A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark case of Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering Construction v. Union of India & Ors., decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, critically interpreted the scope and application of Section 14(2) and Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 read in conjunction with Article 119(b) of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The crux of the matter involved the determination of the starting point of limitation for filing objections against an arbitral award. The question before the Hon’ble Court was whether the 30-day limitation period to object under the Arbitration Act commences from the date of receiving a formal notice of the filing of the award or from the date when the party becomes aware of the award’s existence.

The Supreme Court departed from a literalist view and adopted a purposive interpretation, holding that awareness or knowledge of the award’s filing is sufficient to trigger the limitation period, and a formal notice is not mandatory. In doing so, it overruled the view adopted by the Gauhati High Court and the District Judge, Sonitpur, who treated the date of formal notice (18.11.2022) as the limitation trigger. The apex court clarified that the order dated 21.09.2022, directing payment of arbitrator’s fee and subsequent filing of the award, was adequate notice under Section 14(2). Consequently, the application filed by the appellant under Section 17 on 10.11.2022 for pronouncement of judgment in terms of the award was valid. The judgment enshrines a principle of substantive compliance over procedural rigidity and seeks to prevent tactical delays in arbitral enforcement.

Keywords:
Arbitration Act, 1940; Section 14(2); Section 17; Article 119(b), Limitation Act, 1963; Filing of Award; Awareness of Award; Premature Application; Service of Notice; Knowledge of Award.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering Construction v. Union of India & Ors.

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2025

iii) Judgement Date
03 January 2025

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta

vi) Author
Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha

vii) Citation
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 81 : 2025 INSC 24

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 14(2), Section 17, Section 38 – Arbitration Act, 1940
• Article 119(b) of the First Schedule – Limitation Act, 1963
• Section 115 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any)
None directly overruled, but precedent in the Gauhati High Court reversed.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects

• Arbitration Law
• Civil Procedure
• Limitation Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This judgment emerges from a civil appeal against the dismissal of a Section 17 application for pronouncement of a judgment in terms of an arbitral award. The primary controversy centered on the interpretation of the expression “notice of the filing of the award” under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The trial and high courts interpreted this term narrowly, insisting on a formal court-issued notice as the trigger for limitation. However, the Supreme Court deviated from this technical approach, relying on its own precedents and the purposive legislative intent of arbitration laws, to rule that mere knowledge or awareness of filing suffices. The ruling harmonizes the textual ambiguity with the broader object of expeditious enforcement under arbitration. The Court found that the awareness of the award’s filing arose on 21.09.2022 itself, when the District Court directed the respondent to clear the arbitrator’s pending fees. The subsequent Section 17 application filed by the appellant on 10.11.2022 was deemed valid.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The dispute traces its origin to a government contract granted to M/s S.R. Engineering Construction, a proprietorship concern, by the Union of India during 1987–88 for the construction of a permanent armament section at Tezpur. The firm raised its final bill in 1993 after project completion. However, due to non-payment, the proprietor (since deceased) and subsequently his legal heir (the appellant) sought arbitration per Clause 70 of the contract. Procedural delays plagued the early arbitration efforts due to jurisdictional issues. The Delhi High Court and Addl. District Judge, Delhi, dismissed her applications. Eventually, on 26.08.2019, the District Judge, Sonitpur allowed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and appointed an arbitrator in T.S. (Arb.) Case No. 19/2003. The arbitrator delivered an award on 31.05.2022 awarding ₹1,33,47,268.92 with 9% interest. Yet, the award’s delivery was delayed because the respondents failed to pay arbitrator fees.

