A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal concerns whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court’s acquittal and convicting six villagers as members of an unlawful assembly that took part in night-time rioting at village Vadod on 28.02.2002. The core legal question is whether mere presence at a large public disturbance a mob of over a thousand persons where police resorted to firing and a stampede ensued can, without specific overt acts or incriminating material, sustain a conviction under ss. 143, 147, 153A, 295, 436 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Trial Court acquitted all accused due to perfunctory and stereotyped police evidence, failures of identification, absence of seized weapons/inflammables and contradictions in eyewitness testimony. The High Court partially reversed that acquittal for those named in the FIR and arrested on the spot, treating arrest and naming as proof of presence and hence participation.

The Supreme Court, on appellate scrutiny, emphasized the heavy duty to protect innocent bystanders in group-clash cases, reiterated the evidentiary limits of general witness statements in large crowds, and applied cautious inferential standards (including reference to the plurality test and principles in Masalti, Nagarjit Ahir and Busi Koteswara Rao).

Holding that no reliable evidence connected the appellants to any overt act, arms or incendiary material, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the Trial Court’s acquittal.

Keywords: unlawful assembly; rioting; mere presence; plurality test; section 149 IPC; innocent bystander.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeals arise from rioting at Vadod on 28.02.2002, during night hours, when a very large crowd (over 1,000 persons) surrounded a graveyard and mosque. Police reached the scene; the crowd allegedly pelted stones, damaged police vehicles and injured personnel; police used tear-gas and fired gunshots, which produced a stampede. Seven persons were apprehended on the spot and named in the FIR; investigation later added others and a total of 19 were tried in Sessions Trial No.119/2003.

The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted all accused on 11.07.2005 for want of reliable testimony, failures of identification and lack of seized implements; the High Court on appeal upheld acquittal of some but reversed acquittal qua six of those arrested on the spot, convicting them under multiple IPC sections and sentencing them to concurrent terms (maximum one year).

On further appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether presence and arrest at the scene, and being named in the FIR, were sufficient to displace the Trial Court’s benefit of doubt in the absence of specific overt acts or corroborative evidence. The judgment examines evidentiary standards in mass-clash scenarios, the protective duty of courts against wrongful conviction of bystanders, and the permissible inferences under section 149 IPC where common object and overt act are not proved.

The Court framed its analysis against earlier decisions including Masalti v. State of U.P., Nagarjit Ahir v. State of Bihar and Busi Koteswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, balancing the realities of chaotic riots with the presumption of innocence and the primacy of specific incriminating proof.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The following facts are established on the record: night-time riots erupted at Vadod, where a mob reportedly surrounded a graveyard and mosque; information reached patrolling police at about 22:10 hours; on arrival, police asked the crowd to disperse and, according to the FIR, were met with stone pelting causing vehicle damage and injuries; police used tear gas and fired to disperse the mob, which caused a stampede.

Seven individuals including the appellants were detained on the spot and named in the FIR; investigation produced a chargesheet against 19 persons. The Trial Court found prosecution witnesses, particularly police witnesses, stereotyped and unable to specifically identify who was arrested by whom; PW-2’s testimony contained material omissions and contradictions (e.g., place of observing incident, presence of street light, alleged earlier complaint); no records showed recovery of weapons, inflammables or instruments from the arrested persons; the investigating officer recorded inconsistent dates and denied certain complaints.

The High Court accepted the Trial Court’s reasoning for accused nos.8–19 but treated the on-spot arrests and naming in the FIR as sufficient proof to convict accused nos.1–5 and 7. The appellants contend they were village residents who could lawfully be present on the street in absence of curfew or prohibitory order and that the record contains no evidence they carried weapons, incited the mob or performed any overt act. The State argued that in rioting cases particularisation is difficult and presence among the mob while the mob commits violence can itself ground conviction.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether mere presence at the scene of a large public disturbance, and arrest therefrom, is sufficient to convict an accused as a member of an unlawful assembly under s.149 IPC?
ii. What standard of proof and caution is required where mass-clash evidence is general and eyewitness identification is unreliable?
iii. When may courts infer membership of an unlawful assembly from circumstantial facts (e.g., carriage of weapons, participation in events serving the common object)?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:
i. The Trial Court rightly acquitted the accused because police evidence was stereotyped and witnesses could not specifically identify individual participation; material contradictions undermined eyewitness credence.
ii. Appellants were residents of the village where the incident occurred; their presence on a public street during non-curfew hours is natural and cannot be equated with membership of an unlawful assembly.
iii. No weapons, inflammable material or instruments of destruction were recovered from appellants at arrest; no overt act of incitement or mischief was attributed to them.
iv. The High Court erred in reversing an acquittal without cogent, specific evidence — particularly where the initial judicial view was in favour of the accused.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that:
i. In riot situations, exact delineation of acts by each participant is often impossible; proof of presence among the rioting mob may suffice to infer membership of the unlawful assembly.
ii. The appellants were arrested on the spot and named in the FIR; absence of a satisfactory explanation for their presence at the scene supports conviction.
iii. Reliance on the difficulty of prosecution to particularize individual acts is a permissible mode of inference in public-order offences involving large crowds.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 143 IPC — Punishment for being a member of an unlawful assembly.
ii. Section 147 IPC — Punishment for rioting.
iii. Section 149 IPC (implicated via reasoning) — Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offences committed in prosecution of common object.
iv. Sections 153A, 295, 436, 332 IPC — Related offences alleged in the FIR and conviction.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and restored the Trial Court’s acquittal. The Court stressed that where a vast crowd is involved, courts bear an onerous duty not to convict innocent bystanders. Generalized witness statements without specific reference to the accused or the role played are insufficient.

