A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS) & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 342 : 2025 INSC 422 addresses a recurrent interpretational conflict surrounding academic qualifications, career progression, and entitlement to higher pay scales within technical education regulated by the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987.

The Supreme Court examined whether Assistant Professors who had completed three years in the pre-revised scale of ₹12,000–18,300 as of 01.01.2006 could claim placement in the Pay Band of ₹37,400–67,000 with AGP ₹9,000 and re-designation as Associate Professors under Clause (ix) of the AICTE Notification dated 05.03.2010, despite lacking the essential qualification of Ph.D., mandated from 15.03.2000 onwards.

The Court differentiated teachers appointed prior to 15.03.2000 when Ph.D. was not compulsory from those appointed after, who were bound by the stipulation to possess or acquire Ph.D. within seven years per the AICTE Notifications of 2000 and 2005. It held that non-Ph.D. appointees after 15.03.2000 who failed to acquire the qualification within the statutory period could neither claim higher pay scales nor redesignation.

The expression “incumbent Assistant Professors” in the 2010 Notification was confined only to qualified personnel those possessing Ph.D. either at entry or within the stipulated period, or those appointed before the qualification became mandatory.

The Court affirmed the regulatory primacy of AICTE as an expert body and reiterated judicial restraint in academic-policy matters unless shown to be arbitrary or ultra vires. Teachers falling outside the mandated qualification matrix were held disentitled to claim parity in pay or designation. Certain respondents, however, including those appointed before 15.03.2000 and one who later acquired Ph.D., were granted consequential benefits with interest.

Keywords: AICTE; Ph.D. mandatory qualification; Associate Professor; higher pay scale; incumbent Assistant Professor; technical education; judicial review; 6th Pay Commission.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The dispute centers upon the entitlement of certain Assistant Professors employed in self-financed engineering institutions run by the appellant-Society to the benefits flowing from the AICTE Notification dated 05.03.2010, particularly the grant of Pay Band ₹37,400–67,000 with AGP ₹9,000 and redesignation as Associate Professor upon completion of three years in the pre-revised scale of ₹12,000–18,300.

The regulatory environment governing technical education is structured by the AICTE Act, 1987, which vests the Council with authority to frame norms relating to faculty qualifications, pay structures, and career advancement. Under Section 10 of the Act, AICTE is obligated to maintain academic standards and prescribe essential qualifications.

The evolution of policy, particularly through notifications in 2000 and 2005, turned the qualification landscape stringent by mandating Ph.D. as an essential prerequisite for appointment or for upward career mobility.

The litigation trace begins with writ petitions filed before the Bombay High Court where teachers lacking Ph.D. some of whom were appointed before 15.03.2000 and others afterwards claimed higher pay scales under Clause (ix) of the 2010 Notification. The High Court extended the benefits following an analogous decision in Sanjay Shrirangrao Surwase v. State of Maharashtra (WP No. 6001/2013).

However, the appellant contended that unlike the teachers in Surwase, the present respondents lacked the essential Ph.D. qualification and thus were disqualified from the 2010 benefits. This contention, not addressed earlier, led the Supreme Court to permit review before the High Court. Upon dismissal of review petitions, the matter returned to the Supreme Court, now requiring a full adjudication on the interplay between the qualification mandate and entitlement to higher designations.

The judgment engages in a doctrinal inquiry into the interpretation of “incumbent Assistant Professors” in the 2010 Notification, the regulatory supremacy of AICTE, the consequences of non-compliance with qualification norms, and judicial deference in academic matters.

Central to the adjudication is the Court’s insistence that pay progression must correlate with prescribed academic standards, preserving the structural hierarchy and integrity of teaching quality in technical institutions. The Court ultimately stratifies respondents into distinct categories based on appointment period and compliance with qualification requirements, producing differential legal outcomes.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS), manages engineering and technical institutes affiliated with concerned universities in Maharashtra. The respondents were appointed as Lecturers/Assistant Professors between 1995 and 2009, with requisite university approval.

