A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This judgment examines the limits of judicial review when a successor State authority cancels a previously prepared select list for public employment. The Court balances competing principles:

(i) the established rule that mere empanelment does not create an indefeasible right to appointment;

(ii) the constitutional requirement that recruitment processes remain fair, non-arbitrary and consistent with Articles 14 and 16; and

(iii) the standard of review applicable to administrative decisions contrasting Wednesbury unreasonableness with the more intrusive proportionality analysis.

Facts reveal a recruitment process for 104 constables in the Assam Forest Protection Force conducted largely by interview in 2016, followed by a successor Government’s cancellation of the select list on the PCCF’s note alleging systemic irregularities and violation of reservation norms. The Gauhati High Court held the irregularities curable and directed the process to be completed; this Court reversed.

Applying precedent, the Supreme Court finds the successor Government’s choice to cancel (one of three realistic options) defended by cogent material in the PCCF note, and concludes that cancellation was neither Wednesbury-unreasonable nor disproportionate. The Court clarifies that while selectees possess no automatic right to appointment, they retain locus to challenge arbitrary executive decisions; relief depends on facts.

Directions emphasise framing or public promulgation of recruitment rules and permit respondents to reapply with specified relaxations under Article 142. The ruling thus affirms wide but not unlimited executive discretion to protect the public interest where systemic taint in selection is credibly shown.

Keywords: select list; cancellation; Wednesbury unreasonableness; proportionality; reservation policy; Article 226; public employment; judicial review.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The contest arises from a recruitment advertisement (23 July 2014) for 104 constables in the Assam Forest Protection Force. The State’s Central Selection Committee completed a PET and interviews in May 2016 and prepared a select list. After a change in Government, the incumbent Principal Chief Conservator of Forests submitted a detailed note (4 July 2016) alleging systemic irregularities, geographic concentration of selectees (64 of 104 from Kamrup districts), and non-observance of reservation norms and binding precedents regarding meritorious reserved-category candidates being placed in open-category vacancies. The Government approved cancellation (order 18 July 2016) and published notice (17 Aug 2016). A fresh advertisement for 132 posts followed on 14 April 2017.

Writ petitions ensued in the Gauhati High Court: one challenging cancellation and the other challenging the fresh advertisement. The single Judge and later a Division Bench held the irregularities were curable and the select list should not have been cancelled without inquiry; the High Court directed the process to be taken forward. The State appealed to this Court. The Supreme Court framed central questions: whether the High Court erred in interfering with the executive cancellation; whether the cancellation was vitiated by Wednesbury unreasonableness or was disproportionate; and whether selectees had enforceable legal rights under Article 226.

The Court emphasised the delicate institutional balance required when successor Governments revisit earlier administrative decisions and the necessity of a proportionality inquiry where cancellation of an entire process is chosen over targeted remedial measures.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Government of Assam issued an advertisement on 23 July 2014 for 104 constable posts. Selection events culminated in May 2016: a qualifying Physical Efficiency Test followed by an interview. The Central Selection Committee constituted by the Minister and chaired by the then PCCF prepared a list of 104 recommended candidates and submitted it to Government approval.

Elections brought a change of regime in May 2016. The incumbent PCCF, upon record review, prepared the note dated 4 July 2016 documenting grave anomalies: disproportionate district-wise representation (64 of 104 from Kamrup areas), complete absence of candidates from 16 districts (holding about 52% of State population), misapplication of reservation categories, and specific instances where lower-ranked candidates were advanced over those meritorious on general merit.

No formal inquiry appears to have been conducted before the Government approved cancellation by order dated 18 July 2016 and public notice 17 August 2016. A new recruitment advertisement issued on 14 April 2017. Two writ petitions challenged these steps; the High Court ordered the earlier list to be salvaged and completed, a decision reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court examined documentary material and precedent to test whether the successor Government’s cancellation fell within boundaries of bona fide policy-making or was arbitrary and thus susceptible to judicial interference.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the executive decision to cancel the select list without an inquiry and in directing the recruitment process to be carried forward?
ii. Whether cancellation of the select list was liable to be quashed as Wednesbury-unreasonable?
iii. Whether cancellation offended the doctrine of proportionality by being disproportionate to the irregularities alleged?
iv. Whether empanelled candidates acquire a legal right enforceable under Article 226 to compel appointment?
v. What relief, if any, is appropriate where cancellation is sustained?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The State contended that inclusion in the select list conferred no indefeasible right to appointment and therefore no cause to invoke certiorari or mandamus; executive discretion to cancel a process is wide, particularly where the PCCF’s note indicated serious irregularities and reservation violations. It argued the court below substituted an appellate view, failing to respect the Government’s factual satisfaction and the need to defer to the employer-State in recruitment matters.

