Author: Karan Pratap Singh, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India, in this partition suit, upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court which relied on admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father (8th defendant) in an earlier suit to hold that certain disputed properties belonged exclusively to the first defendant and not to the joint family. The Court held that admissions by a party are substantive evidence under Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and can be relied upon irrespective of whether the maker has appeared as a witness or has been confronted with the same. The Court distinguished party admissions from prior inconsistent statements used to impeach a witness’s credibility under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.[1]

Keywords: Partition suit, Admissions, Substantive evidence, Prior inconsistent statements, Joint family property, Exclusive property, Indian Evidence Act

B) CASE DETAILS

iii) Judgement Date: 30 October, 1973

vii) Citation: 1974 AIR 117, 1974 SCR (2) 124, 1974 SCC (1) 78

viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Sections 17, 21 and 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal emanated from a partition suit where the plaintiffs claimed that certain properties were joint family properties liable to partition. The first defendant disputed the plaintiffs’ claim and asserted that some of the properties, including three properties covered by four usufructuary mortgage deeds and a shop room, belonged to him exclusively in his own right and not to the joint family. The Trial Court and the High Court concurrently accepted the first defendant’s contention by placing reliance on certain admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father (8th defendant) in their pleadings and depositions in an earlier suit.[2]

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiffs instituted a partition suit in respect of certain properties claiming them to be joint family properties that were liable to be partitioned among the family members. The first defendant contested the suit asserting that some of the properties, particularly three items covered by four usufructuary mortgage deeds (Exhibits B1 to B4) as well as a shop room situated in the north-west corner of Plot No. 1238, belonged to him exclusively in his individual capacity and did not constitute joint family properties.

To substantiate his claim, the first defendant relied on admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father (who was impleaded as the 8th defendant) in an earlier title suit being Title Suit No. 61 of 1945. In that suit, the present plaintiffs and their father (who was the first defendant in that suit) had filed a joint written statement wherein they had admitted the first defendant’s exclusive right over the presently disputed items of property. Similar admissions were made by the present first plaintiff and his father (8th defendant) in their depositions in that earlier suit.[3]

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the lower courts were justified in relying on admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father in an earlier suit to determine the nature of the disputed properties?

ii. Whether the disputed shop room and other properties were joint family properties subject to partition or belonged exclusively to the first defendant?

iii. Whether party admissions can be relied upon even if the maker of the admissions has not been confronted with the same in evidence?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The plaintiffs (appellants) contended that the lower courts erred in placing reliance on their admissions made in the earlier Title Suit No. 61 of 1945 as the first defendant had not pleaded or raised any alternative case based on these admissions. They argued that the first defendant’s case in his written statement was that he was the exclusive owner of the disputed properties as the heir of his father Narain Sah and not on the basis of any admissions.[4]

ii. It was further argued that the impugned admissions were not put to the first plaintiff when he appeared as a witness in the present suit. The 8th defendant had also not been summoned by the first defendant to confront him with his previous admissions. Hence, it was contended that the plaintiffs were seriously prejudiced by the reliance placed on these admissions without giving them any opportunity to explain the same.[5]

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The first defendant (respondent) supported the findings of the lower courts and contended that the admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father in the earlier Title Suit No. 61 of 1945, both in their joint written statement and depositions, clearly showed that the disputed properties were allotted to the first defendant in a family partition that had taken place in 1938 itself. Hence, he argued that the plaintiffs were rightly not granted any relief in respect of these properties on the basis of their own previous admissions.[6]

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deal with admissions as substantive evidence. Section 17 defines an admission as a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to a fact in issue or relevant fact. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them.[7]

ii. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with prior inconsistent statements of witnesses. It provides that a witness may be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing or reduced into writing, and such writing may be proved to contradict him.[8]