Except for one, the respondents did not possess Ph.D. at appointment and failed further to obtain it within seven years as mandated under the AICTE Notification dated 28.11.2005. The qualification regime had shifted dramatically after 15.03.2000, when AICTE made Ph.D. an essential qualification for Assistant Professors under the revised pay scales for technical institutions.

Under Clause 7(b) of the 2000 Notification, movement into the grade of Assistant Professor required Ph.D., restricting non-Ph.D. teachers to lecturer-level progression. The 2005 Notification reiterated the requirement: candidates without Ph.D. but holding a first-class Master’s degree and five years’ experience could be appointed Assistant Professors, but were compelled to obtain Ph.D. within seven years, failing which increments would be stopped. The respondents admittedly fell into the category of persons not meeting this requirement.

The 2010 AICTE Notification restructured designations and pay scales, reducing faculty ranks to three Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, and Professor and providing that “incumbent Assistant Professors and incumbent Lecturers (Selection Grade)” who completed three years in the pre-revised scale as of 01.01.2006 would be placed in PB-4 with AGP ₹9,000 and re-designated as Associate Professors. The respondents claimed the benefit of this clause, arguing that the stipulation did not distinguish between Ph.D.-holders and non-Ph.D. candidates.

The Society denied the benefits, asserting that since the respondents lacked the essential Ph.D. qualification, they were never validly “incumbent Assistant Professors” under the 2010 Notification, and therefore could not claim career advancement. The High Court, however, relying on Surwase, directed grant of benefits.

The appellant challenged this, leading to Supreme Court proceedings where the principal issues involved determining eligibility for higher pay bands, assessing the binding force of the 2016 AICTE clarificatory notification, and interpreting statutory obligations under the 1987 Act. The Court segregated respondents into three categories:

(i) those appointed before 15.03.2000;

(ii) those appointed after 15.03.2000 without Ph.D. and failing to acquire it; and

(iii) one respondent who subsequently acquired Ph.D..

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Assistant Professors appointed after 15.03.2000 without Ph.D. and failing to obtain it within seven years are eligible to receive the higher pay scale and redesignation under Clause (ix) of the AICTE Notification dated 05.03.2010?

ii. Whether the expression “incumbent Assistant Professors” in the 2010 Notification includes non-Ph.D. teachers appointed after the introduction of mandatory qualifications?

iii. Whether the AICTE Clarificatory Notification dated 04.01.2016 issued under Section 23 of the AICTE Act, 1987 alters or expands entitlement to pay-scale movement?

iv. To what extent can courts interfere with qualifications or service norms prescribed by an expert academic body like AICTE?

F) PETITIONERS’ / APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS

The appellants argued that AICTE, under Sections 3 and 10 of the 1987 Act, is the statutory authority empowered to prescribe qualifications and career advancement norms for technical faculty. Therefore, any entitlement to higher pay scales must strictly adhere to qualification requirements in the 2000, 2005, and 2010 Notifications.

They contended that the essential Ph.D. condition has never been diluted, and persons appointed after 15.03.2000 without Ph.D. were only provisionally accommodated, subject to acquiring the qualification within seven years. The respondents’ admitted failure disentitled them from invoking Clause (ix) of the 2010 Notification.

The appellants further emphasized that the 2016 Clarificatory Notification is neither statutory nor amendatory, relying on Gelus Ram Sahu v. Surendra Kumar Singh, (2023) 4 SCC 484, which delineated the limited effect of such clarifications. They submitted that the purpose of the clarification was only to emphasize stoppage of increments, not to authorize higher pay or redesignation for unqualified candidates.

They argued that reading non-Ph.D. teachers into “incumbent Assistant Professors” would violate the merit-based regulatory structure, collapse academic standards, and produce inequitable treatment of qualified faculty. Citing AICTE v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan, (2009) 11 SCC 726 and Medical Council of India v. Sarang, (2001) 8 SCC 427, counsel stressed judicial restraint in academic matters.

G) RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS

Respondents argued that Clause (ix) of the 2010 Notification did not expressly condition redesignation on possession of Ph.D., thereby creating a vested entitlement. They submitted that the 2016 AICTE clarification, issued under Section 23, possessed statutory force and clarified that non-Ph.D. teachers would merely face stoppage of increments, not loss of career advancement.

