A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark judgment in Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay (1957 SCR 721) dealt with the constitutional validity and enforceability of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, particularly focusing on the requisitioning of premises and the conclusive evidentiary value of governmental findings under Sections 5 and 6. The Supreme Court of India, through a Bench including Sinha J., upheld the validity of the Act and the requisition order issued posthumously to the tenant, dismissing the contention that the law infringed on fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f), 31, and 32 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that the Act, being a pre-Constitution law saved under Article 31(5)(a), continued to be valid even if it lacked the phrase “for a public purpose” originally. The judgment further solidified that certain governmental declarations under the Act, once made, were final and not subject to judicial scrutiny under Articles 226 and 32. The petitioner’s plea challenging the posthumous requisition of premises in her late husband’s name was also dismissed. In doing so, the Court clarified that a requisition order is not akin to a judicial order, thus not invalidated by the tenant’s death. The judgment notably clarified the reach of the ejusdem generis doctrine, stating that the term “or otherwise” in Section 6 was intended to extend, not limit, the grounds for requisitioning.

Keywords: Bombay Land Requisition Act, constitutional validity, requisition order, Article 31, Article 32, judicial review, conclusive evidence, vacancy, fundamental rights, ejusdem generis.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title: Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay

ii) Case Number: Petition No. 119 of 1955 with Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 140 of 1955

iii) Judgment Date: 5th March 1957

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das C.J., Venkatarama Ayyar, B.P. Sinha, S.K. Das, and P.B. Gajendragadkar JJ.

vi) Author: Justice B.P. Sinha

vii) Citation: (1957) SCR 721

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (as amended by Act II of 1950 and Act XXXIX of 1950): Sections 5, 6, 6 Explanation (a), and 13.

• Constitution of India: Articles 19(1)(f), 31, 32, and 226.

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None explicitly overruled.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Property Law, Administrative Law, Interpretation of Statutes.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The case of Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay arose in the context of India’s urban housing crisis and legislative attempts to regulate requisition of property for public purposes. The Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 empowered the State to requisition premises under conditions it deemed expedient. The Act became contentious due to the conclusive nature of certain declarations it enabled, bypassing judicial review, and because of its potential conflict with constitutional protections after the adoption of the Constitution in 1950. In this matter, the widow of the original tenant challenged both the constitutional validity of the Act and the legality of the requisition order served in her deceased husband’s name. The judgment addresses critical intersections between pre-constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and fundamental rights under the Constitution.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Lilavati Bai, was the widow of Dharamdas Chellaram, the original tenant of a flat at Hem Prabha building, Marine Drive, Bombay. Dharamdas died in November 1953. The State Government, under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, issued an order on 27th January 1954, requisitioning the flat for housing a government servant. The requisition order mentioned that the premises had become vacant in October 1952. The petitioner contended that she and her late husband continued to reside in the flat until his death and that she remained in possession thereafter. Contrarily, the State alleged that the tenant had vacated the premises and handed it over to Narottamdas Dharamsey Patel, who was just a lodger.

The requisition order, which included the deceased tenant as a party, was affixed to the premises. The petitioner challenged the validity of the Act and the order before the Bombay High Court, which dismissed her writ. She then approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking enforcement of her fundamental rights and also filed a petition for special leave under Article 136.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, as amended, was constitutionally valid post the commencement of the Constitution under Articles 19(1)(f), 31, and 13?

ii) Whether the absence of Presidential assent under Article 31(3) rendered the amendments of 1950 invalid?

iii) Whether the declaration of vacancy under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act could be judicially reviewed?

iv) Whether the requisition order served on a deceased person was valid and enforceable?

v) Whether the phrase “or otherwise” in Explanation (a) to Section 6 should be interpreted ejusdem generis?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, ceased to be valid upon the commencement of the Constitution due to non-compliance with Article 31(2) which mandates a public purpose for deprivation of property. Since the original Act did not contain this phrase and was subsequently amended without Presidential assent, it violated Article 31(3) and was void ab initio[1].

ii) They further argued that Sections 5 and 6, which declared governmental findings as conclusive, were unconstitutional as they impaired judicial review, contrary to Articles 32 and 226[2].

iii) It was contended that the requisition order, being made against a dead person, was a legal nullity, and that such administrative acts require the subject to be alive at the time of issuance[3].

