A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE (Word Count: 219)

The Supreme Court, in Arjun Singh alias Puran v. Kartar Singh and Others (1951 SCR 258), analyzed the limits of judicial discretion under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in the context of admitting additional evidence during appellate proceedings. The plaintiff challenged a will on the ground that the property involved was ancestral and could not have been alienated under customary law applicable to Jat agriculturists. The main contention revolved around the legitimacy of a will executed by Inder Singh in favor of Kartar Singh, who claimed to be an adopted son. The core legal question dealt with the evidentiary value of certain historical land records introduced at the appellate stage, which allegedly proved the ancestral nature of the land.

The Court underscored that the appellate court cannot admit additional evidence unless there is a clear lacuna in the existing record that prevents it from delivering justice. The judgment emphasized that such discretion must be judicial and not arbitrary. It further clarified that alienation of non-ancestral immovable property cannot be contested under Section 7 of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the evidence relied upon by the District Judge was improperly admitted and lacked credibility.

Keywords: Additional Evidence, Customary Law, Jat Agriculturists, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, Ancestral Property, Punjab Custom Act, Judicial Discretion, Reversionary Heir, Second Appeal, Will Validity

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Arjun Singh alias Puran v. Kartar Singh and Others

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1950

iii) Judgement Date: March 2, 1951

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Saiyid Fazl Ali, Mukherjea, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar

vii) Citation: (1951) SCR 258

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

• Section 7 of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920

• Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

• Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None explicitly overruled.

x) Case is Related to: Civil Law, Customary Succession, Law of Evidence, Procedural Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arose from a dispute over the validity of a will executed by Inder Singh in favor of Kartar Singh. Arjun Singh, claiming to be the reversionary heir, filed a declaratory suit challenging the will as null and void. He alleged the will concerned ancestral property, which under customary law governing Jat agriculturists, could not be bequeathed when collaterals existed up to the fifth degree. The case traversed through the Subordinate Judge, District Judge, High Court, and finally landed in the Supreme Court on appeal.

The focal point of contention lay in whether the appellate court could justifiably admit additional documentary evidence purportedly found later and whether such evidence proved the property in dispute to be ancestral. The Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920, particularly Section 7, became pivotal as it restricted challenges to alienations of non-ancestral property, thereby affecting the maintainability of the suit. The interplay between customary inheritance rights and procedural adherence to evidentiary rules shaped the core of this landmark decision.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Arjun Singh, the plaintiff, filed a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Jullundur, against Inder Singh (testator), Kartar Singh (legatee), and others for a declaration that a will executed 14 years prior by Inder Singh was void against him as a reversionary heir. The disputed property included:

• Half-share of 395 kanals in Kadduwal village

• 837 kanals 11 marlas and four houses in Pattar Kalan village

The plaintiff asserted that the entire property was ancestral, invoking the customary law among Jat agriculturists, which restricts alienation of ancestral land when there are surviving male collaterals.

The trial court found the property in Kadduwal to be non-ancestral and held that the land in Pattar Kalan could not be proven ancestral due to ambiguity in the pedigree—particularly regarding a third son, Pohlo, whose share was unaccounted for. The court also ruled that the plaintiff lacked locus standi and was barred by limitation.

The District Judge reversed this by admitting additional evidence, which allegedly proved Pohlo relinquished his share. The High Court, however, invalidated the admission of such evidence and declared the land to be non-ancestral, thereby upholding the bar under Section 7 of the 1920 Act.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the District Judge exercised proper discretion under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC in admitting additional evidence.

ii) Whether the property in question was ancestral and governed by customary law.

iii) Whether Section 7 of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 bars the suit, as the property was non-ancestral.

iv) Whether a finding based on inadmissible evidence can be deemed conclusive in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the appellant contended that the District Judge acted within his judicial discretion under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC.

They asserted that the additional evidence (settlement registers from 1849-50 and 1852) was discovered after the trial, was authentic, and crucial to prove that Pohlo had relinquished his share, thereby confirming that the property was ancestral.

The appellant’s counsel relied on the precedent in Kessowji Issur v. GIP Railway (34 IA 115) and Parsotim v. Lal Mohan (58 IA 254) to argue that evidence critical for reaching a just decision should be permitted, even at the appellate stage.

They maintained that the plaintiff’s right as a reversionary heir could not be extinguished due to a procedural technicality, especially in a matter involving customary succession rights.

