A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury [1957 SCR 488] decisively addressed the nature and existence of a vested right of appeal and the interpretation of Articles 133 and 135 of the Constitution of India. The case arose from a civil dispute initiated prior to the commencement of the Constitution, and the central issue revolved around whether the right to appeal to the Supreme Court survived post-Constitution when the valuation was less than ₹20,000 but above ₹10,000. The majority of the Constitution Bench held that the appellant had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court (replaced by the Supreme Court), and that such a right, once vested, could not be taken away retrospectively by the enactment of the Constitution, unless explicitly stated or necessarily implied. The judgment also overruled several previous High Court decisions that had failed to recognize such vested rights. This case remains a cornerstone in Indian constitutional and procedural jurisprudence on the doctrine of vested rights, substantive versus procedural law, and statutory interpretation. It reinforced the principle that legislation should not be interpreted to take away vested substantive rights unless such an intention is clearly manifested.

Keywords: Vested right of appeal, Article 135, Article 133, Supreme Court jurisdiction, retrospective effect, procedural law, substantive right, Federal Court.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury

ii) Case Number: Civil Special Leave Petition No. 170 of 1955

iii) Judgement Date: 1 February 1957

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das C.J., Bhagwati, B.P. Sinha, S.K. Das JJ., and Venkatarama Ayyar J. (Dissenting)

vi) Author: S.R. Das, C.J. (for majority)

vii) Citation: AIR 1957 SC 540; 1957 SCR 488

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 133 of the Constitution of India

• Article 135 of the Constitution of India

• Section 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

• Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935

• Section 3 of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947

• Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 – Clause 20

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:

• Veeranna v. Chinna Venkanna, ILR 1953 Mad 1079

• Probirendra Mohan v. Berhampore Bank Ltd., AIR 1954 Cal 289

• Ram Sahai v. Ram Sewak, AIR 1956 All 321

• Tafammul Hussain v. Mst. Qaisar Jahan Begam, AIR 1956 All 638

• The Indian Trade and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Raj Mal Pahar Chand, AIR 1956 Punj 228

x) Case is Related to: Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, and Interpretation of Statutes

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The decision in Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury arises from a long-standing question about the scope and nature of appeal rights, particularly in the context of transitioning from the colonial legal framework to the post-Constitutional order. The appellant had instituted a civil suit in 1949, prior to the enforcement of the Constitution, seeking to assert proprietary rights over a property. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, but later decreed in his favour by the Andhra High Court in 1955. He sought to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was by then the apex judicial body replacing the Federal Court under the new Constitution. The High Court rejected his application for leave to appeal, citing that the value of the subject matter did not reach the threshold of ₹20,000 as required under Article 133. The appellant contended that his right to appeal was vested under the pre-Constitutional regime and protected by Article 135 of the Constitution. The case thus presented an important constitutional question about whether rights that were vested prior to the Constitution remained unaffected by it unless expressly or implicitly taken away.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Garikapatti Veeraya, filed a suit on April 22, 1949, in the Sub-Court at Bapatla, seeking declaration and consequential relief concerning certain immovable property. The suit was valued at ₹11,400. The trial court dismissed the suit by a decree dated November 14, 1950. The plaintiff preferred an appeal, which, upon the creation of Andhra State in 1953, got transferred to the newly constituted Andhra High Court. On March 4, 1955, the High Court reversed the trial court’s decision and decreed the suit in favour of the appellant. The appellant applied for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court, which the High Court denied, stating that the subject matter did not satisfy the monetary threshold prescribed under Article 133(1) of the Constitution, which required a minimum valuation of ₹20,000 for civil appeals. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal, asserting that he had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, preserved under Article 135 of the Constitution.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the appellant possessed a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court at the time of institution of the suit?

ii) Whether Article 133 of the Constitution retrospectively altered or abrogated such a right?

iii) Whether Article 135 of the Constitution preserved pre-Constitutional rights of appeal?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the right of appeal was a substantive right, not a procedural one. This right vested at the date of institution of the suit, namely, April 22, 1949 [1]. They cited the ruling in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) AC 369, where the Privy Council held that the right to appeal is not merely procedural but a substantive and vested right [2].