The Court noted key proven facts: no curfew; a mob of over a thousand; firing by police; only seven persons arrested on the spot with no reliable evidence about who arrested them or what they were doing; absence of recovered weapons or inflammable material; and villagers’ natural presence at night in absence of prohibitory orders. The High Court’s reasoning that on-spot arrest and naming in the FIR proved presence and thus membership was rejected as inadequate to displace the benefit of doubt.

The Court reiterated that although section 149 IPC can render all members vicariously liable where the common object and overt acts are made out, the prosecution must lead evidence to connect an accused with the assembly’s object (for example, coming armed, actively participating, or performing some event serving the common object). Where only general observation exists in a crowded scene, conviction should not follow as a matter of course.

The Supreme Court applied cautionary principles: where the evidence shows a large number was present, it is safer to convict only those against whom overt acts are clearly alleged; some courts have used a plurality test (requiring consistent accounts from multiple witnesses) as a rule of caution. On the facts, the Court found no reliable evidence linking appellants to overt acts or to arms; the defense suggestion that they were trying to douse fire was not evidence of culpability and could as well indicate bystander conduct.

The High Court’s reversal of acquittal was held to be unjustified, particularly on an appeal from an order of acquittal. The appeals were allowed; bail bonds discharged where applicable.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is that mere presence in a large rioting crowd, and arrest therefrom or naming in the FIR, does not automatically prove membership of an unlawful assembly. Courts must insist on evidence of specific overt acts, participation in events serving the common object, or carriage of weapons/instruments of destruction to infer membership under s.149 IPC. Where eyewitness evidence is general, contradictory or stereotyped, judicial caution is mandatory to avoid convicting innocent bystanders.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court, by way of observation, emphasized practical safeguards:

(i) the plurality test requiring multiple consistent witnesses can be used as a rule of caution though not a fixed legal rule;

(ii) when assailants are numerous, absence of individual assault does not preclude liability but the prosecution must still establish membership by inference from reliable facts (e.g., arrival with arms, active participation);

(iii) police firing and resultant stampede may create conditions where innocent persons are mistakenly apprehended, and courts should factor that in.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. In mass-clash prosecutions, courts should be reluctant to rely on generalized witness testimony that fails to specify the accused’s role.
ii. Prosecution should, where possible, show overt act, possession of weapons/inflammables, or other conduct from which membership of the unlawful assembly can be reasonably inferred.
iii. Arrest on the spot and naming in FIR are relevant but not conclusive; corroborative evidence is necessary before reversing acquittal.
iv. Where the scene is public and large crowds gather, courts must actively guard against equating spectators with perpetrators.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reaffirms the constitutional and evidentiary principle that criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt and that judicial caution must be heightened in chaotic mass-riot contexts. The Court strikes a careful balance: it does not immunize participants in violent assemblies but demands that convictions rest on specific, reliable evidence linking accused persons to the common object or overt acts.

The ruling draws on and follows precedent (Masalti, Nagarjit Ahir, Busi Koteswara Rao), and provides pragmatic guidance to trial and appellate courts to prevent miscarriage of justice when the prosecution’s case is general and identification weak. The decision is important for protecting bystanders and ensuring that the operation of section 149 IPC does not become a tool to substitute communal panic for proof of individual guilt.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Busi Koteswara Rao & Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 12 SCC 711.
ii. Nagarjit Ahir v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 369.
iii. Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30.
iv. State of U.P. v. Dan Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 747.
v. Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 904 : 2025 INSC 381.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — ss. 143, 147, 149, 153A, 295, 436, 332.