A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The present analysis examines Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 393 of 2024, decided by the Supreme Court on 6 January 2025, wherein the Court set aside an FIR registered under Section 420, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and quashed proceedings against the appellant insofar as he was concerned. The dispute arises from competing proprietary claims over a coastal land parcel in Dhargalim Village, Pernem, Goa, and concerns sale deeds executed by the appellant as power of attorney and confirming party on behalf of two vendors.

The complainant the 4th respondent  had earlier instituted twelve declaratory suits claiming undivided ownership and only after two years lodged a criminal complaint alleging cheating and land-grabbing. The Supreme Court examined the ingredients of Section 415 IPC (cheating) and held that the complaint did not disclose how the appellant had deceived the complainant or caused harm to him; the purchasers under the sale deeds did not complain; and the complaint suppressed the pendency of civil suits and applications for interim relief.

Relying on precedents including Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar and related decisions dealing with the boundary between civil title disputes and criminal liability, the Court concluded the matter was essentially civil and that invoking criminal law after a two-year gap amounted to an abuse of process. The FIR and consequential proceedings were therefore quashed only as against the appellant, without adjudicating the merits of the civil controversy.

Keywords: Section 415 IPC; Section 420 IPC; power of attorney; sale deed; civil remedy; abuse of process.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation concerns the coastal property described as “CAPNIVORIL GUERA” / “KAPNI VARIL GHERA” in Sy. No. 481/0, Dhargalim, Pernem, Goa. The 4th respondent instituted twelve declaratory suits on 16 October 2018 asserting an undivided share in the subject property. The appellant, acting as constituted attorney for Vidhya Natekar and Sanjay Natekar (vendors), executed sale deeds transferring their claimed rights to purchasers. A complaint filed by the constituted attorney of the 4th respondent on 23 October 2020 led to registration of FIR No.177/2020 for offences under Section 420 IPC, alleging deceitful sale without consent of all legal heirs.

Prior to police action, the appellant had entered appearance in civil proceedings and had published a public notice in 2013; purchasers under the deeds did not complain. The appellant obtained anticipatory bail and moved to quash the FIR; the High Court dismissed the writ on 1 March 2023. This appeal to the Supreme Court raised the core question whether the allegations, on their face, disclosed the elements of cheating or whether the complaint was an impermissible invocation of criminal law to resolve a title dispute while civil suits were pending.

The Court examined documentary sale deeds, the power of attorney clauses, and the chronology including the two-year delay in lodging the criminal complaint, and considered precedents delineating the threshold for criminalization of property disputes.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The 4th respondent filed twelve suits in October 2018 seeking declaration of co-ownership in the subject property inherited from his father. The appellant filed a written statement in the civil suits on 1 September 2020 and maintained that the property was originally owned by Sacarama Sadassiva Natecar.

On 23 October 2020, the constituted attorney of the 4th respondent lodged a criminal complaint alleging that the appellant, as power of attorney of Vidhya and Sanjay Natekar, sold portions of the property without consent of all legal heirs. The sale deeds executed by the appellant, who also signed as a confirming party, purportedly transferred the ownership rights of Vidhya and Sanjay to purchasers. The complaint accused the appellant of vicious and mala fide deceit, forgery and land-grabbing.

Notably, the complainant omitted to disclose the prior institution of declaratory suits and interim injunction applications filed two years earlier. The police registered FIR No.177/2020 and the appellant secured anticipatory bail on 10 February 2021. A supplementary complaint dated 13 October 2022 later alleged that the vendors themselves had committed offences. Purchasers under the sale deeds raised no grievance. The High Court dismissed the writ petition to quash the FIR on 1 March 2023, prompting this appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the allegations made in the complaint, taken at face value, disclose the ingredients of cheating as defined under Section 415 IPC?

ii. Whether a pending civil action concerning title precludes criminal proceedings where the complaint primarily raises civil questions of ownership?

iii. Whether the filing of a criminal complaint two years after institution of civil suits, and without disclosing such suits, amounts to abuse of process warranting quashing of the FIR?

iv. Whether the absence of complaint by purchasers and lack of allegation of any false representation to the complainant weakens the criminal charge?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant acted as constituted attorney for Vidhya Natekar and Sanjay Natekar and executed sale deeds within their rights; the sale conveyed the right, title and interest of the vendors. It was argued that the ingredients of Section 415 IPC were not satisfied because there was no deceptive inducement of the complainant, no dishonest concealment directed at him, and no allegation that the appellant pretended to be the complainant or transferred the complainant’s rights.