iv) The petitioner emphasized that the term “or otherwise” in Section 6 should be interpreted ejusdem generis with preceding terms like eviction, termination of tenancy, etc., thereby excluding cases where vacancy was ambiguous[4].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Act, as a pre-Constitutional law, was preserved by Article 31(5)(a) and continued to remain valid after January 26, 1950, even in the absence of the phrase “for a public purpose”, since it served a clear governmental housing need[5].

ii) They argued that Article 31(3) applied only to laws made after the commencement of the Constitution, and since the amendments of 1950 did not substantially change the law, Presidential assent was not required[6].

iii) The respondent contended that the declarations made under Sections 5 and 6 were valid and conclusive, in light of legislative intent to prevent frivolous litigation and were therefore beyond judicial scrutiny except for compliance issues[7].

iv) As for the service of the order on a deceased person, it was submitted that the requisition was administrative and not judicial in nature. Thus, the death of the tenant did not invalidate the requisition itself, only the procedural aspect of naming him in the notice, which was immaterial[8].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948:
Section 5 – Permits requisition if the tenant has not resided continuously for six months.
Section 6 – Deals with vacancy, requisitioning, and government declaration.
Section 6 Explanation (a) – Defines what constitutes vacancy.
Section 13 – Specifies methods for serving requisition orders.

ii) Constitution of India:
Article 19(1)(f) – Right to property (repealed in 1978).
Article 31 – Compulsory acquisition of property (repealed).
Article 32 – Right to constitutional remedies.
Article 226 – High Courts’ writ jurisdiction.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that the Act was constitutionally valid under Article 31(5)(a) as an existing law. It did not require the expression “for a public purpose” to be explicitly mentioned, so long as the statute’s tenor implies public purpose, as previously held in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji [(1955) 1 SCR 777][9].

ii) The amending Acts of 1950 were not new laws, but mere clarifications or extensions of the existing statute and hence, did not attract Article 31(3). Presidential assent was not necessary[10].

iii) The Court ruled that the government’s declaration of vacancy under Sections 5 and 6 was final and conclusive, hence not open to judicial review, except where procedural compliance was entirely absent. It rejected the idea that courts could reappraise such findings as legal issues[11].

iv) The Court emphasized that the words “or otherwise” were intended as inclusive and not restrictive. Hence, the doctrine of ejusdem generis did not apply, and any form of vacancy was within the ambit of the Act[12].

v) The death of the tenant did not nullify the requisition order. It was an administrative decision, not a judicial one, and hence, valid service of the order by affixing it on the premises sufficed[13].

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court remarked that judicial scrutiny cannot override legislative intent where the statute explicitly makes governmental findings conclusive evidence. Allowing otherwise would undermine the purpose of the Act and open floodgates to litigation[14].

c. GUIDELINES 

• A statute can render certain factual determinations conclusive, precluding re-litigation in courts.

• Administrative orders can be effective even if one of the recipients is deceased, provided service is effectively made.

• The ejusdem generis doctrine must yield to context and legislative purpose where general words are meant to expand, not restrict, interpretation.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case served as a touchstone for balancing legislative power with constitutional safeguards in the realm of property rights. The judgment reiterated that pre-constitutional laws, if not inconsistent with Part III, continue to hold validity under Article 31(5). The Court adopted a purposive interpretation of statutory language, rejecting a rigid application of ejusdem generis. By upholding statutory finality clauses, it emphasized that judicial review is not absolute when the legislature has explicitly narrowed it. The judgment also clarified that procedural anomalies, such as naming a deceased person, do not vitiate otherwise valid administrative actions. It affirmed the precedence of public purpose and administrative expediency in urban planning and housing, reflecting a pro-government stance amid housing shortages.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, (1955) 1 SCR 777.
[2] Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw & Brothers, (1951) SCR 145.
[3] Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay, (1948) L.R. 76 I.A. 57.
[4] Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., (1893) 1 Ch.D. 413.
[5] Moosa Goolam Ariff v. Ebrahim Goolam Ariff, (1912) L.R. 39 I.A. 237.
[6] Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd., (1917) A.C. 406.

b. Important Statutes Referred

• Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948

• Constitution of India, Articles 19(1)(f), 31, 32, 226

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXIX Rule 2, Order XXX Rule 3

• Government of India Act, 1935, Section 104