A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Supreme Court of India addressed the issue of limitation in criminal prosecution under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (4 of 1889). The appellant, Dau Dayal, was prosecuted for possessing counterfeit trade-marked bidis under multiple sections of the Indian Penal Code. The pivotal question was whether the prosecution commenced on filing the complaint or on issuance of process by the Magistrate. The Court held that prosecution begins when the complaint is filed, not when process is issued. This judgment clarified the application of limitation provisions in trade mark counterfeiting offences and emphasized that statutory limitation aims at ensuring prosecutorial diligence and not penalizing procedural delays within the court system.
Keywords: Limitation Period, Indian Merchandise Marks Act, Prosecution Commencement, Counterfeit Trade Marks, Criminal Procedure Code, Trade Mark Protection, Private Complaint, Supreme Court Judgment.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title
Dau Dayal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 1958
iii) Judgement Date
November 24, 1958
iv) Court
Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.
vi) Author
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.
vii) Citation
[1959] Supp. SCR 639
viii) Legal Provisions Involved
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Section 15 of Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (4 of 1889)
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Sections 420, 482, 483, 485, 486 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
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Article 134(1)(c) of Constitution of India, 1950
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Sections 190, 200, 202 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case
None.
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Criminal Law, Trade Mark Law, Procedural Law, Intellectual Property Law, Constitutional Law.
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The controversy in this appeal focused on the interpretation of Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889, particularly on the point of limitation in initiating criminal prosecution for counterfeiting trade marks. The provision allows the prosecution to be instituted within three years from the commission of the offence or one year from its first discovery by the prosecutor, whichever expires earlier. The central dispute arose because of differing interpretations of when a prosecution can be said to have commenced: whether upon the filing of the complaint or only upon issuance of process by the Magistrate. This was critical in determining whether the complaint filed against the appellant was barred by limitation.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
On April 26, 1954, the appellant was arrested by Sisamau Police, Kanpur, for allegedly possessing 25 packets of “Chand Chhap Biri” bearing counterfeit trade marks. Authorities seized counterfeit bidis, wrappers, and labels. Subsequently, on May 26, 1954, one Harish Chandra Jain, representing M/s Mohan Lal Hargovind Das, lodged a private complaint alleging offences under Sections 420, 482, 483, 485, and 486 IPC. The Magistrate directed the police to register a case and investigate. Following investigation, the police submitted a charge sheet on September 30, 1954. The Magistrate issued summons on July 22, 1955. The appellant objected, claiming that since the offence was discovered on April 26, 1954, the prosecution was barred by the one-year limitation under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 because process was not issued until after that period. Both the Magistrate and revisional courts rejected his contention, leading to this appeal.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether the prosecution commenced on the date of filing the complaint or on the date when process was issued by the Magistrate for the purposes of calculating limitation under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889?
F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that
The appellant argued that the one-year limitation period began on April 26, 1954, when police arrested him and seized the counterfeit goods. Therefore, issuance of process on July 22, 1955, occurred beyond the permissible period. The appellant relied on multiple precedents to argue that prosecution commences only upon issuance of process, not upon filing of complaint.
They cited Sheik Meeran Sahib v. Ratnavelu Mudali (1912) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 181, De Rozario v. Gulab Chand Anundjee (1910) I.L.R. 37 Cal. 358, and Golap Jan v. Bholanath Khettry (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 880, where courts had held that prosecution for malicious prosecution purposes commenced only when process was issued.
The appellant also sought support from the Supreme Court’s decision in R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1951] S.C.R. 312, contending that without issuance of process, no prosecution could be said to have been commenced. Additionally, they referred to Gopal Marwari v. King-Emperor (1943) I.L.R. 22 Pat. 433, where distinctions were drawn between initiation of proceedings and taking cognizance.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that
The respondent argued that prosecution for purposes of limitation begins on filing the complaint, not on issuance of process. They emphasized that Section 15 intends to ensure diligence on the part of complainants and not to penalize them for procedural delays within the judicial system.
The respondent referred to English law principles from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. X, 3rd Edn., p. 340, para. 630, where it is stated that prosecution commences when an information is laid before a justice.
