Dharam Dutt & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 24 November, 2003

Author: Shriya Tripathi

Edited By: Parmar Krishna

ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Indian President issued Ordinance No. 3 of 2000 on September 1, 2000, which mirrored the provisions of an earlier Ordinance from 1990. The established legitimacy of this statute was tested through C.W.P. No. 5174 of 2000 before the Delhi High Court Following a progression of omissions and recoveries of comparable Statutes, the Bill in the long run passed as a demonstration of Parliament on September 3, 2001. By taking over the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and its properties, infringing on their freedoms of speech, expression, and association, and depriving them of property without lawful authority, the writ petitioners argued that the disputed Ordinance and subsequent Act violated their rights under Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution. The Union of India argued that ICWA had global significance for India’s foreign policy and world affairs. However, the Society’s administration has been criticized for poor operations, financial mismanagement, and irregularities in elections. The ICWA’s reputation was damaged as a result of these issues, which prompted the adoption of the Ordinance and subsequent legislation to ensure proper administration. The question of whether the government’s takeover constituted a reasonable restriction on the petitioners’ fundamental rights and whether the legislation flouted prior judicial rulings, thereby challenging its validity, were the primary points of contention. The High Court’s judgment assessed the sensibility of the limitations forced and the authoritative purpose behind the sanctioning, taking into account the harmony between individual freedoms and public premium as outlined by sacred arrangements.

Keywords

• Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001
• Societies Registration Act, 1860
• Sapru House
• Entries 62 and 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India
• Writ Petition

CASE DETAILS

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001, and the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001, which followed, are the subject of a challenge to their constitutional validity in the case “Dharam Dutt & Ors vs Union of India & Ors,” which was decided on November 24, 2003. The candidates, Dharam Dutt, and others opposed the mandate, and the demonstration disregarded their major privileges under Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), and 300A of the Indian Constitution. They argued that the government violated their rights to freedom of speech, association, and property by taking over the Indian Council of World Affairs and its properties. The case shows how Indian constitutional law conflicts with individual rights and governmental authority.

FACTS OF THE CASE

• Procedural Background of the Case

The Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001, which was issued by the President on May 8, 2001, was challenged in WP(C) No.276 of 2001 on June 22, 2001. The Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001, which received the President’s assent on September 3, 2001, replaced the Ordinance before this petition could be decided. WP(C) No.543 of 2001 was then filed on October 19, 2001, challenging the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001’s constitutionality. The two petitions were recorded under Article 32 of the Constitution under the steady gaze of the High Court engaging straightforwardly to its purview to implement major privileges. In both writ petitions, the petitioners were the same, namely Dharam Dutt and others. The respondents named were the Association of India and others. During the pendency of the main writ appeal, occasions like the substitution of the mandate by the Demonstration occurred, requiring the second request against the Demonstration. The High Court heard the two petitions together as the grounds raised were indistinguishable testing the takeover of the General public and claiming infringement of crucial privileges. Its errand was to meditate upon the lawfulness of both the reproved Mandate as well as the in this way sanctioned Follow-up based on contentions introduced by the two players.

• Factual Background of the Case

To encourage study and research on international issues, the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) was established in 1943 as a non-official, non-political, and non-profit organization. It was established at Sapru House in Delhi, which also housed the organization’s library and other amenities, and was authorized to operate by the Societies Registration Act of 1860. Sapru House was developed on two sections of land rented from the Public Authority of India in 1950-51. Up until 1987, the government gave ICWA grants. In 1990, a law was passed comprising ICWA as a legal body. The Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld this after challenging it. In 1999, the public authority dropped the ceaseless rent on the land and gave reemergence orders, which were tested in the Delhi High Court. In 2000 and 2001, similar ordinances were issued, establishing ICWA as a statutory body. Ownership of Sapru House properties was the subject of contention, as were numerous allegations of financial irregularities and improper administration against ICWA management. An extraordinary review by CAG in 2000 uncovered liabilities of Rs. 132.84 lakh and the possibility of stealing Rs. 1.39 lakhs. The Upbraided 2001 Law and 2001 Demonstration were established, prompting the documenting of the current writ petitions testing their legitimacy on grounds of infringement of basic privileges.

