A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This case revolves around the interpretative and procedural dimensions of the Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949 and the subsequent Evacuee Property Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, followed by Act XXXI of 1950. The matter emerged after an Additional Custodian refused to declare one Aboobaker Abdul Rahman as an evacuee, despite the initiation of proceedings under Section 7. The Custodian General later reversed this decision on an appeal filed by an informant, Tekchand Dolwani, who was aggrieved by the earlier order. The appellants (legal heirs of Aboobaker) contested the locus standi of Tekchand and the maintainability of the appeal, seeking constitutional remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The crux of the case involved determining who qualifies as a “person aggrieved” under Section 24 of the Ordinance, the appellate jurisdiction of the Custodian General, and the permissible scope for judicial review by writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of India, in affirming the appellate jurisdiction of the Custodian General, delved into jurisprudential boundaries concerning administrative quasi-judicial decisions and their amenability to writs. The ruling is foundational in Indian administrative and constitutional law for clarifying limits on judicial oversight of tribunals and asserting the autonomy of appellate mechanisms.

Keywords: Evacuee Property, Custodian General, Certiorari, Locus Standi, Appellate Jurisdiction

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Ebrahim Aboobakar and Another v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1952

iii) Judgement Date
26th May, 1952

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Patanjali Sastri C.J., Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das and Vivian Bose JJ.

vi) Author
Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan

vii) Citation
AIR 1952 SC 319; [1952] SCR 696

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 7, 19, and 24 of the Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949

• Section 43 of the Act XXXI of 1950

• Article 226 of the Constitution of India

• Order XXII Rule 6 CPC

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Evacuee Property Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises in the milieu of post-Partition India, where a substantial legislative focus involved the administration of properties left behind by individuals who migrated to Pakistan. Aboobaker Abdul Rahman, the father of the appellants, was alleged to have migrated to Karachi in September 1947. Pursuant to information given by Tekchand Dolwani, the Additional Custodian initiated proceedings under the Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949, later transitioning under Ordinance XXVII of 1949. Despite the notice issued under Section 7 of the Ordinance, the Additional Custodian held on 8th February 1950 that Aboobaker was not an evacuee, although he was adjudged as an intending evacuee under Section 19 the next day. Tekchand Dolwani filed an appeal under Section 24 against the refusal to declare Aboobaker as an evacuee. The matter reached the Custodian General, who admitted the appeal. Aboobaker died on 14th May 1950, and the appellants moved the Punjab High Court under Article 226, alleging absence of jurisdiction and violation of legal standing. The High Court dismissed their petition, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Aboobaker, a wealthy property holder, including the Imperial Cinema in Bombay, went to Karachi in 1947, post-Partition. Based on a complaint filed by Tekchand Dolwani, the Additional Custodian issued notices under Section 7 and Section 19 of Ordinance XXVII of 1949. On 8th February 1950, the Custodian decided Aboobaker was not an evacuee. On 9th February, he was labelled as an intending evacuee. Tekchand, who had initiated the proceedings and desired the cinema to be allotted to him as per rehabilitation policy, filed an appeal on 31st March 1950. The Ordinance was repealed by Act XXXI of 1950 in April. The Custodian General heard the appeal and overruled preliminary objections, finding Tekchand had locus standi and was a person aggrieved. Aboobaker passed away before final pronouncement of the order. The appellants, claiming inheritance rights, challenged the jurisdiction of the appeal via a writ petition. They contended Tekchand could not appeal, the order was not appealable, and the Custodian General lacked jurisdiction post death of the affected party. The Punjab High Court rejected these arguments.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Tekchand Dolwani was a person aggrieved and hence had locus standi to appeal under Section 24.

ii) Whether the Custodian General had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal after the death of Aboobaker.

iii) Whether the order passed by the Additional Custodian refusing to declare Aboobaker as an evacuee was appealable under Section 24.

