A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark case, Dr. N. B. Khare v. Election Commission of India, [1958] SCR 648, examined the scope and limits of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 71(1) of the Constitution of India concerning disputes arising from the presidential election. Dr. Khare, an “intending candidate,” challenged the validity of the presidential election of 1957, asserting procedural and constitutional irregularities. His petition was rejected by the Registrar of the Supreme Court as it failed to comply with the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952 and relevant Supreme Court Rules under Order XXXVII-A. The key constitutional issue was whether the right to challenge a presidential election is inherent under Article 71(1) or governed strictly by statutory provisions enacted under Article 71(3). The Court held that Article 71(1) only designates the forum—the Supreme Court—for adjudicating election disputes, while the substantive right to challenge an election and procedural modalities arise solely from legislation under Article 71(3). Hence, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that only persons statutorily authorized under Section 14 of the 1952 Act could initiate such proceedings. This judgment reaffirmed legislative supremacy in election laws and emphasized the necessity for strict adherence to procedural statutes when invoking constitutional remedies.

Keywords: Presidential Election, Article 71, Election Dispute, Jurisdiction of Supreme Court, Election Laws

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Dr. N. B. Khare v. Election Commission of India

ii) Case Number
Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 915 of 1957

iii) Judgement Date
14 October 1957

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
S. R. Das, C.J.; Venkatarama Aiyar, S.K. Das, J.L. Kapur, and Vivian Bose, JJ.

vi) Author
Justice Venkatarama Aiyar

vii) Citation
[1958] SCR 648

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Article 71(1) & (3) of the Constitution of India

• Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952 – Sections 14 and 18

• Supreme Court Rules, 1950, Order XXXVII-A, Rules 3 and 12

• Article 145 of the Constitution of India

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Election Law, Procedural Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

In this seminal case, the Supreme Court of India deliberated on a constitutional question that had significant implications for democratic governance and judicial review of presidential elections. Dr. N. B. Khare, a seasoned political figure and former minister, questioned the validity of the 1957 presidential election, which resulted in the re-election of Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Claiming to be an “intending candidate,” Dr. Khare filed a petition under Article 71(1) of the Constitution, alleging that the election suffered from various constitutional violations. The issue pivoted on whether Article 71(1) itself created a freestanding right to challenge an election or merely designated the Supreme Court as the adjudicatory forum. The Registrar of the Supreme Court, adhering strictly to procedural mandates under the 1952 Act and Supreme Court Rules, rejected the petition. This led to an appeal wherein the Court examined legislative competence under Article 71(3) and the permissible contours of judicial intervention in electoral disputes. The decision reasserted the foundational principle that electoral rights are creatures of statute, and access to constitutional forums requires compliance with statutory prerequisites[1].

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 6 May 1957, the Indian presidential election culminated in the victory of Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Post-election, Dr. N. B. Khare submitted a petition before the Supreme Court under Article 71(1), identifying himself as an intending candidate. He did not contest the election formally nor satisfy statutory conditions such as being a candidate or having the requisite support of ten or more electors, as required under Section 14 of the 1952 Act. His petition broadly alleged constitutional violations during the electoral process and sought to annul the entire election on these grounds. However, the Registrar rejected the petition, noting its non-compliance with the procedural requirements under Order XXXVII-A of the Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rules 3 and 12, which mandated a court fee of Rs. 250 and a security deposit of Rs. 2,000. Dr. Khare appealed this administrative decision, bringing the matter before a constitutional bench for adjudication. The factual matrix thus revolved around a legally insufficient and procedurally defective attempt to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in a highly regulated constitutional domain[2].