They relied on Christy James Jose v. State of Kerala, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1817, asserting that the clarificatory notification mitigated adverse consequences of failure to obtain Ph.D.

Further, respondents argued that once the university approved their appointments, the employer could not retrospectively question qualifications. They contended that the High Court’s earlier ruling in Sanjay Shrirangrao Surwase recognized entitlement of non-Ph.D. incumbents to the 2010 benefits.

They maintained that classification between Ph.D. and non-Ph.D. teachers for pay purposes violated Article 14 by creating unreasonable discrimination.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 3, AICTE Act, 1987 – Constitution of AICTE as statutory authority.
ii. Section 10, AICTE Act, 1987 – Power to lay down norms for qualifications and academic standards.
iii. Section 23, AICTE Act, 1987 – Power to issue regulations and clarifications.
iv. AICTE Notification dated 15.03.2000 – Introduction of Ph.D. as essential qualification.
v. AICTE Notification dated 28.11.2005 – Mandate to acquire Ph.D. within seven years; consequence of increment stoppage.
vi. AICTE Notification dated 05.03.2010 – Revised pay scales; Clause (ix) for redesignation.
vii. AICTE Clarificatory Notification dated 04.01.2016 – Questionnaire format; interpreted as reiterative, not amendatory.
viii. Case law: AICTE v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan; Medical Council of India v. Sarang; Gelus Ram Sahu; Christy James Jose.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court held that respondents appointed prior to 15.03.2000, when Ph.D. was not an essential qualification, remained eligible for the benefits of the 2010 Notification. Their continuity through an earlier, less stringent regulatory regime protected their entitlement.

However, respondents appointed after 15.03.2000, without Ph.D., were governed strictly by the qualification mandates of the 2000 and 2005 Notifications. The failure to acquire Ph.D. within seven years was fatal to their claim for higher pay scales and redesignation.

Interpreting Clause (ix), the Court held that “incumbent Assistant Professors” could not be construed expansively to include teachers who did not possess essential qualifications. The term refers exclusively to:

(i) Assistant Professors who possessed Ph.D. at entry,

(ii) those who acquired Ph.D. within the seven-year statutory timeline, and

(iii) those appointed before 15.03.2000 when Ph.D. was not mandatory.

This restrictive construction, the Court reasoned, harmonizes with the qualification norms laid down by AICTE.

The Court rejected the respondents’ reliance on the 2016 clarification, holding that it merely reiterates consequences already contained in the 2010 Notification and cannot be treated as an amending instrument. Echoing Gelus Ram Sahu, the Court emphasized that clarificatory notifications cannot introduce new rights.

Judicial review was held limited in academic matters. The Court reaffirmed AICTE’s primacy as a statutory expert body entrusted with maintaining academic excellence. Regulatory frameworks specifying qualifications cannot be diluted by judicial interpretation, particularly when the consequence of non-compliance is expressly provided by statute or notification.

Based on this framework, the Court partly allowed the appeal:
• Four respondents appointed before 15.03.2000 were granted the higher pay scale with interest at 7.5%.
• One respondent appointed after 2000 but who subsequently obtained Ph.D. was also granted benefits.
• All other respondents were denied redesignation and pay advancement but permitted to apply again upon obtaining Ph.D..

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court’s ratio rests on three interpretive pillars. First, AICTE’s statutory mandate under Sections 10 and 23 establishes that essential qualifications for faculty positions must be strictly enforced.

The introduction of Ph.D. as a mandatory qualification through the 2000 and 2005 Notifications created a binding legal threshold for career advancement. Any claim for higher pay or redesignation presupposes compliance with this foundational requirement.

Second, Clause (ix) of the 2010 Notification does not create an independent right to pay progression; it operates within the larger regulatory framework. The expression “incumbent Assistant Professors” must be construed contextually, referring only to those validly occupying the post under applicable qualification norms.

Non-Ph.D. teachers appointed after the qualification became mandatory cannot be treated as lawful incumbents for purposes of advancement.

Third, the Court clarified the limited legal effect of the 2016 Clarificatory Notification. It reiterated the existing law but did not modify qualification requirements or entitlements. A clarificatory instrument cannot override substantive regulatory provisions nor create entitlements for those disqualified under prior norms.