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the impugned Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001, and the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001 violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), and 300A of the Constitution?
2. Whether the impugned Ordinance and Act fell within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entries 62 and 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution declaring ICWA as an institution of national importance.

PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS-

The Petitioners’ Counsel made the following affirmation:

Issue 1: Violation of Constitutional Article 19(1)(a): It was submitted by the Counsel for Petitioner that the Government has violated the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution by taking over the ICWA Society through the disputed Ordinance and Act. This means that the Government has limited the Society’s activities and its goal of encouraging discussion and research on international affairs. According to Article 19(2), the takeover amounts to an unreasonable restriction of the aforementioned fundamental right.

Issue 2: Violation of Constitutional Article 19(1)(c): In addition, it was submitted by the Counsel for Petitioner that the citizens who are members of the ICWA Society are arbitrarily denied their fundamental right to freely form associations under Article 19(1)(c) because of the Government’s takeover of the Society through the challenged laws. This violates the right to social interaction, which cannot be restricted by Article 19(4) of the Constitution.

Issue 3: Infringement of Article 300A of the Constitution: It was submitted by the Counsel for Petitioner that the ICWA Society had been illegally and without legal authority deprived of its private properties worth crores of rupees by transferring all of its assets to the statutory body established by the Act. This removes the properties of the general public in repudiation of the central right ensured under Article 300A of the Constitution. Fourth problem: Abuse of power: The learned counsel vigorously argued that the disputed Ordinance and Act were the result of political malice and were maliciously enacted to take control of the reputable ICWA society for unrelated purposes. This was a questionable exercise of power without legislative authority.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

 Issue 1: Article 19(1)(a) validity: The Advice presented that the reproved Act doesn’t in any way confine the right to speak freely and articulation of the ICWA Society or its individuals under Article 19(1)(a). The general public keeps on existing as an autonomous substance with practically no limitations on its exercises or targets. Only the organization known as “ICWA” has been taken over and declared to be an organization of national importance; entries 62 and 63 of List I cover this organization in full.

Issue 2: Legitimacy under Article 19(1)(c): The guidance further presented that the reprimanded Act has not the slightest bit denied the residents who are individuals from the general public of their entitlement to unreservedly frame relationships under Article 19(1)(c). Once more, just the organization “ICWA” has been dominated, not the general public. As a result, the aforementioned fundamental right is not violated.

 Issue 3: Article 300A Validity: The Counsels argued that the majority of the properties, including the “Sapru House” building, were primarily constructed with funds provided by the Government over time. The general public had just leasehold freedoms over the land that stood. As a result, there was no violation of Article 300A when private property was taken away.

 Issue 4: There is no malice: The Counsels vehemently denied the allegations of malicious intent and argued that the takeover was based on the recommendations of parliamentary committees to revive the organization in light of its declining standards and growing mismanagement over time.

RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

The Constitution of India 1950 –

Article 14,19(1)(a),19(1)(c) and 300A

1. Article 14 – [1]The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth
2. Article 19(1)(a) – Guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression.
3. Article 19(1)(c) – Guarantees the right to form associations or unions.[2]
4. Article 300A – States that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law.[3]

JUDGEMENT

RATIO DECIDENDI-

• The following is a summary of the case’s ratio decidendi, or legal principle, that served as the basis for the decision, based on the issues raised and analysis conducted in the judgment: simple claims of political malevolence or colorable activity of abilities are not significant in deciding the established legitimacy of regulation.
• The question is whether the Legislature had the skills necessary to pass the law. According to Article 19(1)(a) and (c), freedom of speech and association does not guarantee that every association’s goal will be achieved. Accomplishing the reason for which an affiliation is framed is certainly not a basic right.
• Taking over a foundation by regulation for motivations behind public significance is inside the authoritative ability given by Passages 62 and 63 of Rundown I.
• If the society itself continues to function independently and without restrictions, such a takeover of an institution does not violate the fundamental rights of its members.
• If the lease is terminated, properties built primarily with government funds cannot be claimed as private property by an association invoking Article 300A.
• The authoritative capability of Parliament to order the reproduced regulation was not surpassed. Legislative malice or motives cannot be investigated so long as Parliament acts within its powers.
• As a result, the ratio indicates that the ICWA institution’s takeover by the contested Act does not violate any Constitutional provision because it is fully covered by the legislative entries in the Seventh Schedule.