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a person not formally contesting the presidential election can challenge its validity under Article 71(1)?

ii. Whether Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, and Supreme Court Rules, violate Article 71(1) by restricting access to the Supreme Court?

iii. Whether Article 71(1) independently confers a right to challenge the election without recourse to statutory conditions?

iv. Whether doubts concerning election validity can be raised outside the mechanism provided by the 1952 Act?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the jurisdiction under Article 71(1) is original and plenary. It does not derive from any statute but is an inherent constitutional authority of the Supreme Court. They contended that the petitioner, as a citizen and intending candidate, had the locus standi to seek redress directly before the Court without being constrained by procedural norms under the 1952 Act. Counsel further argued that the 1952 Act and Supreme Court Rules restrict this constitutional jurisdiction and are, therefore, ultra vires to the extent that they impose procedural and substantive barriers not envisaged under Article 71(1). They maintained that doubts regarding election validity need not meet the threshold of a formal election petition. Rather, they asserted that any breach of constitutional provision in the election process entitled a citizen to judicial remedy, thereby invoking a broader interpretation of Article 71(1)[3].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the petition is wholly incompetent as it does not conform to the requirements under Section 14 of the 1952 Act. They argued that electoral challenges are not part of common law rights but statutory creations. Hence, no person, including an “intending candidate,” can bypass the legislative framework to invoke the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. They emphasized that Article 71(3) expressly authorizes Parliament to regulate presidential election disputes, and such statutory regulation does not dilute the jurisdiction conferred under Article 71(1) but structures its exercise. The respondents highlighted that the right to be elected and the right to challenge an election are both statutory, citing precedents such as Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210, where the Court held that election rights are neither fundamental nor common law rights but solely statutory[4].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 71(1) of the Constitution of India
Mandates that disputes relating to the election of President or Vice-President shall be decided by the Supreme Court.

ii. Article 71(3)
Empowers Parliament to enact laws to regulate the manner in which doubts and disputes in such elections shall be inquired into and adjudicated.

iii. Section 14, Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952
Stipulates that only a candidate or ten electors can present an election petition to the Supreme Court.

iv. Section 18, Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952
Limits grounds for setting aside an election to specific causes like corrupt practices or material impact on the result.

v. Order XXXVII-A, Rules 3 and 12 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950
Mandates court fees and security deposits for costs associated with an election petition.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court unequivocally held that Article 71(1) does not provide a freestanding right to file petitions. It only designates the Supreme Court as the forum for adjudicating disputes. The right to challenge an election arises only under Parliamentary legislation made pursuant to Article 71(3). The Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, validly restricts such challenges to candidates or ten electors. Since Dr. Khare was neither, and the petition lacked required formalities, the appeal was rightly rejected. The Court also emphasized that procedural rules are integral to the exercise of jurisdiction, not mere technicalities[5].

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court remarked that “the right to move for setting aside an election is not a common law right but a statutory right.” This reinforces the jurisprudential stance that constitutional mechanisms must be statutorily defined when explicitly delegated, like under Article 71(3).

c. GUIDELINES 

• Only statutory rights under election laws can invoke jurisdiction under Article 71(1).

• Procedural compliance is mandatory; constitutional remedies are not absolute or automatic.

• The Supreme Court will not entertain electoral challenges unless strictly authorized by law.

• Articles 71(1) and 71(3) must be read conjunctively to determine both forum and manner.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case reinforces the principle that constitutional jurisdiction must adhere to statutorily prescribed processes. The Supreme Court’s reasoning aligns with established jurisprudence that electoral rights are statutory in origin, even when adjudicated by the apex constitutional forum. By denying the claim of an “intending candidate,” the Court preserved the sanctity of statutory mechanisms and protected electoral integrity from frivolous or unregulated challenges. This judgment acts as a doctrinal reaffirmation of the supremacy of legislative control over electoral disputes, respecting the separation of powers and constitutional structure. It cautions litigants against bypassing well-defined procedural laws by invoking vague constitutional grievances, thereby ensuring judicial economy and institutional coherence.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
[1] Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210
[2] N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64

b. Important Statutes Referred
[3] Constitution of India, Article 71(1), Article 71(3), Article 145
[4] Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, Sections 14, 18
[5] Supreme Court Rules, 1950, Order XXXVII-A, Rules 3 and 12