A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz & Ors., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1681 & 1770 of 2009 (judgment 20 March 2025) examines the scope and mandatory nature of procedural safeguards under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Rule 15 of the TADA Rules for confessions recorded by police officers not below the rank of Superintendent of Police.

The appeals arose from acquittals by the Special Court in two separate but related criminal trials concerning kidnapping and subsequent murders (including the Vice-Chancellor of Kashmir University) where the prosecution’s case relied heavily on confessional statements recorded by an SP (A.K. Suri). The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on admissibility and reliability of such confessions, adherence to the Kartar Singh guidelines, the doctrine of issue estoppel where an identical confession had been earlier rejected, and the impact of non-recovery of the weapon and weak ocular testimony.

The Court found pervasive non-compliance with Rule 15 absence of questions and answers establishing voluntariness, failure to record time/place or reflection period, discrepancies in dates, recording in intimidating environments (BSF camps/JICs) and lack of authorization for the Recording Officer and held that the Special Court rightly rejected the confessions and acquitted the accused.

The appeals were dismissed. This judgment reinforces the mandatory nature of procedural safeguards under Section 15 and Rule 15, emphasises the protective rationale behind excluding police confessions, and reiterates the limits to reliance on confessions in the absence of corroboration and compliance with statutory safeguards.

Keywords: TADA Act Section 15; Rule 15 TADA Rules; Kartar Singh guidelines; confessional statements; issue estoppel; admissibility; voluntariness; BSF camp; AK-47 cartridges.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation arises from high-profile incidents in Srinagar (1990): the abduction and later discovery of the dead bodies of Dr. Mushir-ul-Haq (Vice-Chancellor, Kashmir University) and his Personal Secretary Abdul Gani Zargar, and separately the kidnapping-murder of H.L. Khera (General Manager, HMT Watch Factory). Investigation by the CBI charged several members of the banned JKSLF, alleging a conspiracy to kidnap to coerce release of associates and to execute hostages when demands were not met.

The prosecution’s evidentiary matrix was weak on ocular identification and failed to recover the weapon (AK-47), although forensic testimony matched recovered cartridges to an AK-47. Consequently, the case depended primarily on confessional statements recorded by an SP under Section 15 of the TADA Act. The Special Court rejected these confessions as inadmissible or unreliable and acquitted. The State (CBI) appealed under Section 19 of TADA.

The Supreme Court had to determine whether the Special Court was correct in excluding the confessions and whether mandatory procedural safeguards were complied with, applying the Kartar Singh guidelines and later pronouncements that stress strict compliance with Rule 15 and the need for voluntariness and corroboration before relying on police-recorded confessions.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 06.04.1990, armed persons forcibly entered the Vice-Chancellor’s official vehicle near the Sadarbal Gate and abducted the Vice-Chancellor and his Personal Secretary. They were transferred to a red Maruti van (Reg. JKD-9394) and moved across multiple locations, ultimately confined in houses associated with accused persons. Hilal Beg publicly claimed responsibility and issued a press release.

Demands for release of militants were made; on 10.04.1990 the hostages were taken to a field where they were fired upon; both died on the spot. Police recovered nine empty AK-47 cartridges but not the rifle. CBI charges included Section 3(1), 3(3), 4(2) of TADA, various RPC sections including 302 and 120-B, and Arms Act offences. During trial, prosecution examined eyewitnesses (driver and onlookers) who could describe assailants generally but failed to identify accused in court.

The confessions recorded by SP A.K. Suri (dates variously recorded) became central. Discrepancies emerged omission of time/place in the memoranda, absence of question-answer records to demonstrate voluntariness, lack of recorded reflection period, discrepancies between dates recorded in certificate and witness testimony, and recording in intimidating locations (BSF camp/JICs).

One confessional statement of Mohd. Salim Zargar had been previously rejected in a different trial. The Special Court excluded the confessions and acquitted for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether confessions recorded by a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police under Section 15 TADA are admissible when procedural safeguards under Rule 15 and Kartar Singh are not strictly complied with?
ii. Whether a confessional statement already rejected in a prior trial constitutes res judicata/issue estoppel and precludes its reception in subsequent proceedings?
iii. Whether confessions recorded in heavily guarded detention centres (BSF camp/JIC) can be deemed made in a “free atmosphere”?
iv. Whether, when ocular evidence is weak and weapon unrecovered, convictions can safely rest on police-recorded confessions lacking contemporaneous safeguards?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The appellant argued that Section 15 confessions, if voluntary and truthful, are sufficient on their own to convict and need no corroboration; the recording officer (PW-12, A.K. Suri) complied with statutory requirements including the memorandum under Rule 15(3) and the certificates were forwarded as mandated.
ii. It was contended that Kartar Singh guidelines post-dated these recordings and could not be applied retrospectively to negate valid confessions made in 1990; accordingly the Special Court erred in rejecting confessions for procedural lacunae.
iii. The appellant relied on corroborative quality among the confessions themselves and the forensic confirmation that bullets were of an AK-47 to sustain the prosecution’s narrative.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Respondents argued the Special Court correctly found the confessions inadmissible: omissions (no Q&A, no timing/place, no reflection period), recording in intimidating locations, lack of authorization to PW-12 and puzzling date discrepancies rendered statements unreliable and non-compliant with mandatory safeguards.
ii. It was urged that one confession had already been rejected in an earlier trial and thus issue estoppel prevented its reuse to disturb an earlier finding, while other confessions lacked independent corroboration or assurance of voluntariness.
iii. They emphasized weak ocular evidence and non-recovery of the weapon as fatal to prosecution relying exclusively on tainted confessions.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court undertook a close statutory and precedential analysis. It summarized Section 15 and Rule 15, and reiterated the protective rationale that confessions to police are ordinarily inadmissible under Section 25 Evidence Act, making Section 15 TADA an exceptional provision requiring strict safeguards.

