A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE 

The Supreme Court in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick ([1951] SCR 1125) addressed the complex interplay between succession under Hindu law, rights of widows under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the legal nature of shebaitship. This case clarified that shebaitship—the office of managing a religious endowment—is a recognised form of property under Hindu law, thereby making it heritable and transferable, subject to the rules of succession unless expressly stated otherwise in the founding deed. The judgment harmonised ancient Hindu legal traditions with modern statutory enactments protecting women’s rights.

The crux of the dispute was whether the plaintiff, Angurbala Mullick—the second wife of Mrityunjoy Mullick, founder and shebait of a Hindu religious endowment—could claim joint shebaitship with her stepson, the son of Mrityunjoy’s first wife. The deed of endowment provided for succession of shebaitship in a specific order. The issue was whether, after Mrityunjoy’s death, the plaintiff as a Hindu widow was entitled to joint shebaitship under the 1937 Act along with her stepson.

The Court held that shebaitship is property within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, and hence the plaintiff, being a co-heir, was entitled to claim joint shebaitship. The deed did not restrict devolution solely to lineal descendants. This case is a landmark in reinforcing the rights of Hindu widows in inheriting religious endowments and in establishing the proprietary nature of shebaitship.

Keywords: Shebaitship, Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, Hindu law, Succession, Religious endowment, Co-heir, Joint Shebaitship

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1951

iii) Judgement Date:
3rd May, 1951

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, B.K. MUKHERJEA, and T.L. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.

vi) Author:
Justice B.K. Mukherjea (main judgment), with a concurring opinion by Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar

vii) Citation:
AIR 1951 SC 293, 1951 SCR 1125

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 3(1) and Section 5, Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937

• General principles of Hindu law on inheritance

• Doctrines governing Shebaitship succession

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any):
No judgment expressly overruled, but the Court distinguished and commented on the Federal Court’s opinion in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, [1945] FCR 1.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:

• Hindu Personal Law

• Religious and Charitable Trust Law

• Women’s Rights under Statutory Law

• Property Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arose out of a long-standing legal conflict between traditional Hindu law succession principles and the statutory rights conferred upon widows by the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937. The tension was most pronounced in religious matters, particularly regarding the devolution of shebaitship, an office that traditionally passed through male lineal heirs. The foundational premise of this case lay in the intersection of religious endowment law and statutory property rights. The Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act was enacted to remedy inequalities faced by Hindu widows under ancient law, granting them a share in the property of their deceased husbands equivalent to that of a son.

The specific background of the case involved a religious endowment created by Mrityunjoy Mullick and his adoptive mother, Nitto Sundari, whereby they established a temple and vested the management in a shebait. The endowment deed prescribed a succession plan for the shebaitship. Upon Mrityunjoy’s death, his second wife Angurbala claimed she was entitled to either sole shebaitship or joint shebaitship with her stepson Debabrata (son of Mrityunjoy’s deceased first wife, Kiranbala).

The central legal query was whether Angurbala, as a widow of the founder, could be recognised as a shebait when the deed mentioned succession by the “heirs of Mrityunjoy”, and whether shebaitship could be interpreted as “property” under the 1937 Act.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Mrityunjoy Mullick, a wealthy Hindu from Calcutta, was the adopted son of Dhananjoy Mullick. Dhananjoy passed away in 1907. In 1934, Mrityunjoy and his adoptive mother Nitto Sundari executed an indenture of religious endowment, creating a trust for the deity Sree Sree Nitto Gopal Jew, vesting in the trust certain immovable properties including a house on Syakrapara Lane.

The deed provided that Nitto Sundari would act as shebait during her lifetime, followed by Mrityunjoy, then by his wife Kiranbala, and thereafter by the “heirs of Mrityunjoy”. It also included a clause stating that if Mrityunjoy died without issue or without empowering his wife to adopt, he could nominate a successor shebait.

Mrityunjoy’s first wife, Kiranbala, passed away in January 1942, leaving behind a minor son Debabrata. Shortly after, Mrityunjoy remarried—his second wife was Angurbala, the plaintiff. Mrityunjoy himself passed away on 4th July 1942. Angurbala then filed a suit in 1947 seeking a declaration that she was either the sole shebait or joint shebait with Debabrata under the deed and by virtue of her status as a co-heir under the 1937 Act.

The defendant, Debabrata (through his guardian), denied Angurbala’s claim, asserting that the 1937 Act did not apply to religious office and that the plaintiff was not entitled to shebaitship under the deed or under law. The trial court rejected Angurbala’s claim but granted her right to reside in the endowment property. The Calcutta High Court upheld this decision, relying on Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi. Angurbala appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether shebaitship is “property” under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, particularly Section 3(1).

ii) Whether a Hindu widow, as a co-heir, is entitled to joint shebaitship with her deceased husband’s son under the rules of succession.

iii) Whether the expression “heirs of Mrityunjoy” in the endowment deed should include Angurbala.

iv) Whether the construction of the endowment deed excludes the widow from succession in favour of lineal descendants.

