A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala and Others, [1953] S.C.R. 226, meticulously interpreted Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The case delved into the scope of jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes, especially in a scenario where a tenant sublet premises in breach of the lease agreement. The sub-tenant challenged the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, claiming it was neither a tenant under the Act nor a party to the original lease. The Court held that although the sub-tenant was not a “tenant” under the Act, the suit, being fundamentally between a landlord and a tenant, rightly fell within the Court’s jurisdiction. The sub-tenant was considered a proper but not necessary party. Importantly, the ruling clarified the inclusive jurisdiction of Section 28 over any “claim or question arising out of this Act or its provisions”, even involving third parties like sub-lessees. The decision reinforced the legislative intent to centralize rent-related disputes before specialized forums and avoid multiplicity of suits.

Keywords: Bombay Rent Act Jurisdiction, Small Causes Court, Sub-tenant, Unlawful Subletting, Section 28 Bombay Rent Act

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala and Others

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 172 of 1952

iii) Judgement Date: 10th December, 1952

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Mehr Chand Mahajan, S.R. Das and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ.

vi) Author: Justice S.R. Das

vii) Citation: [1953] S.C.R. 226

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 28, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947

• Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

• Section 5(11), Bombay Rent Act (definition of tenant)

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None expressly overruled

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Civil Law, Tenancy Law, Rent Control Law, Procedural Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arose from a lease dispute in Bombay, where the original lessee, in violation of a covenant, sublet the premises without the landlord’s written consent. The landlords, being trustees under the will of the original owner, filed a suit against both the tenant and the sub-tenant in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, for possession and compensation for use and occupation. The sub-tenant company objected, arguing that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction since the dispute did not involve a landlord-tenant relationship with them. The issue turned on the interpretation of Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court for certain disputes. The Supreme Court’s ruling clarified that even if the sub-lessee was not a statutory tenant, the suit involving questions about the lease and the sub-letting fell within the ambit of the said section, thereby affirming the competence of the Small Causes Court.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The second-floor flat of Sunama House in Cumballa Hill, Bombay, was originally leased to Mrs. Dinbai K. Lala on 1st September 1942, at a rent of Rs. 370 per month. The lease included a restrictive covenant prohibiting sub-letting without written consent of the landlords. On 16th November 1947, Mrs. Lala sublet the premises to Importers and Manufacturers Ltd., a limited company, at the same rent, without obtaining such consent. The landlords, being trustees of the estate of Framroze D.B. Taraporewala, issued a notice to vacate and subsequently filed a suit in 1948 before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, seeking both eviction and compensation. The defendants contested the suit on multiple grounds, including jurisdiction. The trial court ruled in favor of the landlords, and the appeal and revision were dismissed. The sub-tenant then approached the Supreme Court via special leave.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act to entertain a suit involving a sub-tenant who was not a tenant within the meaning of Section 5(11) of the Act?

ii) Whether such a suit for possession and compensation qualifies as one between a landlord and tenant under the Act, when the sub-tenant is also impleaded?

iii) Whether impleading a sub-tenant alters the nature of the suit and excludes jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the suit against them was not one between a landlord and tenant. They argued that the company was neither a contractual nor a statutory tenant under Section 5(11) of the Act. The claim for compensation was distinct from rent and thus fell outside the ambit of Section 28. The petitioners further contended that they were treated as trespassers, thereby making the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court inapplicable. The appellate counsel emphasized that the act of impleading them could not validate the jurisdiction, as jurisdiction flows from statute, not party conduct. They asserted that the primary relief of possession could only be granted by a civil court of plenary jurisdiction in such circumstances. They relied on the strict construction of statutory jurisdiction and posited that “jurisdiction must be clear and express, not assumed by implication.”

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the suit was essentially one between a landlord and a tenant—between the plaintiffs and Mrs. Lala—and hence within Section 28. They argued that the second defendant was at most a proper party, not a necessary one. The claim against the second defendant arose out of the tenancy and violation of its terms, thereby falling within the purview of Section 28. The respondents urged that Section 28’s wide scope to “deal with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions” justified the joinder and relief sought. They contended that the entire dispute centered on unauthorized subletting, which directly invoked statutory tenancy issues, hence was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. They referred to the doctrine of necessary implication, suggesting that the presence of the sub-tenant must not fragment the litigation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 28, Bombay Rent Act, 1947
Full Text: This section vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Small Causes to entertain suits between landlords and tenants relating to possession or rent, and to deal with any claim arising out of the Act.

ii) Section 5(11), Bombay Rent Act, 1947
Full Text: Defines “tenant”, but excludes those who came into possession in breach of tenancy terms.

iii) Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Full Text: Provides for revision of decisions by subordinate courts in certain cases.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that the suit was rightly instituted in the Court of Small Causes, as it was fundamentally between a landlord and a tenant, and the sub-tenant was only a proper party, not a necessary one. The claim against the sub-tenant arose out of the same cause of action, i.e., breach of tenancy terms, and thus was within the jurisdiction of Section 28. The Court observed that the jurisdiction does not become vitiated merely because a third party is impleaded, especially when their presence aids in effective adjudication. The claim for compensation was held to be incidental to the main relief of possession, further confirming the competence of the Small Causes Court. This decision upheld the exclusive and expansive jurisdiction of the Court under the Act.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court opined that the exclusion of such sub-lessees from the proceedings would lead to multiplicity of litigation and encourage avoidance of statutory obligations, thus defeating the purpose of rent control legislation. The joinder of a trespasser or unauthorised occupant does not alter the tenurial character of the original suit.

c. GUIDELINES

The presence of sub-lessee, though not a tenant, does not remove the suit from Section 28 jurisdiction.

• Claims for compensation ancillary to possession are within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court.

• Courts must interpret rent control statutes liberally to effectuate legislative intent and minimize litigation.

• A person claiming under a tenant can be a proper party even if not recognised under Section 5(11).

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is a seminal ruling on the scope of jurisdiction under rent control laws. It upholds the specialized function of Small Causes Courts and discourages evasion of tenancy law obligations through technical pleas. The judgment reinforces the liberal construction of procedural provisions in welfare statutes. It confirms that tenancy disputes involving sub-letting violations remain within the control regime and do not transform into ordinary civil disputes merely by joining a sub-lessee. This decision continues to be relevant in modern tenancy litigation, especially in urban lease disputes.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala and Others, [1953] S.C.R. 226
[2] Raj Bai v. Thakurain Bakhtraj Kuer, [1953] S.C.R. 231 (referenced in same volume for contrasting jurisdictional interpretation)
[3] K.K. Verma v. Union of India, AIR 1954 Bom 358
[4] M.C. Chockalingam v. Mangilal, AIR 1969 SC 387
[5] K.K. Beniwal v. Assistant Custodian Evacuee Property, AIR 1967 SC 1445

b. Important Statutes Referred

[1] Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Section 28, Section 5(11)
[2] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 115