They contended that if prosecution were held to commence only after issuance of process, the complainant would suffer for delays beyond his control, thereby frustrating legislative intent to protect trade mark owners from counterfeiting.
The respondent further distinguished malicious prosecution cases as inapplicable, as they dealt with entirely different contexts where actual prosecution against the plaintiff was in question rather than commencement of prosecution under limitation statutes.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (4 of 1889)
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Section 15: No prosecution shall be commenced after expiration of one year from discovery or three years from commission of the offence, whichever occurs first.
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Sections 13 and 14: Special procedural rules related to evidence and costs in trade mark prosecutions.
ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860
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Sections 420, 482, 483, 485, and 486: Punishments for cheating, counterfeiting, and fraudulent use of trade marks.
iii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
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Sections 190, 200, 202: Taking cognizance on complaints, preliminary examination, and inquiry into offences.
iv) Constitution of India, 1950
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Article 134(1)(c): Special leave to appeal granted by High Court in criminal matters.
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution commences on presentation of complaint before a Magistrate. The term “prosecution” under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 was not defined, hence judicial interpretation was warranted. The Court extensively relied on Halsbury’s Laws of England, holding that in absence of statutory contradiction, prosecution begins when a complaint is lodged.
The Court opined that the object of Section 15 is to ensure that the complainant approaches the Court diligently within one year of discovering the offence. The period of limitation is not intended to cover administrative delays after complaint filing. Delays attributable to the Court, such as time taken to issue process, cannot render the complaint barred by limitation.
The Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on malicious prosecution cases, stating they were distinguishable. The Court observed that Sheik Meeran Sahib, De Rozario, and Golap Jan involved actions where the question was whether the plaintiff had been subjected to prosecution, not when prosecution commenced.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court clarified its earlier ruling in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh was inapplicable since that case involved a prosecution launched by police under preventive arrest powers, not a private complaint.
Thus, the Court upheld the High Court’s judgment that the prosecution was not barred by limitation.
b. OBITER DICTA
The Court emphasized that trade mark counterfeiting is both a civil and criminal wrong. While civil proceedings are time-consuming, criminal prosecutions offer speedier remedies to protect trade mark owners. The legislative intent behind the Merchandise Marks Act was to prevent unfair trade practices promptly and efficiently. If prosecution were to commence only on issuance of process, this intent would be defeated by procedural delays outside the control of the complainant.
c. GUIDELINES
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Prosecution under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889, commences on presentation of complaint.
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Limitation provisions aim to ensure diligence by complainant, not penalize court-related delays.
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Malicious prosecution precedents are not relevant for determining commencement of prosecution under limitation statutes.
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Police investigations initiated after complaint filing do not delay commencement of prosecution for limitation purposes.
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Courts must interpret limitation statutes to avoid frustrating legislative intent and protection of trade mark rights.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
This landmark ruling by the Supreme Court of India significantly clarified the interpretation of commencement of prosecution under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889. The judgment adopts a complainant-centric view that encourages diligent prosecution of trade mark infringements while ensuring that procedural inefficiencies of the judiciary do not defeat the substantive rights of complainants. The ruling harmonizes Indian law with English common law principles as enunciated in Halsbury’s Laws of England. It also highlights the balance courts must maintain between the rights of accused persons and the interests of intellectual property holders in combating counterfeit activities.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
[1] Sheik Meeran Sahib v. Ratnavelu Mudali, (1912) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 181
[2] De Rozario v. Gulab Chand Anundjee, (1910) I.L.R. 37 Cal. 358
[3] Golap Jan v. Bholanath Khettry, (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 880
[4] Mohamed Amin v. Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee, [1947] A.C. 322
[5] R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1951] S.C.R. 312
[6] Gopal Marwari v. King-Emperor, (1943) I.L.R. 22 Pat. 433
[7] Ruppell v. Ponnuswami Tewan, (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 488
b. Important Statutes Referred
[8] Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (4 of 1889) — Sections 13, 14, 15
[9] Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 420, 482, 483, 485, 486
[10] Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 — Sections 190, 200, 202
[11] Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 134(1)(c)