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The counsel for the appellant, Bakshi Tek Chand, submitted that the office of shebaitship is property under Hindu law and thus the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 would apply to its devolution. He argued that the 1937 Act, under Section 3(1), granted a Hindu widow the same rights as a son in the inheritance of property upon intestate death. Since Mrityunjoy Mullick died intestate, and no contrary intent was expressly laid out in the deed to exclude her, Angurbala became a co-heir and was entitled to joint shebaitship alongside her stepson.

He emphasized that the term “property” under the Act is wide and includes all heritable property, including religious offices like shebaitship, which carry proprietary elements. Relying on the decision of the Privy Council in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary, 63 I.A. 448, and the Full Bench decision in Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji, ILR 60 Cal. 452, he underscored that shebaitship is not a mere religious duty but involves beneficial enjoyment, including emoluments and residential rights, and therefore constitutes property.

Tek Chand further submitted that even assuming shebaitship was not “property” in the strict sense under the 1937 Act, the Act amended the general Hindu law of inheritance. Since succession to shebaitship follows the general rules of inheritance, the amendments under the Act would apply equally to the succession of shebaitship. This was based on the principle that unless specifically excluded, statutory changes in inheritance would affect all forms of property governed by Hindu personal law.

He also contended that the clause in the endowment deed, which stated that shebaitship would pass to “heirs of Mrityunjoy” after Kiranbala, was not a gift clause, but a clause of devolution, and therefore must be interpreted in line with current laws of inheritance, including the changes introduced by the 1937 Act.

Lastly, Tek Chand asserted that the failure of Kiranbala’s succession (as she predeceased Mrityunjoy) triggered the devolution upon the legal heirs as per the Hindu law applicable at the time of Mrityunjoy’s death. Since Angurbala was alive and qualified under the amended succession rules, she was entitled to be a joint shebait with Debabrata.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

Mr. Shankar Banerjee, appearing for the minor respondent Debabrata, contended that the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, does not apply to religious offices such as shebaitship, which he argued are not “property” in the ordinary sense. He asserted that the Act, by its text and context, was limited to secular and private property, and not to religious or trust-based roles. To support this, he referred to the Federal Court’s judgment in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, [1945] FCR 1, which observed that the Act does not extend to trusts and religious offices, especially when the deceased had no beneficial ownership.

Banerjee emphasized that the 1937 Act mentions in Section 3(3) that the widow’s share is limited to a Hindu woman’s estate, and such a concept, he claimed, cannot apply to shebaitship, since the office by its very nature is non-transferable, non-alienable, and always reverts to the line of succession determined by the founder’s wishes or customary Hindu law.

He also submitted that the deed of endowment itself must be interpreted to limit the devolution of shebaitship primarily to the issue of Mrityunjoy. He argued that the proviso in the deed—which stated that if Mrityunjoy died without issue, then the “heirs under Hindu law” would inherit—implied that the existence of an issue (as in this case, the minor Debabrata) excluded other heirs, including the widow.

According to Banerjee, the use of the phrase “heirs of Mrityunjoy” must be construed in a restrictive sense, meaning lineal descendants, and not all heirs in law. He cautioned that interpreting it broadly to include stepmothers or widows would defeat the founder’s intent to keep shebaitship within the bloodline. He further pointed out that testamentary disposition, referenced in Section 5 of the 1937 Act, had no application to shebaitship, which was non-testamentary in nature and thus outside the scope of the statute.

Therefore, Banerjee concluded, Angurbala was not entitled to either sole or joint shebaitship, as her claim lacked basis under both the deed and the law.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937

• Section 3(1): Grants Hindu widows the same share as a son in the property of the deceased husband if he dies intestate. Read on Indian Kanoon

• Section 3(3): The share received by a widow is subject to the limitation of a “Hindu woman’s estate”.

• Section 5: Clarifies that intestacy applies to all property not disposed of by testamentary means.

ii) Hindu Law Principles (customary):

• A shebaitship follows the line of inheritance, unless the founder directs otherwise.

• Shebaitship includes elements of both office and property and is treated as heritable.

iii) Judicial Decisions Cited:

• Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, 48 I.A. 302: Shebaitship is not a trust in the English sense but a religious office with property rights.

• Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary, 63 I.A. 448: Confirmed shebaitship as property.

• Bhabatarini v. Ashalata, 70 I.A. 57: Succession to shebaitship follows inheritance unless otherwise directed.

• Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji, ILR 60 Cal. 452: Sustained the proprietary element in shebaitship.

• Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, [1945] FCR 1: Distinguished rights over trust estates from personal property.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) Shebaitship is “Property” within the meaning of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937

Justice B.K. Mukherjea, delivering the majority opinion, ruled that shebaitship, though a religious office, is also property under Hindu law, and thus falls within the ambit of Section 3(1) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937. The Court held that unless the deed of endowment expressly excludes female heirs or lays down an alternate line of succession, shebaitship devolves according to Hindu succession law, which had been amended by the 1937 Act to include widows as co-heirs.

