A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 stands as a landmark authority of the Supreme Court of India on the evidentiary value of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The ruling addresses a crucial jurisprudential issue—whether a dying declaration alone, without corroboration, can lawfully form the basis for a conviction. The Supreme Court, in a detailed analytical judgment authored by Justice B.P. Sinha, clarified that there is no absolute legal or prudential rule requiring mandatory corroboration of a dying declaration. The Court held that each dying declaration must be scrutinized individually, and if it appears credible and truthful, a conviction can rest solely on its strength. The judgment also reasserted the importance of procedural regularity and circumstances under which dying declarations are recorded, underscoring that if such statements are made in a fit mental state and are recorded properly, they may hold standalone evidentiary value. The Court ultimately upheld the death sentence of the appellant based on three consistent dying declarations made by the deceased shortly before his death. This case continues to be a touchstone for assessing the admissibility and probative value of dying declarations in Indian criminal jurisprudence.

Keywords: Dying Declaration, Section 32(1) Indian Evidence Act, Criminal Appeal, Abscondence, Corroboration, Section 302 IPC

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Khushal Rao v. The State of Bombay

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. 184 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date:
September 25, 1957

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justice B.P. Sinha, Justice Govinda Menon, and Justice J.L. Kapur

vi) Author:
Justice B.P. Sinha

vii) Citation:
AIR 1958 SC 22; 1958 SCR 552

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India

• Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860

• Section 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case:
The ruling clarified and limited the precedential scope of Ram Nath Madhoprasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 420

x) Case is Related to:
Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Evidence Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal arose under a certificate of fitness granted by the Nagpur High Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The appellant, Khushal Rao, was convicted for the murder of Baboolal and sentenced to death under Section 302 IPC. The prosecution’s case relied primarily on three dying declarations made by Baboolal within a span of two hours after he sustained fatal injuries. The High Court upheld the conviction but acquitted another accused, Tukaram, citing identity confusion. The appeal raised significant questions on whether the Supreme Court should entertain appeals based on facts and whether a dying declaration alone can sustain a conviction without corroboration.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On February 12, 1956, at around 9 PM, Baboolal was brutally attacked with swords and spears by a group allegedly led by the appellant Khushal Rao in Nagpur’s Mill Area. Baboolal, seriously wounded, was rushed to Mayo Hospital. Within minutes, he made his first dying declaration to the attending doctor, naming Khushal and Tukaram as the assailants. A second declaration was recorded shortly thereafter by Sub-Inspector A.K. Khan. The third, most formal declaration, was documented by a magistrate, Shri M.S. Khetkar, between 11:15 and 11:35 PM in the presence of a medical professional who certified his mental fitness. Baboolal succumbed to his injuries the following morning. The appellant was arrested four days later while hiding in a locked outhouse. The prosecution placed heavy reliance on these declarations as the eyewitnesses were discredited for partisanship. The trial court convicted Khushal and Tukaram, but the High Court acquitted Tukaram citing identity doubts, while confirming Khushal’s conviction and death sentence.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) can be granted by a High Court on questions of fact.

ii. Whether a dying declaration requires corroboration to form the sole basis for conviction.

iii. Whether the conduct of the accused post-crime, such as absconding, constitutes corroborative evidence.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the appellant contended that the certificate under Article 134(1)(c) was wrongly granted as the case turned purely on questions of fact. They stressed that no substantial question of law arose, and hence, the appeal was incompetent.

ii. It was submitted that the dying declarations were inadmissible as they lacked independent corroboration. The defense heavily relied on Ram Nath Madhoprasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 420, where the Court had expressed caution in convicting solely on dying declarations[1].

iii. The defense also asserted that the appellant’s alleged abscondence was due to fear of prosecution in a liquor case and not linked to the murder, thereby nullifying its value as corroboration[2].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent argued that Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act treats dying declarations as relevant evidence irrespective of corroboration. They relied on In re Guruswami Tevar, ILR (1940) Mad. 158, which held that conviction can be based solely on a truthful dying declaration[3].

ii. It was contended that the consistency in three dying declarations, made to a doctor, a police officer, and a magistrate—all public functionaries—highlighted the truthfulness and credibility of the deceased’s statements.

iii. The prosecution emphasized the timing and spontaneous nature of the declarations, made within half an hour of the attack, and in a fit mental state, proved by medical certification[4].

iv. It was argued that the absconding behavior of the accused was a conscious effort to evade arrest, suggesting guilt and serving as corroboration[5].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India – Discretionary appeals in criminal matters from High Courts.

ii. Section 302, IPC – Punishment for murder.

iii. Section 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Relevancy of dying declarations in cases involving cause of death.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no legal mandate requiring a dying declaration to be corroborated to sustain a conviction. The Court stated:

“There is no absolute rule of law, not even a rule of prudence that has ripened into law, that a dying declaration must be corroborated.”[6]

It emphasized that if a court, after close scrutiny, finds a dying declaration to be truthful and voluntarily made, it can form sole evidence to convict.

Further, it held that Article 134(1)(c) cannot be invoked on questions of fact, and appeals on such grounds are incompetent without substantial legal questions[7].

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that dying declarations must be “subjected to very close scrutiny” due to their non-testable nature. However, once found reliable, “no question of corroboration arises.”[8]

c. GUIDELINES 

The Court laid down clear guidelines on how to assess dying declarations:

• No universal requirement of corroboration.

• Declaration must be scrutinized for consistency and spontaneity.

• Reliability can depend on opportunity for observation, mental fitness, promptness of record, and absence of tutoring.

• A declaration recorded by a magistrate in Q&A format stands on a higher evidentiary footing.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision in Khushal Rao serves as a foundational precedent in evaluating dying declarations under Indian criminal law. It reaffirms the probative strength of a dying declaration, provided it is truthful, spontaneous, and properly recorded. This judgment clarifies a previously misunderstood position from Ram Nath Madhoprasad, distinguishing between judicial caution and a legal mandate for corroboration. The decision reinforces that dying declarations are an exception to hearsay rules, grounded in their necessity and solemnity. Courts must, however, apply strict scrutiny to ensure authenticity. The ruling carries immense significance in trials where the victim’s last words are the only evidence, especially in homicide cases where independent eyewitnesses are unavailable or untrustworthy.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Haripada Dey v. State of West Bengal, (1956) SCR 639[1]
ii. Ram Nath Madhoprasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 420[2]
iii. In re Guruswami Tevar, ILR (1940) Mad. 158[3]
iv. Chandrasekera v. The King, [1937] AC 220[4]
v. Golabrao Krishnaji Maratha v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Nag 153[5]

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Article 134(1)(c), Constitution of India – Link
ii. Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Link
iii. Section 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Link