The appellant filed a Section 38 application before the District Judge to compel fee payment. On 21.09.2022, the Court directed the respondent to pay arbitrator dues. The appellant received the award copy on 22.09.2022, but respondents only made payment and received formal notice on 18.11.2022. Before that, the appellant filed a Section 17 application on 10.11.2022. The District Court dismissed it as premature, citing the limitation as running from 18.11.2022. The High Court upheld this view. The Supreme Court reversed these findings, asserting that the respondents had constructive notice as early as 21.09.2022.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

Whether the 30-day limitation under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 begins from the date of formal notice of award filing or from the date of actual/constructive awareness of the award’s filing?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The date of notice under Section 14(2) is fulfilled by knowledge or awareness, not a formal notice. The order dated 21.09.2022 sufficed as it directed the respondent to pay arbitrator’s dues, indicating that the award was filed. Hence, limitation started from 21.09.2022 and expired on 20.10.2022. The Section 17 application filed on 10.11.2022 was valid.

Counsel cited Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti [1962] 2 SCR 551 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 75, asserting that oral or informal notice fulfills Section 14(2) requirements. They further relied on Deo Narain Choudhury v. Shree Narain Choudhury (2000) 8 SCC 626, where this Court accepted indirect intimation as adequate notice. The Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending Engineer [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 266 : (1999) 9 SCC 610 decision also upheld that Section 14(2) does not need a written notice, unlike sub-section (1). These precedents supported the appellant’s contention that substantive awareness should suffice.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The formal notice issued on 18.11.2022 alone fulfilled the requirement of Section 14(2) and started the limitation. The order dated 21.09.2022 did not amount to filing notice. They cited the language of Section 14(2) and argued that treating any communication as sufficient would introduce unpredictability in limitation law. Furthermore, they filed objections on 22.11.2022 based on this formal notice. The counsel stressed that a formal step by court is necessary for commencement of limitation. A vague communication about fees cannot constitute valid notice.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Arbitration Act, 1940

• Section 14(2): Filing of award and giving notice by the Court
• Section 17: Pronouncement of judgment according to award
• Section 38: Arbitrator’s remuneration disputes

ii) Limitation Act, 1963

• Article 119(b), First Schedule: 30-day limitation from service of notice of filing of award

iii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

• Section 115: Civil Revision to High Court

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court ruled that limitation under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 begins not from the receipt of a formal notice, but from the date when a party becomes aware of the award’s existence or its filing in court.

The order dated 21.09.2022 directing arbitrator fee payment was sufficient notice under Section 14(2). The Section 17 application filed by appellant on 10.11.2022 was after the limitation expired on 20.10.2022, and therefore valid.

The Court relied on Nilkantha Sidramappa, Deo Narain Choudhury, Ramalinga Reddy, E. Kuttappan, Indian Rayon, and Bharat Coking Coal cases.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court emphasized that reading Section 14(2) narrowly defeats the arbitration law’s objective of speedy resolution. It warned against allowing award-debtors to manipulate technicalities to delay enforcement.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Awareness of the award is sufficient to trigger limitation.
• Court need not issue a formal written notice under Section 14(2).
• Limitation runs from knowledge, not receipt of the award copy.
• Procedural formalities cannot override substantive compliance.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The ruling protects the core object of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which is to ensure prompt enforcement of awards. The Supreme Court prioritised substantive justice and realistic awareness over rigid formalism. It closed a critical loophole exploited by parties to delay enforcement. The decision brings clarity and finality to what qualifies as “notice” and cements pro-arbitration jurisprudence in India. It aligns with international best practices, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law’s spirit that discourages post-award procedural tactics. The ruling will serve as a vital precedent in all matters involving Section 17 enforcement and interpretation of Section 14(2) in arbitration law.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti, [1962] 2 SCR 551 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 75
ii. Deo Narain Choudhury v. Shree Narain Choudhury, (2000) 8 SCC 626
iii. Ch. Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending Engineer, [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 266 : (1999) 9 SCC 610
iv. Food Corporation of India v. E. Kuttappan, [1993] 3 SCR 1028 : (1993) 3 SCC 445
v. Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co. (P) Ltd, [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 231 : (1988) 4 SCC 31
vi. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. C.K. Ahuja, [1995] 2 SCR 65 : (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 744

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Arbitration Act, 1940 – Sections 14(2), 17, 38
ii. Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 119(b), First Schedule
iii. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 115