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court fully concurred with the findings of the courts below which had relied on the previous admissions of the plaintiffs and their father to arrive at the conclusion that the disputed properties belonged exclusively to the first defendant. The Court noted that if the admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father in the earlier suit were reliable, then the plaintiffs’ case stood damaged by their own admissions.[9]

ii. The Court observed that at the trial stage itself, the admissions contained in Exhibits G, G2 and H (which were the previous written statement and depositions of the plaintiffs and their father in Title Suit No. 61 of 1945) had been considered and acted upon while decreeing the first defendant’s exclusive rights in the disputed properties. Even before the High Court, the plaintiffs had not raised any contention that they were prejudiced by the reliance placed on their previous admissions without giving them an opportunity to explain the same.[10]

iii. It was held that there is a crucial distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness whose previous inconsistent statement is used to discredit him. In the former case, admissions by a party are substantive evidence under Section 21 of the Evidence Act if they fulfill the requirements of Section 17. In contrast, prior inconsistent statements of a witness do not become substantive evidence and are only used to impeach his credibility under Section 145.[11]

iv. The Court clarified that there is no requirement for party admissions to be put to the maker in evidence, as they are substantive evidence by themselves. On the other hand, a witness cannot be discredited using his prior inconsistent statement unless it has been put to him in cross-examination as per Section 145.[12]

v. Following the principles laid down in Bharat Singh & Anr. v. Bhagirathi[13], the Supreme Court held that admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them has appeared as a witness or not, and regardless of whether the party has been confronted with those admissions if he deposes to the contrary.[14]

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court opined that the first defendant had consistently set up a case denying the joint family character of the properties in his pleadings. His reliance on the plaintiffs’ admissions to advance an alternative defense was raised only at the evidence stage. Balancing the equities, the Court directed the plaintiffs to pay only half the costs of the appeal to the first defendant.[15]

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s judgment provides crucial clarity on the distinction between party admissions under Section 21 and witness statements under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Admissions have a higher evidentiary value as substantive evidence and can be relied upon even without confronting the maker with the same.

The Court rightly noted that the plaintiffs’ admissions in the earlier suit, if reliable, dealt a serious blow to their own case in the present suit. It was also observed that the plaintiffs had not raised any objection before the High Court regarding the reliance placed on their admissions without giving them an opportunity to explain. The Court’s approach in this case highlights the importance of uniformity and consistency in pleadings and evidence.

However, the Court was also cognizant of the fact that the first defendant had developed his case based on admissions only at the evidence stage, as contrasted with his exclusive reliance on inheritance in the pleadings. The Court adopted a balanced approach by making the plaintiffs liable for only half the costs, while dismissing their appeal on merits.

Overall, this judgment is a significant precedent on the interpretation of the Indian Evidence Act and the evidentiary value of party admissions. It underscores the importance of caution and consistency for litigants in making any statements or admissions, whether in pleadings or evidence, as they can decisively influence the outcome of a case.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Bharat Singh & Anr. v. Bhagirathi, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 606[16] – This judgment laid down the principle that admissions duly proved are admissible as substantive evidence regardless of whether the maker has appeared as a witness or has been confronted with the admissions. The Supreme Court distinguished admissions from prior inconsistent statements used to impeach witness credibility.

b. Important Statutes Referred

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

• Section 17 – Definition of admission[17]
• Section 21 – Relevancy of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf[18]
• Section 145 – Cross examination as to previous statements in writing[19]

ENDNOTES

[1] Paras 9-10, Page 5 of the judgment
[2] Para 1, Page 1 of the judgment
[3] Paras 1-2, Pages 1-2 of the judgment
[4] Paras 7-8, Page 4 of the judgment
[5] Para 8, Page 4 of the judgment
[6] Para 3, Page 2 of the judgment
[7] Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
[8] Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
[9] Para 3, Page 2 of the judgment
[10] Paras 7-8, Page 4 of the judgment
[11] Para 10, Page 5 of the judgment
[12] Para 10, Page 5 of the judgment
[13] [1966] 1 SCR 606
[14] Para 10, Page 5 of the judgment
[15] Paras 12-13, Page 6 of the judgment
[16] Bharat Singh & Anr. v. Bhagirathi, [1966] 1 SCR 606
[17] Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
[18] Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
[19] Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872