Reliance was placed on precedents delineating the boundary between civil disputes and criminal liability in property matters. It was further submitted that the complainant deliberately withheld the pendency of twelve declaratory suits and interim relief applications, and that the two-year delay in resorting to criminal law evidenced mala fides and an abuse of process.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The 4th respondent contended that the appellant dishonestly misappropriated the subject property and sold it with knowledge that the 4th respondent was co-owner. It was argued that the present case fell within the ambit of criminal misconduct and that an early interference with investigation would be inappropriate. Reliance was placed on M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander to stress that a pending civil suit is not an absolute bar to criminal investigation where conduct may constitute an offence. The State supported continuation of investigation and opposed quashing at the initial stage.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court scrutinised the sale deed and the power of attorney and observed that the documents recited Vidhya and Sanjay as co-owners and that the sale deeds legally transferred their ownership rights to purchasers. Applying Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, the Court emphasised that a third party complainant who is not the purchaser must demonstrate how he was deceived and how the accused’s acts caused damage or were likely to cause damage as required by Section 415 IPC.

The Court held that the complaint did not allege any false or misleading representation to the 4th respondent nor any dishonest inducement by the appellant to cause the complainant to part with property. The Court further recorded that purchasers under the sale deeds had not complained, which undermined the narrative of fraud upon third parties. The chronology showed that declaratory suits were instituted in October 2018 and yet the criminal complaint was lodged only in October 2020, without disclosure of the prior litigation or interim relief applications.

The Court treated this delay and suppression as indicative of mala fide invocation of criminal law to influence a pending civil contest. Balancing the competing precedents, the Court accepted that while criminal liability may arise in property transactions where dishonest inducement to the purchaser exists, those elements were absent here and the matter was essentially civil.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order, and quashed FIR No.177/2020 and proceedings arising therefrom only as against the appellant, leaving open civil adjudication between parties. The Court expressly refrained from adjudicating the merits of title.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive principle is that cheating under Section 415 IPC requires proof of deceptive or dishonest inducement causing or likely to cause damage to the complainant; mere execution of a sale deed by a power of attorney holder in respect of the vendor’s interest does not automatically constitute cheating as to a non-purchaser third party. Where a civil suit on title is pending and purchasers have not complained, resort to criminal remedy after an unexplained delay accompanied by suppression of the pending civil litigation may constitute abuse of process, warranting quashing of FIRs against the accused in appropriate cases. The Court anchored this ratio on Mohd. Ibrahim and related decisions distinguishing purchaser’s grievances from third-party complaints.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed, obiter, that execution of a sale deed by a person purporting to convey property not his may, in specific circumstances, amount to a criminal offence vis-à-vis a defrauded purchaser. However, such criminality is contingent on demonstrable deception and dishonest inducement to the aggrieved purchaser. The observation clarifies that criminal liability is not foreclosed in all title disputes but must be evaluated on the presence of mens rea and the direct victim’s complaint. The Court also remarked on the limited role of the FIR and cautioned against scuttling investigations prematurely where prima facie offences appear, while simultaneously recognizing the risk of weaponising criminal law within property litigation.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. When a complainant is a third party (not the purchaser), the complaint must clearly spell out the deception, the dishonest inducement, and the causal harm fitting Section 415 IPC to sustain criminal proceedings.

2. Courts should scrutinise the chronology and completeness of complaints; suppression of earlier civil suits and interim relief applications ordinarily weakens a plea for immediate criminal inquiry and may indicate mala fide invocation of criminal process.

3. Quashing of FIRs is appropriate in clear cases where allegations disclose only civil controversy and there is an evident abuse of criminal process, but such relief should be confined to the accused whose conduct is demonstrably outside criminal culpability.

4. The distinction between the purchaser’s grievance and a third-party complainant must be maintained; an aggrieved purchaser may validly pursue cheating charges upon satisfying Section 415 ingredients.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s order reinforces the established demarcation between civil title disputes and criminal punishment for cheating. The judgment sensibly insists on textual compliance with Section 415 IPC and situational presence of deceit targeted at the complainant. By quashing the FIR only against the appellant, the Court avoided precluding law enforcement action against other accused where prima facie culpability may exist, while correcting manifest misuse of criminal remedies to influence a pending civil contest.

The decision underscores the duty of complainants to disclose parallel civil proceedings and chronology; failure to do so may be considered material suppression impacting the credibility of the criminal complaint. For practitioners, the judgment provides a pragmatic test: examine whether the alleged act manifested dishonest inducement of the complainant and whether the complainant himself suffered or was likely to suffer harm by reason of the accused’s deception. The case therefore reiterates that criminal law is not a substitute for civil adjudication and that courts must guard against weaponisation of criminal process in property litigation.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751; [2009] 13 SCR 1254.
ii. R.K. Vijayasarathy & Anr. v. Sudha Seetharam & Anr., (2019) 16 SCC 739; [2019] 2 SCR 185.
iii. M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2021) 19 SCC 401; [2021] 4 SCR 1044.
iv. Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander & Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 460; [2012] 7 SCR 988.
v. Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 393/2024, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 230 (Supreme Court of India).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 415 (Cheating); Section 420 and related penal provisions.