The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh laid down mandatory guidelines (language, free atmosphere, magistrate production, medical examination on complaint, rank of investigating officer, affidavit for custody change, respect for silence and cooling time).

Subsequent decisions (SN Dube, Shiraj Ahmed, Ajit Singh, Ravinder Singh, etc.) reinforced that compliance is mandatory and that a mechanical certificate is insufficient without recorded Q&A and clear evidence of voluntary choice and reflection.

Applying these principles, the Court found material departures: Mohd. Salim Zargar’s confession had no recorded Q&A, lacked mention of time/place, and displayed date inconsistencies (certificate dated 16.09.1990 while PW-12 testified to recording on 06.08.1990), suggesting unreliability. That same confession had been rejected earlier; acceptance now would disturb the earlier finding invoking the doctrine of issue estoppel (as explained in Ravinder Singh).

The confessions of Mushtaq Ahmed Khan and Mohd. Sadiq Rather suffered similar defects: recorded on the day of production with no evidence of reflection period, absence of recorded questioning to establish voluntariness, no authorization for PW-12, and recording in intimidating JICs/BSF camps not a free atmosphere.

The memorandum lacked critical particulars (time of recording, custody source, reflection period). Considering the weak ocular identification and failure to recover the weapon (despite cartridge recovery), the confessions were the only substantive incriminating material and were tainted.

The Court upheld the Special Court’s rejection of the confessions and the consequent acquittals, dismissing the appeals. The judgment emphasized that Rule 15 and the Kartar Singh safeguards are not mere formalities but essential guarantees; non-compliance vitiates admissibility.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal proposition is that confessions under Section 15 TADA are admissible only when strict compliance with procedural safeguards mandated by Rule 15 and clarified in Kartar Singh (and subsequent cases) is demonstrated by the prosecution.

Where contemporaneous record fails to show questioning to establish voluntariness, adequate reflection time, place/time of recording, authorization of the recording officer, and a free atmosphere, such confessions are inadmissible; relying on them in the absence of independent corroboration is unsafe and mandates acquittal.

Also, a confession previously rejected in an earlier competent trial may give rise to issue estoppel preventing its later use if reception would disturb an earlier finding.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed, as a cautionary note, that confessions recorded in fortified or intimidating settings (BSF camps or JICs) are generally incompatible with the requirement of a “free atmosphere.” It lamented the heavy handedness and observed that such draconian provisions (TADA) had later been repealed, reflecting that procedural protections are indispensable when confessions by police are made admissible. The Court indicated that mere certificates or forwarding of statements without contemporaneous evidentiary support are insufficient.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Strict compliance with Rule 15 and Kartar Singh guidelines is mandatory; certificates alone will not validate a confession.
ii. Record question-and-answer steps showing the Recording Officer ascertained voluntariness prior to the confessional narrative.
iii. Document time, place and the source of custody, and ensure a meaningful cooling-off/reflection period before recording the confession.
iv. Avoid recording confessions in intimidating or fortified centres; ensure a free atmosphere.
v. Where a confession was earlier rejected in competent proceedings, prosecution must not re-introduce it in a way that disturbs the earlier finding (issue estoppel).
vi. Corroboration: where ocular evidence is weak and material evidence (weapon) is unrecovered, courts must be cautious in convicting solely on Section 15 confessions.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Court’s dismissal of the appeals reaffirms a key evidentiary principle: exceptional statutory inroads permitting police-recorded confessions require compensatory procedural rigour. The judgment underscores the protective function of Rule 15 and the Kartar Singh prescriptions not as formal checkboxes but as substantive preconditions to reliability. Practically, the decision sends a clear message to investigators and prosecutors that reliance on confessions recorded in custodial/intimidating settings without contemporaneous safeguards and recorded questioning is perilous.

The invocation of issue estoppel to bar reuse of a confession already rejected earlier protects finality in criminal adjudication and shields accused from repeated collateral attacks using the same tainted material. For criminal practice, the judgment emphasises careful documentation: production before magistrate, clear Q&A records, authorizations for recording officers, time/place entries, and ensuring opportunity for reflection.

In cases where independent corroboration (identification, weapon recovery) is lacking, courts must scrutinize Section 15 confessions with particular care. The decision thus strengthens procedural justice safeguards while balancing the State’s legitimate interest in prosecuting terrorism; it preserves the rule that reliability and voluntariness are prerequisites to converting a confession into a conviction.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.

2. Sharafat Hussain Abdul Rahaman Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 11 SCC 62.

3. SN Dube v. NB Bhoir, (2000) 2 SCC 254.

4. Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254.

5. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1.

6. Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2020) 5 SCC 118.

7. Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 245.

8. Shiraj Ahmed (as cited in judgment).

9. Ajit Singh (as cited in judgment).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 — Section 15.

2. TADA Rules — Rule 15.

3. Ranbir Penal Code, 1932 — Sections 118, 120-B, 302, 341, 364, 365, 368.

4. Arms Act, 1959 — Section 3/25.