Collectively, the ratio affirms a strict nexus between minimum qualifications and eligibility for higher academic posts, emphasising maintenance of academic standards, and endorsing AICTE’s exclusive competence in such matters. Judicial intervention is permissible only when regulations are arbitrary or ultra vires, neither of which was established.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court expressed that maintaining quality in technical education necessitates objective differentiation between qualified and unqualified faculty. Equating the pay and designation of Ph.D. and non-Ph.D. teachers would dilute academic standards and disrupt the incentive structure embedded within the qualification regime.

These statements, although not essential to the final holding, underscore policy concerns that guide judicial interpretation in academic matters.

The Court additionally noted that academic bodies like AICTE possess expert knowledge and must receive judicial deference. This observation reinforces the principle that courts should avoid substituting their own notions of educational adequacy where a specialized body has articulated coherent regulatory norms.

Another obiter remark concerned the continued liberty of teachers to seek career advancement upon subsequently obtaining Ph.D., suggesting that compliance—even if belated—may reopen avenues for progression. This reflects the Court’s recognition of fairness while upholding strict standards.

c) GUIDELINES

The Court did not issue formal guidelines but articulated operative principles which function as guiding norms:

1. Qualification Compliance: Higher pay scales and redesignation under AICTE regulations require strict adherence to essential qualifications, including Ph.D., unless the appointment predates the introduction of such qualifications.

2. Interpretation of “Incumbent”: The term “incumbent Assistant Professor” in regulatory notifications refers only to faculty legally holding the post under requisite qualifications.

3. Effect of Clarificatory Notifications: AICTE clarifications do not alter or expand substantive rights; they must be read harmoniously with existing regulations.

4. Judicial Deference: Courts must refrain from interfering with academic policy unless shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or ultra vires.

5. Prospective Opportunity: Teachers who later obtain Ph.D. may apply afresh for higher pay scales and redesignation, and institutions must consider such applications under prevailing regulations.

These principles collectively guide institutions, regulators, and courts on the manner in which qualification-linked service benefits are to be interpreted and implemented.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment represents a significant reaffirmation of the structural integrity of academic regulation in technical education. By upholding the mandatory Ph.D. requirement as a decisive factor for career advancement, the Court not only aligns with the statutory mandate of AICTE but also reinforces the professionalization of teaching in engineering institutes. The nuanced differentiation between pre-2000 and post-2000 appointees reflects a balanced application of fairness and regulatory compliance.

The Court’s insistence that “incumbent” cannot include those lacking essential qualifications preserves the legitimacy of designation hierarchies. Equally important is the rejection of the argument that the 2016 clarificatory notification bestowed broader rights; this preserves the doctrinal clarity between clarificatory and amendatory instruments.

The reasoning strengthens judicial deference to expert academic bodies. Through reliance on precedents like AICTE v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan and Medical Council of India v. Sarang, the Court underscores that educational standards must be determined by technocratic bodies rather than courts. This philosophy prevents dilution of norms that underpin national academic quality.

However, the judgment also reflects sensitivity: those who have legitimately acquired Ph.D. later or belonged to earlier appointment cycles are not deprived of equitable benefits. This demonstrates the Court’s commitment to both the rule of law and fairness.

Overall, the judgment provides clarity for institutions managing faculty progression, discourages ad-hoc deviations from AICTE norms, and fortifies the policy imperative of enhancing academic standards in technical education.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. AICTE v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan, [2009] 3 SCR 859 : (2009) 11 SCC 726.
ii. Medical Council of India v. Sarang, [2001] Supp. 2 SCR 275 : (2001) 8 SCC 427.
iii. Christy James Jose v. State of Kerala, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1817.
iv. Gelus Ram Sahu v. Surendra Kumar Singh, (2023) 4 SCC 484.
v. Sanjay Shrirangrao Surwase v. State of Maharashtra, WP No. 6001/2013.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 (Sections 3, 10, 23).
ii. AICTE Notifications: 15.03.2000, 28.11.2005, 05.03.2010, 04.01.2016.