.XXI r.97) claiming they were in possession and entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955. Lower courts granted relief to those occupants; the decree-holders challenged that in revision. The Supreme Court was tasked with reconciling the executing-court’s power to determine possessory disputes with the general principle that substantive rights ordinarily must have been litigated in the main suit, especially where parties had opportunities earlier.

The Court framed the legal map: s.47 broadly empowers the executing court to decide questions arising in execution, but Order XXI, Rules 97–101 create a specific code for obstruction/dispossession incidents and for deciding right, title or interest “relevant to adjudication” of the execution application. The Court stressed the difference between pre-decree substantive litigation and post-decree events, and the need to prevent tactical after-thoughts which frustrate decrees.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

An agreement of sale (30.06.1980) was executed; earnest money paid; vendors failed to execute deed leading to suit for specific performance by the purchasers. The trial court decreed specific performance (02.04.1986) including delivery of possession; vendors pursued appeals but ultimately the decree was confirmed, deposits made by decree-holders and the executing court executed the sale deed (17.08.2007) and ordered delivery of possession (12.02.2008).

At the time of physical delivery, respondent No.1 threatened self-immolation and obstructed handing over; subsequently respondent Nos.1 & 2 filed s.47 objections claiming they were in possession (inducted earlier by vendors), asserted continuous cultivation since 1967 and sought retrospective entry in revenue cultivation records from 1974.

Revenue authorities granted limited recognition (entry from 2008 but refused retrospective alteration to 1974). Tehsildar/RDO proceedings produced a certificate of possession but recorded limitations as to retrospective registration. The occupants did not contest the original suit or subsequent appeals, and their names were deleted from the executed sale deed by mutual consent at one stage; later they relied on post-decree revenue entries and the certificate to oppose execution.

The executing court and High Court accepted their possession evidence and relief under s.47/Or.XXI r.97, prompting this appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether an executing court can adjudicate claims of third-party occupants that challenge execution by asserting title/possession as cultivating tenants under special tenancy law?

2. Does Section 47 CPC read with Order XXI, Rules 97–101 permit the executing court to decide matters of title and jurisdictional nullity of a decree?

3. Can an occupant, who did not contest the original suit and whose name was deleted from the sale deed, invoke retrospective revenue entries/certificates to defeat execution?

4. Whether a decree-holder’s remedy is to amend execution prayers or to file a separate suit for possession when facing obstruction by third parties?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants (decree-holders) argued: they promptly pursued execution (within statutory window), no notice was required under Or.XXI r.22 as execution was within two years of confirmation; respondent occupants were parties to the original suit but chose not to contest and had actual knowledge of the decree; the executing court erred in allowing collateral objections based on documents produced much later (2008 onwards); amendments sought to execution petition were proper and procedural law should be liberally construed to effectuate justice (State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India relied upon); there were strong indicia of collusion between vendors and occupants designed to frustrate execution and delay relief.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The occupants contended they had uninterrupted possession since 1967, were bona fide cultivating tenants, and thus beyond the civil court’s competence for eviction because of protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 (ss.3 & 6). They argued the executing court must examine the decree’s validity where the court lacks jurisdiction to evict cultivating tenants (invoking Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash on nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction). They stressed absence of notice and absence of a specific dispossession suit thus execution without adjudicating their possessory rights would be unjust.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court undertook statutory construction and contextual analysis. It reiterated that Order XXI (particularly rr.97–101) is a specialized code for execution cases where obstruction or dispossession occurs; those rules empower the executing court to determine all questions relevant to adjudication (including right, title or interest) but only to the extent those questions are pertinent to execution and, normally, to matters arising after passing of the decree.

The Court held that s.47 is general and should be read harmoniously with Or.XXI r.101; an executing court cannot reopen issues that should have been ventilated in the original suit because that would undermine finality and permit collateral re-litigation. The Court emphasised the distinction between substantive challenges to a decree as a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction which may be raised even at execution (following Sunder Dass) and ordinary title/contention which must ordinarily be raised earlier.

