A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This case forms a landmark decision concerning the retrospective applicability of constitutional provisions, especially Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guaranteeing equality before the law, and Article 13 that renders laws inconsistent with fundamental rights void. The core issue in this case was whether the continuation of a special trial procedure—initially lawful under the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947—violated the rights of the accused once the Constitution came into effect on 26th January 1950.

The appellants were convicted under a discriminatory procedure established by the Bombay Act before the Constitution’s enforcement. The majority of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such discriminatory procedure, if continued post-constitution, contravened Article 14, thereby voiding the provisions authorizing such continuance under Article 13. This judgment set a benchmark in the jurisprudence of retrospective versus prospective applicability of constitutional guarantees, distinguishing procedural rights from substantive rights, and affirming that no person has a vested right in a procedural law. The dissenting view by Patanjali Sastri, C.J., emphasized that pending trials should remain unaffected by the Constitution, invoking principles of legislative continuity.

Keywords: Equality before law, Retrospective application, Fundamental rights, Special courts, Article 14, Article 13, Criminal procedure, Special Judge, Procedural discrimination.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v. The State of Bombay

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeals Nos. 20 and 21 of 1950

iii) Judgement Date
20 May 1952

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Patanjali Sastri C.J., Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.

vi) Author
Justice S.R. Das (Majority); Justice Patanjali Sastri (Dissenting)

vii) Citation
AIR 1952 SC 235; [1952] S.C.R. 710

viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Article 13 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India; Section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any)
None directly overruled, but clarified the ruling in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay [1951 SCR 228]

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Procedural Law, Human Rights Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose under Article 132(1) of the Constitution from a decision of the Bombay High Court, which had confirmed the conviction and death sentence of the appellants by a Special Judge under the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act. The appellants were involved in what became known as the Central Bank Robbery case in Ahmedabad, and the trial commenced before 26th January 1950. The Constitution came into force during the course of the trial. The major question was whether the continuation of the trial under a special, now discriminatory, procedure post-Constitution infringed upon Article 14.

The Court revisited its earlier jurisprudence in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, and further developed the reasoning articulated in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 26 May 1949, in Ahmedabad, the appellants committed a violent robbery involving the hijacking of a Central Bank of India van, resulting in the death of two individuals. They were charged with multiple offences including murder under Section 302 IPC, attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC, along with offences under the Arms Act and the Bombay District Police Act.

The Government referred their case to a Special Judge under the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, and by January 13, 1950, charges were framed. Seventeen witnesses were examined prior to January 26, 1950, when the Constitution came into force. The Special Court trial concluded on March 13, 1950, with the appellants being sentenced to death.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the continuation of the trial under a special and discriminatory procedure post-constitution infringed Article 14?

ii. Whether Section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947 is void under Article 13 of the Constitution?

iii. Can the rights of accused be affected by a procedure that was discriminatory only in its continuance?

iv. Whether procedural laws enjoy the same sanctity as substantive rights under the Constitution?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioners / Appellants submitted that:

• Section 12 of the Bombay Act violated Article 14 since it allowed the State Government to refer particular “cases” selectively to a Special Judge, without any classification, thereby resulting in arbitrary treatment.

• Post-constitution, the appellants were denied equal protection of laws, as similarly placed individuals committing identical offences would now be tried under the ordinary procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code, while they continued under a harsh and biased special procedure.

• They invoked The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284, where similar provisions in the Bengal Special Courts Act were struck down for being discriminatory.

• They asserted that procedural rights are not static, and no one has a vested right in any particular mode of procedure, hence Article 14 applies even to changes in procedure once the Constitution is enforced.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

• The trial was lawfully initiated before the Constitution came into force, and hence, by virtue of the principle of prospective application of fundamental rights, the Constitution could not invalidate a proceeding that had already commenced.

• They relied on Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, [1951] SCR 228, which held that Article 13 does not have retrospective effect.

• The discriminatory procedure, even if void post-Constitution, did not vitiate proceedings initiated under a valid law, thus ensuring procedural continuity.

• They contended that switching from the special to the regular procedure mid-trial would cause legal and administrative chaos and was not mandated by the Constitution.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 14 of Constitution: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws…”
Read on Indian Kanoon

ii. Article 13 of Constitution: “All laws in force… inconsistent with the provisions of this Part shall… be void.”
Read on Indian Kanoon

iii. Section 12 of Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947: Allowed the Government to direct specific “cases” to be tried by Special Courts without preliminary inquiry. This discretion was held as arbitrary.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The majority held that Section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, in authorizing the government to refer individual cases for trial by a Special Judge without any classification, violated Article 14 and was therefore void under Article 13(1).

ii. The Court clarified that procedural rights are not vested rights; hence, once the Constitution came into force, the appellants were entitled to be tried by equal procedural law, like other similarly situated persons.

iii. The Court held that continued discrimination in procedure post-constitution amounts to a fresh cause of action violating Article 14.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. Justice Patanjali Sastri, dissenting, argued that pending trials are unaffected by Article 14, and procedural discrimination, if validly begun pre-constitution, may continue post-constitution.

ii. He emphasized the principle of non-retrospectivity and highlighted that judicial processes started under a valid law do not get invalidated retroactively.

c. GUIDELINES

Any special procedure prescribed by legislation must be backed by reasonable classification.

• The equality clause applies to procedure and not just to substantive rights.

• Pending criminal trials must adhere to non-discriminatory procedure once the Constitution comes into effect.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court in Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. State of Bombay took a firm stand against procedural inequality. It significantly broadened the scope of Article 14, ensuring that criminal trials, even if initiated pre-constitution, must not violate post-constitution rights. The decision aligns with the liberal interpretation of fundamental rights, particularly focusing on equality in procedural fairness.

The case not only reaffirmed the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ruling but also clarified the scope and limitations of Keshavan Madhava Menon’s precedent. It established that substantive liabilities may survive, but discriminatory procedural mechanisms cannot persist post-enforcement of the Constitution.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284
ii. Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952] SCR 435
iii. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, [1951] SCR 228
iv. Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal Mallick, [1927] 54 I.A. 152

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India, Articles 13, 14, 132
ii. Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, Section 12
iii. Indian Penal Code, Sections 302, 307, 394, 397, 34
iv. Arms Act, Section 19(e)
v. Bombay District Police Act, Section 68(1)
vi. Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 342, 526, 537