They emphasized that Article 120 of the Limitation Act applied, and the suit was within time, given the plaintiff was a minor when the will was executed.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the respondent submitted that the District Judge acted contrary to law by admitting evidence that was not necessitated by any lacuna in the existing record.

They argued that the application to admit new evidence did not fulfill the test of necessity under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) and that the documents were not discovered due to due diligence.

They pointed out the suspicious nature of the interpolated entries in the kami beshi and muntakhib asami-war, suggesting they were fabricated.

They stressed that even if the evidence were valid, Section 7 of the 1920 Act expressly bars challenges to alienation of non-ancestral property, making the entire suit non-maintainable.

They urged the court to consider that customary law cannot override the statutory bar imposed by legislation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Order XLI Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, 1908
This provision governs the conditions under which appellate courts may admit additional evidence. The rule allows such evidence only when:

• The trial court refused to admit it wrongly,

• It was not available despite due diligence,

• The appellate court requires it to pronounce judgment.
  The Supreme Court emphasized that the discretion under Rule 27 must be judicial, not arbitrary, and only to fill lacunae apparent on the record.

ii) Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, 1908
This section restricts second appeals to substantial questions of law. Findings of fact are generally not revisited unless they are based on inadmissible or improperly admitted evidence, which the Court found applicable here.

iii) Section 7, Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920
The section bars contesting alienations of non-ancestral property on the basis of customary law. It overrides Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872. The Court ruled this provision as determinative of the maintainability of suits like the present.

iv) Article 120, Limitation Act, 1908
This article provides a six-year limitation period for suits not otherwise provided for. The District Judge had accepted that since the plaintiff was a minor when the will was executed, the suit was within time under this article.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that the District Judge improperly admitted additional evidence without applying the statutory test under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. The records were admitted before even examining the existing evidence, violating procedural rules.

ii) The High Court rightly excluded this additional evidence and held that, without it, the plaintiff failed to prove the property was ancestral.

iii) The finding by the District Judge based on this inadmissible evidence could not be accepted as conclusive under Section 100 CPC, as it was fundamentally flawed.

iv) The Court found that even if the land had been ancestral, the claim was barred by Section 7 of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920, which prevents challenges to alienation of non-ancestral property based on custom.

v) As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court’s judgment.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court made a strong observation that mere belief or suspicion of a document’s importance cannot justify its late production at the appellate stage. There must be a real and demonstrable defect in the record, not just post-trial discovery of new documents.

ii) The Court also cautioned against treating settlement records as gospel, especially when they bear signs of interpolation or tampering. Authenticity and chain of custody must be proven.

c. GUIDELINES 

i) The Appellate Court can admit additional evidence only when:

• The lower court wrongly excluded it;

• The party could not produce it despite due diligence;

• The appellate court needs it to pronounce judgment.

ii) Additional evidence should not be permitted:

• Merely because it was discovered after trial;

• Without proving its authenticity and relevance;

• When it is offered to patch weak points in the appellant’s case.

iii) Even valid findings of fact in lower courts cannot be sustained if:

• Based on improperly admitted evidence;

• The court failed to consider clear internal defects in such evidence.

iv) Customary laws cannot override statutory bars like Section 7 of the Punjab Act.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case stands as a critical precedent on judicial restraint in appellate procedure and offers clarity on the limits of additional evidence. The judgment underscores that procedural discipline is as vital to justice as substantive rights. The Court was vigilant in preventing misuse of appellate forums to re-litigate matters under the guise of fresh evidence.

By affirming the High Court’s rejection of the fabricated documents, the Court reinforced the principle that fraud or forgery cannot form the foundation of legal claims. Further, the ruling emphasized the need for strict construction of Section 7 of the 1920 Act, effectively barring suits that invoke custom to defeat statutory property rights.

This judgment remains instructive for both trial and appellate courts in maintaining the purity of the record and the scope of review at each judicial tier. It also consolidates the jurisprudence regarding the non-interference with factual findings unless they rest on inadmissible foundations.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Kessowji Issur v. G. I. P. Railway, (1907) 34 I.A. 115
ii) Parsotim v. Lal Mohan, (1932) 58 I.A. 254
iii) Arjun Singh alias Puran v. Kartar Singh and Others, (1951) SCR 258

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Order XLI Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, 1908
ii) Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, 1908
iii) Section 7, Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920
iv) Article 120, Limitation Act, 1908