A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This case analysis critically examines the landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, reported in 1957 SCR 575, which laid down foundational principles on bias in quasi-judicial tribunals, waiver of objections to such bias, and standards for professional misconduct in the legal profession. The case arose from a complaint of professional misconduct against an advocate, Manak Lal, who was alleged to have procured a fraudulent court order for his client through corrupt means. The tribunal, constituted under the Bar Councils Act, found him guilty, a decision upheld by the Rajasthan High Court. The Supreme Court, while affirming the findings of guilt, made profound observations on judicial impartiality, the doctrine of waiver, and the degree of ethical responsibility required in the legal profession. This case forms a cornerstone of Indian jurisprudence on natural justice, particularly the nemo judex in causa sua maxim, and emphasizes that not only must justice be done, but it must also be seen to be done. The judgment also balances the technicality of bias with the principle of waiver, creating a nuanced jurisprudential precedent that continues to guide judicial and administrative law in India.

Keywords:
Professional Misconduct, Bias in Tribunal, Waiver, Natural Justice, Bar Council Proceedings

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date:
6th February, 1957

iv) Court:
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, Justice S. K. Das, and Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar

vi) Author:
Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar

vii) Citation:
(1957) SCR 575

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926

• Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879

• Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:
None specifically overruled.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Responsibility

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court was confronted with a nuanced interplay between procedural fairness and substantive misconduct. A complaint had been filed by Dr. Prem Chand against Advocate Manak Lal, alleging that the latter, through improper influence over court staff, secured a fabricated stay order in a Section 145 CrPC proceeding. Upon receipt of the complaint, the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court constituted a tribunal under the Bar Councils Act, 1926. The tribunal, chaired by Shri Chhangani, a senior advocate who had previously appeared for the complainant, held the appellant guilty of misconduct. This composition became a central constitutional and procedural issue when the matter was appealed before the Supreme Court, thereby raising serious questions about the principle of bias under the broader doctrine of natural justice. The appellant also challenged the severity of punishment and raised concerns over the alleged procedural irregularities and reliance on accomplice testimony. This case became pivotal in defining the contours of judicial impartiality, the waiver doctrine, and ethical standards for advocates in India[1].

D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The dispute originated from criminal proceedings under Section 145 CrPC, initiated due to a land-related feud between two parties: Party No. 1 represented by Advocate Manak Lal, and Party No. 2 led by Dr. Prem Chand. The police anticipated breach of peace and referred the matter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who attached the land pending adjudication. Manak Lal, acting for Party No. 1, challenged the attachment order through a revision application before the Sessions Judge, Pali. Importantly, on September 6, 1951, despite no stay being granted, a fabricated stay order allegedly originated from the Sessions Court and was delivered by Manak Lal to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. It later emerged that the stay order was not judicially passed but was created through illicit means involving court staff, including the clerk Maghraj. An enquiry was ordered, and though the clerk was lightly penalized, a complaint was lodged against Manak Lal for professional misconduct. The tribunal found him guilty, a finding accepted by the Rajasthan High Court which ordered his removal from the rolls. Manak Lal appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging procedural bias and arguing innocence[2].

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the tribunal was improperly constituted due to bias, rendering its findings void?
ii) Whether the failure to object to the tribunal’s constitution amounted to waiver?
iii) Whether the finding of professional misconduct was legally and factually sustainable?
iv) Whether the punishment imposed (removal from the rolls) was proportionate?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that
The tribunal suffered from a fatal defect as it was chaired by Shri Chhangani, who had previously represented the complainant, Dr. Prem Chand, in related proceedings. This, it was argued, violated the principles of natural justice, particularly the maxim nemo judex in causa sua. Reliance was placed on Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256 and Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices [1926] A.C. 586, which emphasized that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. It was also argued that the appellant was unaware of his right to object to the tribunal’s composition, and thus waiver could not be implied. Furthermore, the evidence against the appellant was mainly circumstantial, and a key witness (the Reader) was not examined. Thus, the entire process lacked procedural fairness and sufficiency of evidence to substantiate guilt[3].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that
The objection as to bias was never raised before the tribunal, and the appellant was fully aware that Shri Chhangani had appeared for the complainant earlier. Hence, waiver applied. It was emphasized that bias does not necessarily vitiate proceedings if there is conscious acquiescence, citing Vyvyan v. Vyvyan (1861) 30 Beav. 65; 54 E.R. 813. The misconduct, being grave, warranted serious punishment. The tribunal’s findings were supported by consistent and corroborated evidence from accomplices, and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 should not be invoked merely to reappreciate facts. The respondent also emphasized that the fabricated stay order was personally handed by the appellant to the Magistrate, demonstrating mens rea and intentional fraud[4].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 10(2), Bar Councils Act, 1926 – Authorizes High Court Chief Justice to constitute tribunal.
ii) Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 – Provides for disciplinary control over advocates.
iii) Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 – Prevents breach of peace relating to disputes over immovable property.
iv) Doctrine of Bias – Part of principles of natural justice under Indian constitutional law.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court reaffirmed that the test of bias is not actual prejudice, but reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a party. A tribunal member who had previously acted for the complainant violates this principle, as held in Rex v. Sussex Justices. However, the Court held that waiver applies if the party was aware of the facts and consciously failed to raise an objection. The Supreme Court found that Manak Lal knew about Shri Chhangani’s role but deliberately chose not to object before the tribunal, thus waiving the right. On merits, the evidence was sufficient to establish misconduct. Fraudulent procurement of a judicial order goes to the root of advocate ethics and justifies the highest penalty under disciplinary jurisdiction[5].

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that even a single instance of serious professional misconduct, such as manipulating judicial processes, justifies permanent removal from the roll, especially where public confidence in the justice system is at stake. It also remarked on the need for the legal profession to remain above suspicion, given its role in upholding the rule of law.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Tribunal members must avoid situations of perceived bias.

• Waiver of bias applies when a party knows the facts and legal implications but fails to object.

• Disciplinary bodies must ensure impartiality in constitution and procedure.

• The seriousness of misconduct should determine the nature of punishment, particularly when involving abuse of judicial process.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i) Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256
ii) Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices [1926] A.C. 586
iii) Rex v. Essex Justices, Ex parte Perkins [1927] 2 K.B. 475
iv) Vyvyan v. Vyvyan (1861) 30 Beav. 65; 54 E.R. 813
v) Rex v. Williams, Ex parte Phillips [1914] 1 K.B. 608

b. Important Statutes Referred
i) Bar Councils Act, 1926, Section 10(2)
ii) Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, Section 13
iii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Section 145