Applying facts, the Court found: respondent Nos.1 & 2 had not led documentary proof of qualifying tenant registration prior to the decree period; revenue certificates claimed were obtained later and on the basis of vendor “no objection” and did not independently establish tenant status dating back to 1974; evidence pointed to collusion with vendors (names deleted from deed then used to obstruct execution); respondents failed to participate in appellate proceedings and had opportunities to litigate earlier.

Consequently, the Court concluded the executing court exceeded permissible limits by allowing objections that effectively nullified the decree on non-meritorious grounds. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the impugned orders that frustrated execution and directed that execution proceed; it also remanded and corrected the High Court’s refusal to allow appellants’ amendments where procedural curative action was warranted.

Additional directions were issued to High Courts about systemic delays in execution proceedings, calling for administrative steps to ensure execution petitions are disposed within six months, in line with precedents addressing execution delay.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court’s binding principle is twofold:

(1) Order XXI rr.97–101 authorise executing courts to conduct complete adjudications of questions relevant to execution, including right, title or interest, but such adjudications must be tied to matters relevant to execution and ordinarily to events arising after the decree;

(2) Section 47 must be read harmoniously with the specific provisions of Order XXI the executing court cannot open adjudication that would effectively retry the substantive issues decided in the main suit, except where the decree is challenged as a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction.

Hence, third parties who had the opportunity to contest the main suit cannot be permitted to derail execution by belatedly raising ordinary title/contentions without credible contemporaneous documentary support.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed (non-binding guidance) on administrative responsibilities: persistent execution delays are inimical to justice; High Courts should gather pendency data and administratively ensure execution petitions conclude within six months, failing which judicial officers shall be answerable administratively.

The Court also reiterated judicial preference for procedural interpretations that advance justice rather than technical defeat, referencing prior decisions that procedure must aid substantive relief and not become a tool to frustrate decrees. These remarks, while advisory, carry persuasive force for court administration reforms.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Read s.47 CPC in harmony with Or.XXI rr.97–101; executing courts may decide title/possession questions only insofar as they are relevant to execution and not to re-try issues decided in the main suit.

2. A decree may be challenged in execution as a nullity only where the court that passed it lacked inherent jurisdiction; ordinary title disputes require prior contestation.

3. Where obstruction occurs, the decree-holder must proceed under Or.XXI r.97; an obstructionist may be heard and the executing court shall adjudicate all relevant questions under r.101.

4. Courts should scrutinise documentary proof of tenancy carefully; retrospective revenue entries obtained after decree may be suspect, particularly where vendor no objection is present.

5. High Courts must collect district judiciary data on execution pendency and issue administrative directions to ensure disposal within six months, with accountability mechanisms for presiding officers.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment strikes a balanced path between two competing equities: finality of decrees and protection of bona fide third-party possessory rights. It reinforces that the executing court is a robust but limited forum capable of full adjudication under Or.XXI r.101 but not a substitute trial for issues that should have been raised in the substantive suit.

Practically, decree-holders must take proactive procedural steps (serve notices, frame execution prayers to include third-party reliefs, seek timely amendments) and courts must be alert to tactical collusion evidenced by belated documentary filings or vendor acquiescence.

For occupants claiming statutory protective status (e.g., cultivating tenants), early administrative registration and documentary continuity are critical; otherwise a late statutory shield may not withstand scrutiny, particularly if it was engineered post-decree. Finally, the Court’s administrative exhortation on six-month disposal is a salutary reminder that execution law is only meaningful if enforced promptly.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 3640–3642 of 2025, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 540 (INSC).

2. Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 697.

3. Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash, (1977) 2 SCC 662.

4. Rajinder Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh, (2014) 15 SCC 529.

5. Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, (2021) 6 SCC 418.

6. State of Bihar & Ors. v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, (2018) 9 SCC 472.

7. Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, §§47; Order XXI, Rules 35, 97–103.

2. Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955, ss.3, 6.