A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The landmark Supreme Court decision in Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan & Ors., (1956) SCR 62, elucidates the limitations of an executing court when faced with a decree for specific performance that imposes reciprocal and inseverable obligations. The case reaffirms that an executing court cannot modify, vary, or go behind the decree, and it can neither interpret nor substitute the obligations enumerated therein. Specifically, if the party seeking execution fails to comply with their own obligations, execution cannot proceed. In the given case, the decree directed transfer of a five annas share in a firm that ceased to exist prior to execution. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that partial or substituted performance was impermissible. This case also reiterates the doctrinal importance of Sections 42 and 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the binding nature of mutual obligations in specific performance suits.

Keywords: Specific performance, Reciprocal obligations, Execution proceedings, Section 47 CPC, Section 42 CPC

B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title: Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Others
ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1955
iii) Judgement Date: January 31, 1956
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Vivian Bose J., Jafer Imam J., Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.
vi) Author: Justice Vivian Bose
vii) Citation: (1956) SCR 62
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 42, Section 47, Order XXI Rule 32(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None
x) Case is Related to: Civil Law, Contract Law, Law of Specific Performance, Procedural Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The case involved execution of a decree for specific performance of a contract executed between two factions of a business partnership — the Bettia Group (defendants) and the Padrauna Group (plaintiffs). The agreement required the defendants to transfer their shares in Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. and a five annas share in a firm named Marwari Brothers, against a consideration of ₹2,45,000. Despite the plaintiffs tendering the amount, the defendants did not act on the decree, initiating a complex web of execution proceedings. The controversy centered on whether the defendants could execute the decree when the firm Marwari Brothers had been dissolved before the execution date. The Supreme Court adjudicated not only on execution mechanics but also on the broader implications of non-performance in mutually binding contracts.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The firm Marwari Brothers was formed in 1936 with two factions—Bettia Group and Padrauna Group. Disputes led to a contract on 1 January 1941, in which the Bettia Group agreed to sell their 250 shares in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills and a five annas share in Marwari Brothers to the Padrauna Group for ₹2,45,000. The Federal Court finally affirmed a decree for specific performance in 1949. However, before execution, the Marwari Brothers firm was dissolved. Despite this, Jai Narain Ram Lundia of the Bettia Group sought execution of the decree. Objections arose, notably that the firm had ceased to exist and the shares could no longer be transferred. The Subordinate Court dismissed this objection for want of jurisdiction, while the High Court reversed this finding, holding that execution could not proceed due to the impossibility of performance.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether an executing court has jurisdiction to determine the capability of parties to perform obligations under the decree.
ii) Whether a decree for specific performance imposing reciprocal obligations can be executed partially.
iii) Whether the substitution of an obligation (e.g., share in assets of a dissolved firm) amounts to alteration of the decree.
iv) Whether the inability to perform obligations due to dissolution of a firm invalidates execution.
v) Whether Order XXI Rule 32(1) CPC can be invoked by a party who is incapable of performance.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The appellant argued that although Marwari Brothers stood dissolved, he was still entitled to enforce the decree by transferring equivalent value—namely, a five annas share in the dissolved firm’s assets. He further claimed that the firm continued de facto till 14 September 1950, the date of sale of assets by Ganga Devi Sugar Mills. He contended that this did not defeat the decree’s enforceability, and that tender by the plaintiffs was defective due to their failure to re-tender the money after appeals concluded. He asserted that the decree should be read liberally, and the executing court had no jurisdiction to go into such factual determinations under Section 47 CPC.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The respondents contended that the firm Marwari Brothers was dissolved even before the decree could be executed, rendering execution impossible. They emphasized that the decree’s performance clause was reciprocal and indivisible. The plaintiffs could not be compelled to accept a share in a defunct firm or its assets in substitution. They relied on the principle that an executing court must enforce a decree as-is and cannot substitute or vary the relief. Further, they argued that the appellant failed to demonstrate his readiness and ability to perform his part, making Order XXI Rule 32(1) CPC inapplicable.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 empowers the executing court to decide all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.
ii) Section 42 of CPC equates the powers of the executing court with the court which passed the decree.
iii) Order XXI Rule 32(1) of CPC provides for execution of a decree for specific performance or injunction via attachment, detention, or both, when the judgment-debtor fails to comply.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Supreme Court ruled that execution cannot be allowed when the decree’s obligations are reciprocal and inseparable, and the decree-holder himself is incapable of performance. Since Marwari Brothers had ceased to exist, the appellant could not transfer a five annas share, thereby failing to satisfy his obligation. The Court declared that the executing court cannot modify or substitute the obligations enumerated in the decree. Citing Kessowji Issur v. G.I.P. Rly. [1907] 34 IA 115 and Indrajit Pratap Sahi v. Amar Singh [1923] 50 IA 183, it held that execution must proceed only as per the decree.

b. OBITER DICTA
i) The Court observed that dissolution of a firm before execution precludes unilateral performance. Even if the decree is one of specific performance, the equitable readiness and willingness to perform remains a necessary condition in execution. The remedy under Order XXI Rule 32(1) CPC is only available when the decree-holder has met his own obligations.

c. GUIDELINES

• A decree imposing reciprocal and inseverable obligations must be executed wholly or not at all.

• An executing court has full jurisdiction under Section 47 CPC to assess the capability of the decree-holder to perform.

• A transferee court enjoys the same powers under Section 42 CPC as the court which passed the decree.

• Substitution of obligations amounts to alteration of the decree, which is impermissible in execution proceedings.

• Order XXI Rule 32(1) CPC cannot be invoked if the decree-holder fails to perform their part of the decree.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i) Kessowji Issur v. G.I.P. Rly., [1907] 34 IA 115
ii) Indrajit Pratap Sahi v. Amar Singh, [1923] 50 IA 183
iii) Parsotim v. Lal Mohar, [1931] 58 IA 254

b. Important Statutes Referred
i) Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
ii) Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
iii) Order XXI Rule 32(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908