The judgment explained that shebaitship is not a mere office, nor a trust as understood in English law. Citing Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami (48 I.A. 302) and Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji (ILR 60 Cal 452), the Court reiterated that shebaitship is a blend of duty and beneficial interest, often with associated usufruct rights and residence in debutter property. This proprietary aspect entitles heirs, including widows under amended Hindu law, to succeed to it.

ii) The phrase “Heirs of Mrityunjoy” includes all legal heirs, not just lineal descendants

The Court interpreted the term “heirs of Mrityunjoy” in the deed not as words of gift, but as words governing devolution. Hence, the word “heirs” was not limited to the issue or children of Mrityunjoy but extended to all heirs under Hindu law, including his widow. There was no language in the deed to suggest that only sons or bloodline descendants were to inherit the office of shebait.

iii) The Proviso in the deed does not limit heirs to lineal descendants

Justice Mukherjea emphasized that the proviso in the deed, which allowed for nomination of a shebait in case Mrityunjoy died without issue or authority for adoption, did not restrict the general clause that provided for succession by heirs. The proviso only created an exception for a particular situation and did not alter the ordinary meaning of “heirs” in the main clause.

iv) Succession to shebaitship follows the general rules of Hindu inheritance

Even if “property” in the 1937 Act were to be interpreted narrowly, the Court held that since shebaitship follows general succession law, and the general law was amended by the 1937 Act, the widow must inherit. The Court cited the Madras High Court in Suryanarayanacharyulu v. Seshamma (AIR 1950 Mad 103), where a similar principle was upheld for hereditary archakatvam, another religious office.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) Federal Court decision in Umayal Achi was distinguishable

The Court distinguished Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, [1945] FCR 1, by observing that the trusts in that case did not involve any beneficial interest for the deceased. The deceased had managerial roles, not proprietary interests. In contrast, shebaitship included beneficial elements, such as 25% income from debutter property, making it a form of property.

ii) Deeds executed by laypersons should not be interpreted using strict statutory rules

Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar, concurring, noted that technical rules of statutory interpretation (e.g., rules for reading provisos) should not be strictly applied to documents executed by laypersons. Instead, courts must glean intent from the entirety of the deed, including its context and the customs it implicates.

iii) Shebaitship does not create a “Hindu woman’s estate” in the traditional sense

Justice Aiyar also reflected that shebaitship cannot create a Hindu woman’s estate, because both male and female shebaits have the same restrictions—i.e., the office is non-transferable, non-alienable, and reverts to the next heir, regardless of gender. Therefore, the objection that the Act cannot apply to such property fails.

c. GUIDELINES 

The Court laid down the following principles that serve as legal guidelines for future similar cases:

1. Shebaitship is Property:
   The office of shebait, carrying beneficial interest, remuneration, and residence rights, qualifies as “property” under Hindu personal law.

2. Widow’s Right Under Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act Applies to Shebaitship:
   The 1937 Act is applicable to religious endowments where shebaitship devolves by inheritance.

3. Succession to Shebaitship is Governed by Hindu Law Unless Otherwise Directed:
   Founders of religious endowments may regulate succession. In absence of such specific clauses, general rules of Hindu succession apply.

4. Widows Are Co-Heirs Post-1937:
   Following the 1937 Act, a Hindu widow shares equally with sons in her deceased husband’s property, including shebaitship.

5. Construction of Religious Deeds Must Focus on Intent:
   Courts must interpret endowment deeds in a broad and liberal manner, accounting for context, and not rigidly apply technical rules of statutory interpretation.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick decision marks a significant judicial evolution in the way Indian courts address religious endowments, particularly in the context of women’s inheritance rights. By recognising shebaitship as property, the Court harmonised the traditional Hindu law with the progressive mandate of the 1937 Act, ensuring that widows are not excluded from offices simply because they are religious in nature.

This decision is notable for its progressive lens on female succession rights, especially in a field that was once considered a masculine preserve. The Court rightly identified that beneficial enjoyment in a religious office cannot be disassociated from property rights, and where such enjoyment exists, inheritance law applies.

Furthermore, the Court’s approach to interpretation of deeds is commendable. It declined to read layperson-executed documents with rigid legalese and instead opted for a purposive and contextual interpretation. This underscores the Court’s commitment to upholding the substantive intent of drafters over semantic technicalities.

Importantly, this judgment bridges statutory law and customary Hindu law, ensuring that statutory rights are not eclipsed by custom in religious matters. It also paved the way for future recognition of female rights in religious and institutional roles, contributing to a broader legal reform in gender and property law.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, 48 I.A. 302
ii) Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary, 63 I.A. 448
iii) Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji, ILR 60 Cal 452
iv) Bhabatarini v. Ashalata, 70 I.A. 57
v) Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, [1945] F.C.R. 1
vi) Suryanarayanacharyulu v. Seshamma, AIR 1950 Mad 103