A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Jaswant Singh v. The State of Punjab ([1958] SCR 762) explores the intricate interplay between procedural requirements for sanction under Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the scope of a criminal trial involving multiple charges, some of which are unsupported by sanction. Jaswant Singh, a Patwari, faced charges under Section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(d) of the 1947 Act. The prosecution alleged habitual bribery and a specific bribe of ₹50 from Pal Singh. However, sanction had only been accorded for the latter. The Supreme Court distinguished the legal implications of sanction deficiencies and upheld the validity of partial sanction. It ruled that while proceedings for the offence without sanction—Section 5(1)(a)—were void, the trial and conviction for the sanctioned offence—Section 5(1)(d)—remained valid. The Court further rejected the appellant’s claim of prejudice due to evidence on the unsanctioned charge. This decision forms a vital precedent in cases involving overlapping offences under anti-corruption laws and delineates the jurisdictional limitations under Section 6. Citing pivotal cases like Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown [(1939) F.C.R. 159] and Basir-ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal [(1953) SCR 836], it sets forth the doctrine that absence of sanction for one charge does not vitiate proceedings for another lawfully sanctioned charge.

Keywords: Sanction under Prevention of Corruption Act, jurisdiction, habitual bribery, specific bribe, Section 6, partial sanction, Jaswant Singh, Supreme Court.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Jaswant Singh v. The State of Punjab

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 1954

iii) Judgement Date
25th October 1957

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Justice B. P. Sinha and Justice J. L. Kapur

vi) Author
Justice J. L. Kapur

vii) Citation
[1958] SCR 762

viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Section 5(1)(a) and Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any)
None expressly overruled

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Criminal Law, Anti-Corruption Law, Public Service Ethics, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal in this case arose from a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, where Jaswant Singh, a Patwari, was found guilty of receiving illegal gratification. The prosecution contended he had received bribes habitually and had accepted ₹50 from Pal Singh for forwarding an allotment application. Sanction for prosecution under Section 6(1) of the Act, however, covered only the specific bribe and not the habitual conduct. The trial court convicted Singh under both Section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(d), while the High Court quashed the former conviction. Singh appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that trying him for any charge in absence of sanction for all made the entire proceeding void. The case posed an important legal question: Does lack of sanction for one offence under the Act render the entire trial void?

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Jaswant Singh, served as Patwari at Fatehpur Rajputan. He allegedly received ₹50 from Pal Singh on 19 March 1953 at Subzi Mandi, Amritsar. The payment was a bribe for assisting in an allotment application for Santa Singh, Pal Singh’s father. Besides this, evidence alleged habitual acceptance of bribes from others, namely Hazara Singh, Harnam Singh, Joginder Singh, Atma Singh, Hari Singh, and Ganda Singh. Based on these, Singh was charged under Section 5(1)(a) for habitual bribery and under Section 5(1)(d) for the specific bribe. The sanction issued by the Deputy Commissioner specifically mentioned only the ₹50 bribe from Pal Singh. At trial, the Special Judge found both charges proven. The High Court reversed the conviction for habitual bribery due to absence of sanction but affirmed the one for the specific bribe.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether a trial becomes wholly void if sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is given for only one of two offences charged?

ii) Whether evidence admitted for a charge lacking sanction prejudices the accused in defending the valid charge?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The appellant argued that the sanction issued was only for the specific ₹50 bribe, which falls under Section 5(1)(d). The charge, however, also included Section 5(1)(a)—habitual acceptance of bribes. Since sanction is mandatory under Section 6, trying him for any offence beyond the sanctioned one rendered the entire trial void. The defence relied on the doctrine of jurisdictional incompetence where an invalid sanction renders proceedings non-est. They cited Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. The King [(1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 158] to argue that each offence requires distinct sanction and lack thereof vitiates the proceeding entirely[1]. They contended that clubbing charges and adducing evidence for the non-sanctioned charge prejudiced the appellant and affected the fairness of trial[2].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The State submitted that the sanction under Section 6 covered the act of receiving ₹50 from Pal Singh and thus enabled valid prosecution under Section 5(1)(d). They argued that lack of sanction for Section 5(1)(a) did not invalidate the trial for the specific act under Section 5(1)(d). The two offences, though arising from related facts, are distinct in law. The State placed reliance on Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown [(1939) F.C.R. 159], where the Federal Court held that lack of sanction for one charge did not bar trial on another validly sanctioned charge[3]. They further argued that there was no proven prejudice or miscarriage of justice, as the conviction rested squarely on Pal Singh’s bribery incident.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: Relates to habitual bribery
ii) Section 5(1)(d): Involves obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage as a bribe
iii) Section 6(1): Mandates prior sanction from competent authority before prosecuting a public servant
iv) Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Relevance of evidence principles under Sections 5-11

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that absence of sanction for one offence does not invalidate proceedings for another offence for which sanction exists. The trial court had jurisdiction to try Singh under Section 5(1)(d) since the sanction explicitly referred to the ₹50 bribe. Relying on Basir-ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal [(1953) SCR 836], the Court ruled that procedural bar under Section 6 only invalidates cognizance of the specific unsanctioned offence, not the entire trial[4]. The conviction under Section 5(1)(a) was rightly quashed. However, the Section 5(1)(d) conviction remained valid due to the presence of sanction.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court remarked that while it is desirable for sanctions to outline full factual matrices, it is not mandatory if the prosecution proves the sanctioning authority considered the facts. It emphasized judicial scrutiny over automatic or mechanical grants of sanction[5].

c. GUIDELINES 

• Sanction under Section 6(1) is a condition precedent to cognizance, not the entire trial

• If one of several charges is unsanctioned, only that charge becomes void—not the rest

• Evidence for void charges must not prejudice validly sanctioned proceedings

• Courts must separate impact of multiple charges and ensure fairness

• Sanction should ideally describe the offence and relevant facts considered

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment in Jaswant Singh v. The State of Punjab crystallizes the jurisprudence on statutory sanctions in corruption prosecutions. It acknowledges the statutory bar under Section 6 while carving out a nuanced interpretation that avoids miscarriage of justice due to hyper-technical objections. The Court ensures that public servants cannot evade accountability merely due to procedural lapse on separate charges, provided the essential offence stands proved with valid sanction. The ruling balances procedural rigour with pragmatic justice delivery, aligning with precedents like Hori Ram Singh and Basir-ul-Huq. The Court’s insistence on proof of prejudice as a threshold for setting aside convictions also strengthens procedural integrity. This decision remains instructive for interpreting mandatory preconditions under anti-corruption and similar statutory frameworks.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. The King, [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 158
[2] Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 30
[3] Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown, (1939) F.C.R. 159
[4] Basir-ul-Huq v. The State of West Bengal, (1953) SCR 836
[5] Basdeo Agarwala v. King Emperor, (1945) F.C.R. 93

b. Important Statutes Referred

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Sections 5(1)(a), 5(1)(d), 6(1)

• Indian Evidence Act, 1872

• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898