GUIDELINES

• Yes, the Supreme Court has given some guidelines while observing the issues raised in this case:
• The test of reasonableness under Article 19 should be applied on a case-to-case basis considering all relevant factors like the nature of the right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the extent of evil sought to be remedied, etc.
• Freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c) does not guarantee the fulfillment of objectives of association. Associations cannot claim rights beyond what citizens enjoy.
• The scope of Article 19(1)(a) cannot be expanded to include concomitant or peripheral rights. Only integral and core rights are protected.
• Validity of the law restricting the association’s activities is to be tested under Article 19(1)(g) and not Article 19(1)(c) or Article 19(4).
• Malafide intent or motives of legislature do not affect the validity of the law. The only test is legislative competence.
• Properties constructed with government funds cannot be claimed as private under Article 300A if the lease is terminated as per law.
• Takeover of the institution for national importance is valid if covered by legislative entries even if it affects the associated body/trust.
• Merely replacing the ordinance with law does not make a challenge to the ordinance infructuous, if the same issues exist in both.
• In determining validity, the court must balance individual rights and government interests in smooth administration.
• So in summary, the case provides guidelines on the interpretation of the scope of Article 19 rights and principles to examine legislative competency and validity of laws affecting fundamental rights.

OBITER DICTA

There are a few obiter dicta or observations made by the court in the course of the judgment that were not central to the ratio decidendi:

 While examining the extent of Article 19(1)(a), the court mentioned its past decisions in Maneka Gandhi v Association of India (1978) and the All India Bank Workers Affiliation case (1962) to explain that the opportunity of affiliation does exclude satisfaction of affiliation’s goals as a surefire right. It saw that simple substitution of a statute by regulation doesn’t make the test to the mandate infructuous if similar issues exist in both. The legal merits of the issues must be considered.

The court expounded on the twin tests set down in the past to look at legitimacy under Article 19: trial of sensibility and whether the limitation falls in statements 2–6. In applying the test of reasonableness on a case-by-case basis, it noted the significance of factors like the nature of the right, the purpose of the restriction, and the extent of evil.

 The ratio, on the other hand, is limited to ensuring that Parliament has the authority to take over the relevant institution without affecting the rights or activities of the associated society.

During the process, no previous precedents were overturned. The observations helped with the analysis, but they weren’t necessary for the decision.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

In Dharam Dutt & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court reached the following conclusions:

 When the Act replaced the Ordinance, the challenge became unsuccessful and was dismissed without merit. The legitimacy of just the demonstration was analyzed.

 The demonstration falls within the authoritative ability of Parliament given under Sections 62 and 63 of Rundown I, which permits the statement of establishments as of public significance.

 According to Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c), the Act’s sole takeover of the ICWA institution does not in any way restrict the freedoms of the ICWA Society or its members. The general public remains unaffected.

The Society’s buildings were mostly built with money from the government, so they were not private properties.

 Subsequently, there was no violation of Article 300A by moving properties to the new body. Legislation’s validity is determined solely by legislative competence, not by allegations of malice or political motives.

 The Act is subject to the permissible restrictions outlined in Articles 19(2) to 19(6) and does not impose any unreasonable restrictions on any fundamental rights.

 Parliament acted to the extent of its authoritative capability presented by the Constitution in establishing the upbraided Act.

As a result, the petitioners’ writ petitions challenging the Indian Council of World Affairs Act were denied by the Supreme Court, which upheld the Act’s constitutionality.

REFERENCES

Important Cases Referred-

• Maneka Gandhi v Association of India (1978)
• All India Bank Employees case (1962)

Important Statutes Referred

• Constitution of India, 1950
• Entries 62 and 63 of List I in the Seventh Schedule (discussing powers on Parliament about institutions of national importance)
• Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c) and 300A (dealing with fundamental rights)

ENDNOTES

[1] The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14.

[2] The constitution of India ,1950, Art.19.

[3] The constitution of India ,1950, Art.300A.