The appellant argued that since the Federal Court had appellate jurisdiction in such matters under Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and since he would have had a right to approach it under the law then prevailing, Article 135 of the Constitution preserved this right, transferring the appellate jurisdiction to the newly established Supreme Court [3].

Further, the counsel submitted that Article 133 had no retrospective effect and could not override the vested right of appeal unless clearly stated. Since there was no such express or implied provision in the Constitution, it could not bar the appellant’s right to appeal based on valuation [4].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the right to appeal could only arise after a final adverse decision, and not merely at the institution of the suit [5]. They rejected the notion that appeal rights vested from the date of filing of the plaint, stating that successive appeal rights did not form a unified legal proceeding [6].

The respondent’s counsel emphasized that Article 133 of the Constitution applied to all decisions rendered after the commencement of the Constitution, irrespective of when the suit was instituted. Since the final judgment by the High Court was passed in 1955, well after the Constitution came into effect, the case must satisfy the criteria laid under Article 133 [7].

They relied on cases such as Canada Cement Co. Ltd. v. East Montreal, (1922) 1 AC 249, and Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch 307, to argue that appellate rights are statutory and do not vest unless a right of appeal has crystallized through an actual order or decree [8].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 133 – Civil appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
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ii) Article 135 – Jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court to vest in the Supreme Court.
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iii) Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947

iv) Government of India Act, 1935 – Section 205

v) CPC, 1908 – Sections 109, 110
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vi) Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 – Clause 20

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The majority held that right of appeal is a substantive and vested right, and not a matter of mere procedure. The moment a litigant initiates legal proceedings, all appellate rights available under existing laws become vested, forming part of the same legal proceeding. The Constitution did not explicitly or implicitly revoke such rights; hence, Article 135 preserved the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, as it had existed under the Federal Court structure [9].

The Bench emphasized that Article 133 was not retrospective, and applying it to extinguish vested appeal rights would render Clause 20 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 ineffective [10].

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court commented that the Constitution should not be interpreted in a manner that retrospectively removes accrued rights, especially those of appeal. It stressed judicial consistency and legal certainty in matters involving the fundamental right to access higher courts [11].

c. GUIDELINES 

• A right of appeal accrues upon the institution of a suit, not upon final adjudication.

• Substantive rights cannot be withdrawn retrospectively unless expressly provided.

• The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 135 must be interpreted to encompass rights that existed under the Federal Court regime.

• Statutory amendments or Constitutional provisions must not be presumed to take away rights unless such an intention is clearly expressed or necessarily implied.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This judgment has become a doctrinal authority for the principle that appeal rights vest at the inception of litigation and enjoy protection unless explicitly removed. It fortified the distinction between substantive and procedural rights in Indian constitutional law. The Court harmoniously interpreted Articles 133 and 135 to uphold pre-Constitutional rights, reflecting judicial fidelity to the rule of law. While the dissenting view of Venkatarama Ayyar J. provided a restrictive view of vested rights, the majority’s liberal interpretation prevailed and has had a lasting impact on the jurisprudence of appellate rights in India.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) AC 369
[2] Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 421
[3] Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin, ILR 56 Cal 512 (1929)
[4] In re Vasudeva Samiar, ILR 52 Mad 361 (1928)
[5] Radhakishan v. Shridhar, ILR 1950 Nag 532 (F.B.)
[6] Hoosein Kasam Dada v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1953 SCR 987
[7] Ganpat Rai Hiralal v. Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd., 1953 SCR 752

b. Important Statutes Referred

[1] Article 133, Constitution of India
[2] Article 135, Constitution of India
[3] Section 109 & 110, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
[4] Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947
[5] Government of India Act, 1935, Section 205
[6] Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, Clause 20