Reliance was placed on Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India to the effect that the State may decide not to fill vacancies subject to bona fide reasons. The appellants maintained that the PCCF’s meticulous review constituted material justification and obviated the need for a separate inquiry before cancellation.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The selectees argued the Government’s notice expressly invoked only reservation and precedent violations as grounds and could not thereafter improve its case by adducing new justifications. They emphasised absence of recruitment rules and absence of a written test, contending these procedural lacunae did not permit wholesale cancellation. They stressed that only 34 selections were allegedly tainted, making total cancellation disproportionate; the defects were curable by reallocating winners or excluding a limited number. Counsel relied on precedents allowing rectification (e.g., Anamica Mishra, Rajesh P.U., Sachin Kumar) and submitted absence of any preliminary inquiry rendered the Government’s action premature and unjustified.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Court surveyed authoritative precedent on selective rights and executive cancellation. It reaffirmed the settled principle that mere empanelment does not automatically yield a right to appointment unless recruitment rules or the State’s conduct create an enforceable expectation; yet selected candidates retain locus to challenge arbitrary decisions.

The Court undertook a fact-sensitive assessment of the PCCF note, summarising concrete indicia of systemic irregularity: severe districtal skew, exclusion of large-population districts, misuse of reservation categories, and specific anomalies in candidate positioning. These materials, the Court held, supplied cogent justification for cancellation.

Applying comparative precedent, the Court explained the interplay between Wednesbury reasonableness and proportionality: the former constrains courts to extreme irrationality; the latter permits closer balancing of means and ends. The Court found the successor Government had three reasonable choices and that cancelling the entire process was within the range of legitimate responses given systemic taint.

It criticised the High Court for effectively exercising appellate correction rather than confined judicial review and for failing to apply the proportionality test. Distinguishing Anamica Mishra and Rajesh P.U. on their facts, the Court concluded cancellation did not amount to arbitrariness or disproportionate excess. On rights of empanelled candidates, the Court reiterated that while no vested right existed here (absence of Government approval legitimising the list), selectees may challenge capricious executive abandonments; but on the facts the respondents’ legal rights were not infringed because the select list had not been granted governmental legitimacy.

The Court allowed the appeal, quashed High Court orders, granted liberty to re-advertise, and directed reasonable concessions (age, minor PET/measurement relaxations) to earlier aspirants under Article 142.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The core legal holding: where credible, documentary allegations establish systemic and pervasive infirmities in a recruitment process (including widespread violation of reservation norms and skewed representation), a successor Government may, bona fide and within public interest, cancel the select list without being subjected to judicial reversal, provided the decision is neither Wednesbury-unreasonable nor disproportionate. Judicial review must focus on the decision-making process and proportionality rather than substitute appellate corrections absent mala fide, arbitrariness or absence of any materials justifying cancellation.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that recruitment without framed rules and reliance solely on interviews invites litigation and recommended framing and publicizing recruitment rules. It noted the merit of segregation of tainted candidates where practicable, but recognised situations where systemic corruption precludes such surgical correction. The Court also commented on permissible use of subsequent material by successor Governments where larger public interest is invoked.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Where a successor Government cancels a selection, it must possess credible material showing systemic infirmity or illegality.

2. Courts must apply proportionality: examine available alternative remedies and whether cancellation is the least intrusive, reasonable measure.

3. Judicial review should avoid appellate substitution; interference is warranted only for arbitrariness, mala fide or manifest irrationality.

4. Recruitment authorities should frame and publish rules and, where feasible, use written examinations to minimise arbitrariness.

5. Where cancellation is upheld, courts may direct equitable concessions to previously selected candidates (age relaxations, waivers) under Article 142.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This decision reafirms a nuanced equilibrium between executive discretion in public employment and constitutional commands of fairness. It anchors the State’s power to cancel a tainted process in documentary justification and the public interest, while preserving judicial capacity to police arbitrariness via proportionality and Wednesbury standards. Practitioners should note the Court’s insistence on concrete materials (not mere suspicion) and its disapproval of courts acting as appellate authorities in recruitment controversies.

Administrations are warned: absence of recruitment rules and reliance on viva voce alone raises vulnerability; transparent rules and written tests reduce litigation risk. For litigants, the ruling confirms that empanelment is not a talismanic right but that selectees can still seek judicial relief against arbitrary executive conduct. Finally, the remedial use of Article 142 to mitigate hardship reflects the Court’s pragmatic approach balancing legality and equity.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 598 : 2025 INSC 334. .

2. Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 S.C.C. 47.

3. B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1942.

4. K. Shyam Kumar v. All India Railway Recruitment Board, (2010) 6 S.C.C. 614.

5. Anamica Mishra v. UPPSC, (1990) Supp. S.C.C. 692.

6. Union of India v. Rajesh P.U., Puthuvalnikathu, (2003) 7 S.C.C. 285.

7. Sachin Kumar v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, (2021) 4 S.C.C. 631.

8. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 405.

9. Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 S.C.C. 161.

10. State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 S.C.C. 220.

11. R.S. Mittal v. Union of India, (1995) Supp. 2 S.C.C. 230.

12. Dinesh Kumar Kashyap v. South East Central Railway, (2019) 12 S.C.C. 798.

13. Jai Singh Dalal v. State of Haryana, (1993) Supp. 2 S.C.C. 600.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 16(1), 162, 226, 142.