F. N. ROY vs. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA.

Case Analysis

F. N. ROY vs. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA.

May 3, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta (1957 SCR 1151) dealt with the constitutional validity of Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 in connection with Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner, F.N. Roy, imported goods (Zip Chains) without a valid import licence, which were subsequently confiscated by the Customs authorities under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioner challenged the confiscation on the ground that Section 183, which allows the officer discretion to impose a fine in lieu of confiscation, as modified by the 1947 Act, violated Article 14 of the Constitution due to its arbitrary nature. The Court held that the statutory scheme neither violated Article 14 nor rendered the confiscation order illegal. It affirmed that Section 3(2) only applied the provisions of the Sea Customs Act with modifications and did not confer unfettered discretion. Moreover, Section 183 did not itself authorize confiscation, but only provided for a fine as an alternative once confiscation was adjudged under other provisions. The Court found no mala fides in the authorities’ actions and upheld the constitutionality of the statutory provisions, dismissing the writ petition under Article 32. The judgment solidifies the constitutional interplay between discretionary statutory powers and procedural safeguards under customs law.

Keywords: Customs Law, Article 14 Constitution of India, Sea Customs Act, Imports and Exports Control Act, Confiscation of Goods, Fundamental Rights.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta

ii) Case Number: Petition No. 438 of 1955

iii) Judgement Date: 16th May 1957

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das C.J., Jafer Imam J., S.K. Das J., Govinda Menon J., A.K. Sarkar J.

vi) Author: Justice A.K. Sarkar

vii) Citation: AIR 1957 SC 648; 1957 SCR 1151

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

Sea Customs Act, 1878 – Sections 167(8) and 183
Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 – Sections 3(1) and 3(2)
Constitution of India – Article 14, Article 32

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Customs Law, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case emerges from a dispute concerning the confiscation of goods under Customs Law, juxtaposed against the fundamental right of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. The central legal question was whether the discretion granted to Customs authorities to either confiscate goods or levy a fine in lieu thereof, under Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act, as modified by Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, violates Article 14. The judgment also scrutinizes the legal boundaries of administrative discretion and procedural due process in regulatory legislation.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, F.N. Roy, imported Zip Chains from Japan in August 1953, based on a notification issued by the Government of India on March 16, 1953, which allowed free import of iron and steel chains under certain exclusions. On arrival at Calcutta port, Customs authorities discovered Roy lacked a valid import licence. Consequently, they initiated action under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, leading to confiscation of the goods and imposition of a penalty of Rs. 1,000. Roy claimed the imported Zip Chains were within the permissible category under the notification and not subject to licensing requirements. He also argued that the confiscation order failed to grant him the mandatory option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation, violating Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act. His appeals to the Central Board of Revenue and revisional application to the Government of India were both dismissed, prompting a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, which modifies Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act, violates Article 14 of the Constitution by granting arbitrary discretion to Customs authorities.

ii) Whether the Collector of Customs acted illegally in confiscating the goods without offering the petitioner an option to pay a fine under Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act.

iii) Whether the impugned statutory provisions could be struck down or read down for violating constitutional guarantees of equality.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act, as modified by Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, created uncontrolled discretion in Customs authorities, violating Article 14. They argued that the substitution of the word “shall” with “may” removed mandatory safeguards and allowed arbitrary decisions in cases of confiscation. The petitioner relied on the doctrine of “unreasonable classification” to submit that such discretionary enforcement lacked intelligible differentia and failed the twin test under Article 14.

They further argued that no opportunity of hearing was provided when the authorities relied on past transactions to deny the option of fine. The confiscation order was allegedly passed mala fide, as other similarly situated importers received lenient treatment. The petitioner submitted that his appeal to the Central Board was wrongly dismissed as time-barred and his arrest was strategically used to impede timely filing.

Reference was made to Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P. (AIR 1954 SC 224) where arbitrary powers conferred by statute were held unconstitutional under Article 14[1]. This case was invoked to assert that discretionary power without guidelines invited discrimination.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that Section 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act did not confer any discretion but merely modified the application of the Sea Customs Act. It simply made applicable the framework of the Sea Customs Act to imports controlled by the 1947 Act, and its modification of Section 183 did not offend Article 14.

The respondent contended that confiscation of goods was authorized under Section 167(8), and Section 183 was a supplementary provision that only provided a possibility, not a right, to pay a fine. The petitioner had admitted he did not want a personal hearing, and the authorities had discretion, not obligation, to impose a fine in lieu of confiscation.

They also argued that the procedural safeguards were followed, the appeal was time-barred, and the discretionary power was not arbitrary as the Customs officer exercised quasi-judicial functions, which are appealable. The difference in treatment between the petitioner and others was justified by the petitioner’s prior knowledge and intent to bypass rules.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 167(8) of Sea Customs Act, 1878 – Authorizes confiscation of goods and penalty for import in violation of prohibition.

ii) Section 183 of Sea Customs Act, 1878 – Provides discretion to Customs officer to allow payment of fine in lieu of confiscation.

iii) Section 3(1) and 3(2) of Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 – Empowers prohibition or restriction of imports and applies the Sea Customs Act to such imports.

iv) Article 14 of Constitution of India – Guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws.

v) Article 32 of Constitution of India – Provides the right to constitutional remedies for enforcement of fundamental rights.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that Section 3(2) of the 1947 Act does not by itself confer discretion and merely renders applicable the Sea Customs Act. The modification it makes to Section 183 cannot be said to violate Article 14, as it only affects procedural discretion after confiscation is adjudged. The confiscation is validly made under Section 167(8), and Section 183 does not itself authorize confiscation, but only provides an alternative remedy. Thus, failure to offer a fine did not invalidate the order.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) Even if Section 183, as modified, were unconstitutional, it would only become inapplicable and not affect Section 167(8) under which the confiscation was validly made. Therefore, an invalid auxiliary provision does not render the substantive penalty void.

c. GUIDELINES

Confiscation under Sea Customs Act must be adjudged under Section 167(8), not Section 183.
Section 183 only applies after confiscation is adjudged and grants discretion, not right, for fine.
A modified procedural statute does not inherently violate Article 14 unless the substantive power itself is arbitrary.
Natural justice does not mandate personal hearing at every appellate stage.
Discretion within statutory limits and under appealable frameworks is not unconstitutional.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case marks a significant precedent in the jurisprudence of administrative discretion vis-à-vis constitutional safeguards. The judgment reinforced that not every discretionary clause offends Article 14, particularly when such discretion is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature and exercised under statutory constraints. The Supreme Court rightly distinguished between substantive and procedural powers and affirmed the legal sanctity of applying customs laws to imports regulated under a different statute. The Court’s refusal to entertain contentions based on assumed mala fides and its reliance on objective statutory interpretation reflects judicial prudence. It also draws a clear line demarcating judicial review of administrative discretion from legislative policy.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 224
[2] Collector of Customs v. F.N. Roy, AIR 1957 SC 648
[3] State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
[4] R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138

b. Important Statutes Referred