iv) Whether the writ of certiorari could lie against the Custodian General’s decision under Article 226.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the order dated 9th February 1950 was appealed against, and not the 8th February order, and therefore the Custodian General erred in entertaining it. They argued that since Aboobaker was declared an intending evacuee, no third party could have challenged that status, especially as Tekchand was not a legal heir or tenant but merely an informant. The learned counsel further argued that Tekchand was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 24 of the Ordinance, as he suffered no direct legal injury. They emphasized the absence of any statutory right in Dolwani to claim allotment of the property and claimed that only a party whose proprietary interest is affected qualifies as an aggrieved person. Further, the order dated 8th February was not in the nature of an appealable order because it merely concluded that the person was not an evacuee. Additionally, they asserted that the Custodian General lost jurisdiction upon Aboobaker’s death, as the proceedings became infructuous.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that Tekchand Dolwani, having initiated the proceedings and actively participated in them by submitting a written statement and evidence, had a vested interest in the outcome. They emphasized Rule 5(5) of the Evacuee Property Rules, which enabled individuals interested in the declaration to participate in the adjudication. The Custodian General was, therefore, justified in treating him as an aggrieved person. The respondent contended that refusal to declare Aboobaker an evacuee was indeed an order under Section 7, and hence, appealable. The Custodian General was statutorily vested with wide appellate powers, and all questions, including preliminary ones like the nature of the order or standing of the appellant, were within his jurisdiction to determine. The respondent also clarified that the appellate order had been dictated and signed on 13th May 1950, a day before Aboobaker’s death. Hence, under Order XXII Rule 6 CPC, pronouncement after his death was not a nullity.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 7 of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 – Empowers Custodians to declare persons and their properties as evacuee or not.

ii) Section 24 of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 – Provides appeal right to any person aggrieved by orders under Sections 7, 16, 19, or 38.

iii) Order XXII Rule 6 CPC – Death of party between conclusion and pronouncement of judgment does not invalidate it.

iv) Article 226 of Constitution – Grants High Courts power to issue writs including certiorari.

v) Section 43 of Act XXXI of 1950 – Bars jurisdiction of civil courts in evacuee property matters.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that the Custodian General was a court of limited but self-contained appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, questions like whether the appeal was competent or whether a party had standing were within his jurisdiction to decide. Tekchand, having filed a written statement and adduced evidence, was rightly considered a person aggrieved. The refusal to declare someone an evacuee amounts to an adjudication under Section 7, and such an order is appealable. The pronouncement post-death of the affected party did not render the decision invalid.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court noted that writ of certiorari does not lie against decisions made within jurisdiction, even if erroneous. Only jurisdictional errors or violations of natural justice warrant interference. The Court reiterated Lord Esher M.R.’s principle in Reg. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (21 Q.B.D. 313), distinguishing between tribunals deciding collateral facts (without jurisdiction) and those deciding within their granted jurisdiction.

c. GUIDELINES (IF ANY)

• A tribunal with appellate powers has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.

• A person participating in proceedings with rights to lead evidence can qualify as a person aggrieved.

• An order refusing to declare someone as an evacuee is also an adjudication under Section 7.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment provides a landmark exposition on administrative law and principles governing appellate tribunal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rightly restrained judicial interference under Article 226 when administrative bodies act within conferred powers. The case solidifies the appellate capacity of tribunals like the Custodian General and elaborates the contours of certiorari. By expanding the definition of person aggrieved, it paved the way for active participation by informants and stakeholders in quasi-judicial processes. The ruling continues to influence Indian jurisprudence in delineating boundaries between judicial oversight and administrative discretion.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Reg. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1888) 21 QBD 313.
[2] In re Lamb, Ex parte Board of Trade, [1894] 2 Q.B.D. 805.
[3] Ex parte Official Receiver, 19 QBD 174.
[4] Rayarappan Nayanar v. Madhavi Amma, [1949] F.C.R. 667.

b. Important Statutes Referred

[5] Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949
[6] Evacuee Property Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949
[7] Evacuee Property Act, Act XXXI of 1950
[8] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXII Rule 6
[9] Constitution of India, Article 226