A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, [1951] SCR 228, laid the foundational interpretation of Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution. The Court decisively held that Article 13(1) has no retrospective effect, and that laws existing prior to the commencement of the Constitution, although rendered void to the extent of inconsistency with fundamental rights, continue to be valid for past acts. The Court further differentiated between a law becoming void under the Constitution and a law repealed or expired, thereby delineating the temporal operation of fundamental rights. The majority upheld the validity of a prosecution initiated under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, prior to the Constitution’s enforcement, stating that it could be proceeded with. In contrast, dissenting opinions (Fazl Ali and Mukherjea JJ.) argued that prosecutions under void laws could not continue post-Constitution.

This judgment marks a cornerstone in Indian constitutional jurisprudence, dealing with transitional constitutional interpretation, the scope of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a), and the voidness of pre-constitutional laws.

Keywords: Article 13(1), Retrospective Effect, Fundamental Rights, Void Laws, Pre-Constitutional Legislation, Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, Freedom of Speech.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. IX of 1950

iii) Judgement Date:
22nd January 1951

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Hiralal J. Kania C.J., Saiyid Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.

vi) Author:
Majority Judgment by Das J.; Dissenting Judgments by Fazl Ali J. and Mukherjea J.

vii) Citation:
AIR 1951 SC 128; [1951] SCR 228

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 13(1) and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India

• Sections 2(6), 15(1), and 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any):
None explicitly overruled.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:

• Constitutional Law

• Criminal Law

• Media and Censorship Laws

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

India adopted its Constitution on 26 January 1950, establishing for the first time a written charter of fundamental rights for its citizens. Among these was the right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). The new constitutional order had to reconcile itself with pre-existing colonial laws, some of which were repressive and inconsistent with the rights now guaranteed.

The present case arose against this historical backdrop. It tested whether prosecutions initiated under pre-Constitutional laws — which were inconsistent with fundamental rights — could continue post-enactment. Specifically, it concerned the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, enacted to suppress dissenting voices during British rule. This case was among the first to test the scope and temporal application of Article 13(1), which renders inconsistent laws void to the extent of their inconsistency.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Keshavan Madhava Menon, served as the Secretary of the People’s Publishing House Ltd., a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. In September 1949, a pamphlet titled “Railway Mazdooron ke khilaf Nai Sazish” was published by the appellant. The Bombay authorities, treating the pamphlet as a “news sheet” under Section 2(6) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, alleged that its publication without requisite permission violated Section 15(1) and was punishable under Section 18(1).

A criminal case was filed against the appellant (Case No. 1102/P of 1949). However, during the pendency of this prosecution, the Constitution of India came into effect on 26 January 1950. On 3 March 1950, the appellant argued before the Chief Presidency Magistrate that the law under which he was being prosecuted had become void under Articles 13(1) and 19(1)(a) and moved the Bombay High Court under Article 228 of the Constitution seeking a declaration that the provisions were ultra vires and void.

The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the continuance of the prosecution. The appellant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the provisions of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 — specifically Sections 2(6), 15(1), and 18(1) — were inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and hence void under Article 13(1)?

ii) Whether a prosecution initiated before 26 January 1950 under a law inconsistent with the Constitution could be continued thereafter?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

• The impugned provisions of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 contravened Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees freedom of speech and expression.

• Since the Constitution rendered inconsistent laws void under Article 13(1), such laws could not be used even for pending prosecutions.

• Once the law became void, it could not sustain further legal proceedings, including framing charges or conducting trials.

• A void law is as if it never existed; prosecutions under such laws violate constitutional guarantees.

• The phrase “shall be void” under Article 13(1) must be given full literal meaning. It implies the total obliteration of the inconsistent law’s effect.

• The Constitution’s “spirit” demanded that colonial repressive laws should not haunt the citizens of a free Republic post-1950.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Respondent submitted that:

• Article 13(1) only renders the impugned law prospectively inoperative from the date of the Constitution’s enforcement — i.e., 26 January 1950.

• The word “void” does not mean that the law is void ab initio, but rather prospectively ineffective.

• There is a clear distinction between laws that have expired/repealed and laws that have become void due to inconsistency. The former affects pending prosecutions, the latter does not.

• Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 supports the principle that repeal of a law does not affect ongoing prosecutions unless expressly stated.

• Pending prosecutions under laws valid at the time of commission of the offence are maintainable even if such laws become void later.

• Accepting the appellant’s interpretation would lead to absurdities, including invalidating lawful convictions merely because the judgment occurred post-Constitution.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The majority (Das J., for himself and Kania C.J., Sastri, Mahajan, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.) held that:

• Article 13(1) has no retrospective effect. It only applies from the commencement of the Constitution, not to acts done before.

• An existing law is rendered void only to the extent of its inconsistency, and only from the date the Constitution came into effect.

• The prosecution of the appellant, initiated prior to 26 January 1950 under a law then valid, was not affected by Article 13(1) and could be continued.

• The term “void” in Article 13(1) must be interpreted in prospective terms and not as void ab initio.

• The Constitution guarantees no fundamental right to protection against prosecution for acts committed prior to its commencement.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) Das J. remarked that a court must derive the spirit of the Constitution from its language, not from emotional or political assumptions. This emphasized the importance of textual interpretation over implied intent.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Article 13(1) does not render inconsistent laws non-existent from their inception.

• Such laws are void only prospectively, and only to the extent of their inconsistency with Part III of the Constitution.

• Pending proceedings under valid laws at the time of commission of the offence are not affected by the Constitution’s coming into force.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s verdict in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay has profound implications for constitutional interpretation in India. It sets a clear demarcation between laws that are repealed and those rendered void due to inconsistency with the Constitution. The judgment confirms that fundamental rights are not retrospective and do not invalidate prosecutions already initiated under valid laws pre-Constitution.

While the majority judgment adheres to the discipline of legal formalism and textual interpretation, the dissents by Fazl Ali and Mukherjea JJ. showcase a more liberal and citizen-oriented approach. This early divergence in interpretative philosophy laid the foundation for future constitutional debates around Article 13 and the doctrine of eclipse.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. v. Emperor, [1947] FCR 141
ii) Surtees v. Ellison, (1829) 9 B & C 152
iii) Kay v. Goodwin, (1830) 6 Bing. 576
iv) Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 125 N.E. 20
v) R v. Mawgan, (1838) 8 A & E 496

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931
ii) Constitution of India – Article 13(1)
iii) Constitution of India – Article 19(1)(a)
iv) General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 6