A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The landmark judgment in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, reported in [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589, constitutes a crucial exposition on the doctrine of eclipse and interpretation of the term “void” under Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution. This case stemmed from a challenge against the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947, which authorized the government to nationalize motor transport services. The petitioners, private stage carriage operators, asserted that the Act became void under Article 13(1) upon the Constitution’s commencement, due to conflict with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 31(2). The Supreme Court, through an insightful interpretation, held that the Act was only inoperative to the extent of inconsistency with fundamental rights and not void ab initio. It ruled that the subsequent First and Fourth Constitutional Amendments cured the inconsistencies, reviving the law’s operation. This judgment laid down the Doctrine of Eclipse, distinguishing between laws that are void per se and those merely dormant due to constitutional inconsistency. The Court’s nuanced reading clarified the application of constitutional amendments on pre-constitutional laws, rejecting the idea that a fresh re-enactment was necessary for such laws to regain effect. This case is a seminal authority on constitutional interpretation, fundamental rights, and legislative continuity post-constitutional transformation.

Keywords: Article 13(1), Doctrine of Eclipse, State Monopoly, Constitutional Amendments, Fundamental Rights, Revival of Void Law, Article 19(1)(g), Article 31(2), Pre-constitutional Law, Nationalisation

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another

ii) Case Number: Petitions Nos. 189 to 193 of 1955

iii) Judgement Date: 29th September 1955

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Acting Chief Justice S.R. Das, Justice Bhagwati, Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, Justice Jaffer Imam, Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar

vi) Author: Acting Chief Justice S.R. Das

vii) Citation: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 13(1)

• Article 19(1)(g) and 19(6)

• Article 31(2)

• Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951

• Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955

• C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947

• Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

• Section 299 of Government of India Act, 1935

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None directly overruled, but Shagir Ahmad v. State of U.P. was distinguished

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Transport Law, Public Law, Fundamental Rights

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arose in a context where post-independence India was transitioning towards state-driven economic models. The provincial governments began enacting laws to nationalize essential services, including motor transport. The C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 gave the provincial government power to regulate, control, and even monopolize motor transport operations. This Act amended Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and introduced sweeping powers, including cancellation of permits, fare regulation, and monopolistic engagement of the state in transport services. Post the Constitution’s commencement in 1950, citizens acquired fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 31(2). As the government started acting under the authority of the 1947 Act, affected transport operators challenged the law, arguing that it became unconstitutional after 26 January 1950. The Supreme Court thus had to address whether the Act had ceased to exist in law and whether subsequent constitutional amendments could revive such a “void” enactment.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners were longstanding stage carriage operators in Madhya Pradesh, operating under valid permits issued under Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. These permits were generally valid for three to five years. The C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 radically changed this position by enabling the government to:

• Fix minimum and maximum fares;

• Cancel existing permits after due notice;

• Nationalize transport routes;

• Limit permit duration to less than statutory minimums;

• Compensate selectively based on rules.

This law created a de facto state monopoly in motor transport. The petitioners contended that this law contravened the right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g) and the right to property under Article 31(2). They further argued that Article 13(1) of the Constitution rendered the Act void upon the Constitution’s enactment. In support, they cited Shagir Ahmad v. State of U.P., where a similar law was invalidated. The State contended that subsequent constitutional amendments removed the inconsistencies, allowing the Act to be enforced again without re-enactment.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 became void under Article 13(1) due to inconsistency with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 31(2)?

ii. Whether the Act, once void, could be revived without re-enactment after constitutional amendments removed the inconsistency?

iii. Whether the Doctrine of Eclipse applied to the revival of pre-constitutional laws?

iv. Whether Shagir Ahmad v. State of U.P. controlled the present case?

v. Whether the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution validated the impugned Act under Article 31(2)?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 became void by virtue of Article 13(1). Since it contravened Article 19(1)(g) and Article 31(2), the law ceased to operate after 26 January 1950. They relied heavily on Shagir Ahmad v. State of U.P., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707, which held that total prohibition on transport business is not a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6). They argued that “void” under Article 13(1) meant the law had no legal effect, hence incapable of revival except through re-enactment. They also invoked Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613, reinforcing the view that once void, a law cannot be revived by constitutional amendments.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the term “void” under Article 13(1) only meant inoperative to the extent of inconsistency. The law remained on the statute book and applied to non-citizens and past transactions. They relied on Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, [1951] S.C.R. 228, which held that pre-constitutional laws are not obliterated but only eclipsed. They contended that the First Amendment of 1951, which modified Article 19(6), removed the inconsistency, reviving the law. Similarly, the Fourth Amendment of 1955 validated the law under the amended Article 31(2). They argued that revival through constitutional amendment did not require re-enactment.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 13(1) – “All laws in force… shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”
ii. Article 19(1)(g) – Freedom to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
iii. Article 19(6) (post-1951 amendment) – Permits creation of state monopolies
iv. Article 31(2) (pre and post-1955 amendment) – Protection against deprivation of property
v. Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 – Expanded exceptions under Article 19(6)
vi. Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 – Redefined compulsory acquisition
vii. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Section 58 regulating permits
viii. C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 – Enabled state monopoly

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i. The Court held that the term “void” in Article 13(1) means “inoperative to the extent of inconsistency,” not null and void from inception. Therefore, the law was not dead but dormant. After the First Amendment, which modified Article 19(6) to permit state monopolies, the inconsistency vanished. Hence, the impugned Act revived and could be enforced without re-enactment. The Court introduced the Doctrine of Eclipse, declaring that pre-constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are eclipsed, not effaced.

b. OBITER DICTA 
i. The Court noted that American doctrines of constitutional invalidity were inapplicable, since their constitutional scheme did not include express provisions like Article 13(1). It also opined that the impugned Act may not have violated Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

c. GUIDELINES 

• A pre-constitutional law that becomes inconsistent with fundamental rights does not become void ab initio.

• Such a law remains inoperative for citizens but operative for non-citizens or past acts.

• Constitutional amendments removing inconsistencies revive the law automatically.

• No re-enactment is required for revival of an eclipsed pre-constitutional law.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case marks a watershed in constitutional jurisprudence on legislative continuity and fundamental rights. The doctrine of eclipse established in this case safeguards legislative intent by preserving laws until constitutional inconsistencies are removed. It balances judicial review with parliamentary sovereignty. By distinguishing between void and dormant, the Court reinforced the dynamic adaptability of India’s legal framework. It also preempted judicial overreach by interpreting Article 13 pragmatically rather than literally. The judgment affirms that constitutional amendments can revive laws and that laws are not struck off the statute book by mere inconsistency with Part III. This principle continues to influence Indian constitutional law.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Shagir Ahmad v. State of U.P., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707
ii. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, [1951] S.C.R. 228
iii. Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613
iv. Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The C.P. and Berar, [1944] F.C.R. 284
v. Rajah of Bobbili v. State of Madras, 1952 1 M.L.J. 174
vi. Subodh Gopal Bose v. State of Bihar, [1954] S.C.R. 587

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India – Articles 13, 19, 31
ii. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Section 58
iii. C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947
iv. Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
v. Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955
vi. Government of India Act, 1935 – Section 299