A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The landmark case of Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi & Others [1955 AIR 77, 1955 SCR (2) 1117] pivots around the complexities arising from a pre-partition oral exchange of immovable property between a displaced person from Lahore and an evacuee, and the subsequent legal trajectory involving the confirmation, revocation, and reassessment of such a transaction under the evolving legislative framework dealing with evacuee properties in post-partition India. The legal challenge presented by the appellant, Indira Sohanlal, revolved around the finality of a confirmation order granted in 1952 and its retrospective susceptibility to revision under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting the scope of revisional jurisdiction vested in the Custodian-General under Section 27 of the 1950 Act and reconciling it with earlier provisions under the East Punjab Act of 1947 and subsequent repealing ordinances. The Court held that a pending application at the time of enactment of the 1950 Act must be adjudicated under the new law, dismissing the notion of a vested right to a final and conclusive determination under the repealed law. In doing so, the Court laid down a nuanced interpretation of repealing statutes and their effect on substantive and procedural rights, rejecting the invocation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 due to the self-contained nature of Section 58(3) of the 1950 Act.

Keywords: Evacuee property, Custodian-General, Revisional powers, Vested rights, Finality of orders, Repeal and reenactment, Administration of Evacuee Property Act, Section 27, Section 58(3), Section 6 General Clauses Act.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi & Others

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 195 of 1954

iii) Judgement Date: 28th October 1955

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das (Acting C.J.), Vivian Bose, Jagannadhadas, Jafar Imam, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Jagannadhadas

vii) Citation: AIR 1955 SC 77; 1955 SCR (2) 1117

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 5-A and 5-B, East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947

• Sections 27 and 58(3), Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950

• Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None explicitly overruled

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:

• Constitutional Law,

• Administrative Law,

• Property Law,

• Civil Law (Procedural rights under repealing statutes)

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case originates in the historical context of partition-era property exchanges between Hindus migrating from West Punjab (Pakistan) to India and Muslims moving in the opposite direction. These population exchanges necessitated legal frameworks to administer properties left behind by evacuees. One such transaction was the oral exchange between Indira Sohanlal, a displaced Hindu from Lahore, and Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon, a Muslim evacuee owning agricultural land in Delhi. Indira Sohanlal moved for confirmation of the property exchange under Section 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947. However, before the confirmation was acted upon, legislative changes repealed the 1947 Act, replacing it with a centralised structure under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, creating a pivotal question: could the Custodian-General exercise revisional powers over a transaction that began under the earlier framework? The Court navigated through complex statutory interpretation, invoking doctrinal guidance from English and Indian case law on vested rights, procedural retroactivity, and finality of judicial orders​.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Indira Sohanlal, a displaced person from Lahore, claimed ownership over agricultural lands in Punjab Khore, Delhi, by virtue of an oral exchange dated 10 October 1947 with an evacuee, Sir Firoz Khan Noon, who took possession of her house in Lahore. Indira filed a formal application for confirmation of the exchange on 23 February 1948 and later filed an amended application in August 1948. However, before any confirmation could be issued, administrative developments led to the same lands being allotted to twenty-six displaced agricultural refugees in 1949, with possession granted to them by early 1950. Despite this, the Additional Custodian confirmed Indira’s exchange on 20 March 1952. She sought actual possession in May 1952, which led to contestation by the allottees. In 1953, the Custodian-General issued a notice under Section 27 of the 1950 Act and ultimately revoked the confirmation. Indira challenged this order before the Supreme Court, raising issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, and substantive rights under repealed legislation​.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the Custodian-General had jurisdiction to revise the confirmation order under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.

ii. Whether the finality provision under Section 5-B of the repealed 1947 Act created a vested substantive right immune from subsequent revision.

iii. Whether the confirmation order passed in 1952 could be subject to the powers of revision despite being based on a 1948 application.

iv. Whether the Custodian-General’s revocation of confirmation violated principles of natural justice.

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the order of confirmation made in 1952 was under an application initiated in 1948 and hence was governed by the 1947 Act. They contended that Section 5-B made such orders final and conclusive, and this finality became a vested right immune from interference. Citing Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving ([1905] A.C. 369) and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner ([1927] I.L.R. 9 Lah. 284), they argued that procedural laws cannot retroactively curtail existing rights. The appeal further emphasized the Custodian-General’s jurisdiction under Section 27 of the 1950 Act could not override such finality unless the legislature had explicitly provided for retroactive revisional jurisdiction​.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that Section 58(3) of the 1950 Act was a self-contained provision that displaced the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, making the new Act applicable to pending matters. They argued that the confirmation in 1952 was not protected by finality under a repealed law because the finality only attaches after an order is passed, not during a pending application. Hence, the Custodian-General rightfully exercised revisional jurisdiction. Moreover, the property in question had already been allotted to multiple refugees under state rehabilitation policy, and due notice to them was absent when the confirmation was granted. They contended the absence of notice violated procedural fairness, justifying the revision and remand​.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 5-A and 5-B, East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947
ii. Section 27 and Section 58(3), Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950
iii. Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897
iv. Rule-making powers under Section 56(2)(q), 1950 Act

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court held that the right to a final and conclusive confirmation under Section 5-B was not a vested right until such confirmation had occurred. Since the confirmation in question occurred in 1952, after the enactment of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, the revisional power of the Custodian-General under Section 27 applied. The Court ruled that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act did not apply as Section 58(3) was a specific, overriding, and self-contained repealing clause. Hence, the Custodian-General acted within jurisdiction​.

b. OBITER DICTA

i. The Court noted that even if one were to accept the existence of a right to finality, such a right only becomes enforceable upon the actual passing of the order, and not earlier. A pending application does not confer any substantive or vested right.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Repealing statutes with specific transitional provisions override Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.

2. No vested right arises in incomplete proceedings unless expressly protected.

3. Finality clauses in repealed statutes do not restrict revisional powers under new enactments if orders were passed after repeal.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The case is a seminal judgment on the doctrine of repeal and re-enactment and its impact on pending quasi-judicial proceedings. The Court’s nuanced reading of Section 58(3) as a self-contained clause excluding Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was critical. It affirmed the view that procedural rights such as finality of orders or appellate jurisdiction do not become substantive unless fully crystallised. The decision also underscores the primacy of public interest in rehabilitation policies over individual transactional claims. While protecting administrative prudence, the Court maintained the balance by remanding the matter for reconsideration, ensuring procedural fairness to all affected parties.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, [1905] A.C. 369

2. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, [1927] I.L.R. 9 Lah. 284

3. State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 893

4. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay, [1923] L.R. 50 I.A. 212

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 – [Section 5-A, 5-B]

2. Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 – [Section 27, Section 58(3)]

3. General Clauses Act, 1897 – [Section 6]