A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Supreme Court of India in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in [1953] SCR 319, addressed the constitutional validity of the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1947, issued under the delegated powers of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. The crux of the matter revolved around whether the Governor of Punjab exceeded his delegated legislative authority by prohibiting exports of essential commodities to a foreign territory, namely Pakistan, without a permit. The Court upheld the validity of the said order by reading the legislative text contextually, affirming that the term “trade and commerce” under Section 3 of the 1946 Act encompassed exports to foreign territories. Furthermore, the Court analysed the legislative competence under both the Government of India Act, 1935, and the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo VI, c. 39). The ruling clarified important principles regarding delegated legislation, interpretation of statutes, and the extent of provincial and central legislative domains, with implications in both constitutional and criminal law jurisprudence. The Court, however, remanded the criminal case back to the Sessions Court due to a serious factual misapprehension regarding a non-existent admission by the appellant Attar Singh, and subsequently extended the same relief to Darshan Singh on principles of parity.

Keywords: Delegated Legislation, Essential Supplies Act, Constitutional Law, Export Prohibition, Trade and Commerce, Statutory Interpretation, Government of India Act 1935

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Darshan Singh v. The State of Punjab; Attar Singh v. The State of Punjab
ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 11 and 12 of 1950
iii) Judgement Date: December 5, 1952
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Patanjali Sastri C.J., Mukherjea J., Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., Vivian Bose J., Ghulam Hasan J.
vi) Author: Justice B.K. Mukherjea
vii) Citation: [1953] SCR 319
viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, Sections 3 and 4

• Indian Penal Code, Section 120-B

• Government of India Act, 1935, Entries in Lists I and II

• Constitution of India, Article 132(1), 132(3)
  ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None
  x) Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Administrative Law, Statutory Interpretation, Public Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This decision arose during the formative post-Independence era where questions of federalism, legislative competence, and transitional laws dominated Indian legal discourse. The East Punjab Government issued a control order prohibiting export of cotton cloth and yarn to Pakistan without a permit under powers delegated by the Central Government through the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. The appellants, customs officers and traders, were convicted for conspiracy and attempt to export cloth illegally. They contended that the control order was ultra vires the Governor’s powers as it involved extra-territorial trade—a Central subject under the Government of India Act, 1935. The Supreme Court had to determine the scope of delegated authority under the 1946 Act, interpret “trade and commerce,” and decide on the constitutionality of penal provisions applied in the case.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The case stems from an incident on 26 May 1948, when a truck loaded with 76 bags of mill-made cloth attempted to cross the Indo-Pakistan customs barrier at Wagha near Amritsar without a valid permit. The cloth was allegedly smuggled by Darshan Singh, then Deputy Superintendent of Customs, and Attar Singh, a Customs Preventive Officer. They, along with co-accused including traders and a customs supervisor, facilitated or conspired to bypass customs checks and allowed manual portage of goods across the border. The goods were intercepted by a police officer on special anti-smuggling duty. Based on this, charges under Section 120-B IPC, Section 7 and Section 8 of the Essential Supplies Act, and relevant provisions of the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947, were framed. The trial court convicted the accused; the appellate court upheld the convictions with modifications. The High Court granted constitutional leave under Article 132, paving the way for this appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the Governor of Punjab acted ultra vires his delegated powers under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 by prohibiting export to Pakistan without a permit?
ii. Whether the expression “trade and commerce” in Section 3 of the 1946 Act included international export?
iii. Whether the control order was a colourable exercise of power intruding into the Central legislative domain under Entry 19, List I of the Government of India Act, 1935?
iv. Whether the criminal conviction could be sustained in light of a factual error concerning an admission that never occurred?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the order under the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1947, was unconstitutional as it involved export beyond the territory of India. They argued that “trade and commerce” in Section 3 of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946 must be construed narrowly to cover intra-provincial or inter-provincial trade, not extra-territorial export, which fell within the exclusive legislative competence of the Central Government under Entry 19 of List I of the Government of India Act, 1935.

They further argued that the central legislature had separately enacted the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 for handling cross-border trade. Thus, it was contended that Parliament never intended the Essential Supplies Act to regulate export beyond India. Additionally, they challenged the factual finding of Attar Singh’s “admission” of presence at the scene as completely unsupported by the record, alleging grave miscarriage of justice in relying on a non-existent confession.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the term “trade and commerce” under Section 3 of the 1946 Act must be interpreted broadly. Given the legislative intent to control essential commodities, any regulation impeding illegal outflow—even to foreign countries—would fall within its ambit. They emphasised the contextual and purposive interpretation, citing the post-war and post-Partition necessity to ensure equitable distribution of cloth within East Punjab.

The Attorney General, appearing as Intervener, supported the Governor’s actions and stated that under the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, the central legislature was duly empowered to make temporary laws on even provincial subjects, justifying the delegation to provincial authorities like the Governor.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, Sections 3 and 4
ii. Government of India Act, 1935, Entry 19 List I, Entries 27 and 29 List II
iii. Indian Penal Code, Section 120-B: Criminal Conspiracy
iv. Constitution of India, Article 132(1), 132(3)
v. Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947
vi. East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947, Sections 2, 3 and 10

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Court held that “trade and commerce” in Section 3 of the Essential Supplies Act must be interpreted in light of the Act’s object, which was to ensure equitable supply of essential commodities. Export prohibition was not ultra vires. Even if construed as provincial legislation, it remained valid as export regulation could be ancillary to control of local supply.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court emphasized that when two statutes operate concurrently, the purpose, scope, and object of each must be harmonised. Mere overlap does not invalidate either enactment unless they are irreconcilable. Also, courts must ensure that trials are fair and not based on non-existent evidence.

c. GUIDELINES

• Courts must interpret statutes contextually, not in isolation.

• Delegated legislation is valid if within the scope of delegated authority and object of the principal Act.

• Misapprehension of evidence affecting criminal culpability mandates retrial.

• Legislative competence may rest on multiple sources; invocation of one does not exclude reliance on another.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment stands as a precedent on the constitutional legitimacy of delegated legislation involving essential supplies. It clarified that the scope of delegated legislative powers under an enabling Act must be construed broadly, based on purpose, and not narrowly to curtail regulatory powers vital for public interest. The Supreme Court’s nuanced reading of legislative powers across central and provincial domains illustrated the doctrine of pith and substance in action. The Court also prioritised the right to fair trial by remanding the matter due to reliance on an erroneous admission, thereby reinforcing procedural safeguards in criminal jurisprudence.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. None directly cited within text, but case law principles inferred.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
ii. Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947
iii. East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1947
iv. Government of India Act, 1935
v. India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946
vi. Constitution of India
vii. Indian Penal Code, 1860