A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This case, Maulana Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand and Another, AIR 1958 SC 52, presents a decisive judicial exposition on the interpretation of the expression “office of profit under the Government” as contemplated under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The appellant, a manager (Mohatmin) of a religious school run under the auspices of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Committee, was disqualified by an Election Tribunal for allegedly holding an office of profit under the Government. The Supreme Court of India, however, reversed this decision and held that the post held by the appellant did not constitute an office of profit under the Government. The judgment reflects upon the importance of statutory autonomy, source of appointment, control and supervision, and remuneration source in determining such constitutional disqualification. The verdict affirms the significance of legislative precision and constitutional interpretation in preserving democratic candidacy while preventing conflict of interest due to executive influence. The case also distinguishes Shivnandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., (1955) 1 SCR 1427 and provides clarity on the application of Article 102.

Keywords: Office of Profit, Article 102(1)(a), Election Disqualification, Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, Statutory Body, Representation of People Act

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Maulana Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand and Another

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1957

iii) Judgement Date
September 12 and 17, 1957

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
S.R. Das C.J., Venkatarama Ayyar, B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, and A.K. Sarkar, JJ.

vi) Author
Justice J.L. Kapur

vii) Citation
AIR 1958 SC 52; 1958 SCR 387

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution of India

• Sections 4(1), 5, 6, 9, 11, 20 of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955

• Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Election Law, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court delivered this landmark judgment in the backdrop of a dispute over disqualification in parliamentary elections. The crux was whether the appellant’s role as manager of a religious school run by the Durgah Committee amounted to an office of profit under the Government of India. The election was contested based on Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution, which seeks to prevent undue governmental influence in the legislature by disqualifying individuals holding governmental profit-based positions. This case arose amidst the transition from the Durgah Khwaja Saheb (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950 to the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955, which restructured the Durgah administration from a centrally controlled regime to a statutory body. The debate thus centered around statutory autonomy versus governmental control.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Maulana Abdul Shakur, the appellant, was appointed as the Mohatmin (Manager) of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb School, a religious educational institution previously under the Nizam of Hyderabad and later governed under the Durgah Committee. His appointment was made by the Administrator of the Durgah, not the Central Government, and he received an honorarium/salary of Rs. 100 per month. On March 22, 1956, he contested elections to the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) from Ajmer, receiving 19 of 26 valid votes. Rikhab Chand, the respondent, challenged the election on the ground that Abdul Shakur held an “office of profit under the Government” at the time of nomination, thus attracting disqualification under Article 102(1)(a). The Election Tribunal, by majority, agreed with the respondent and set aside the election, which the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the office held by the appellant as manager of the Durgah School constituted an “office of profit under the Government of India” under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the appellant was not appointed by the Government but by the statutory Committee and was paid from endowment funds, not public exchequer. They emphasized that the Durgah Committee is a corporate body under the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955, and operates independently of government control [1].

ii. They contended that Article 102(1)(a) disqualifies only those who hold office directly under the Government and not under statutory authorities. Comparisons were drawn with Articles 58(2) and 66(4), which expressly mention disqualification arising from offices under any local authority or body controlled by Government, thus distinguishing the legislative intent in Article 102(1)(a) [2].

iii. It was argued that mere appointment of Committee members by the Central Government does not convert the statutory committee into a Government body. The appellant was neither appointed nor removable by the Government, which is a key determinant of governmental control [3].

iv. The salary/honorarium was paid from endowment funds, not the Consolidated Fund of India, rendering the test of public remuneration inapplicable.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Government exercises deep control over the Durgah Committee through appointment, removal, and regulation under the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955. This supervisory power, they argued, brings the office within the meaning of “under the Government” [4].

ii. The Committee’s bye-laws and administrative decisions, such as appointments like the appellant’s, are subject to cancellation or approval by the Central Government under Section 20(5) of the Act, reflecting a form of control.

iii. The respondent relied on Shivnandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., (1955) 1 SCR 1427, to argue that delegation of appointment powers does not sever the relationship of governmental employment if the ultimate control vests in Government [5].

iv. They argued that public interest control over the Committee equates to de facto governmental control, thus attracting disqualification under Article 102(1)(a).

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution of India: Read here

ii. Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955: Read relevant provisions

iii. Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 81: View Section 81

iv. Religious Endowments Act, 1863, Section 7

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Court held that the Durgah Committee, being a statutory corporate body, is distinct from the Government. The appellant’s appointment, salary, and service conditions were all governed by the Committee, not the Central Government. Thus, his position did not qualify as an office of profit under the Government [6].

ii. The Court emphasized that mere control or power of removal of Committee members by Government does not automatically translate into government employment for servants under the Committee [7].

iii. The source of remuneration, independence of appointment, and statutory framework were crucial in the Court’s decision. The Court clearly delineated between statutory independence and governmental subordination.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court noted the deliberate legislative distinction in Article 102(1)(a) as opposed to Articles 58(2) and 66(4), indicating a narrower scope of disqualification for MPs compared to the President or Vice-President.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Disqualification under Article 102(1)(a) applies only when:

  • The Government appoints the person to the office.

  • The Government pays the salary.

  • The person is removable by Government.

  • The office functions under Government supervision.

• Control over the statutory body is not equivalent to Government control over individual posts under it.

• Payment from endowment funds, as opposed to government revenues, is a significant indicator of statutory autonomy.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment firmly establishes a nuanced understanding of the constitutional disqualification arising from holding an office of profit under the Government. It reinforces the constitutional principle of separation between statutory bodies and governmental machinery, ensuring that not all public appointments are subject to disqualification. The verdict protects legitimate candidates serving religious or autonomous statutory bodies from frivolous election disqualifications, thereby safeguarding electoral democracy. This interpretation also aligns with comparative constitutional analysis, as seen in UK parliamentary disqualifications jurisprudence and the Australian dual citizenship cases under Section 44 of their Constitution.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Shivnandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., (1955) 1 SCR 1427 [7].

ii. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 7th Edn., LexisNexis (cited in context)

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India, Article 102(1)(a), 58(2), 66(4)

ii. Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955 (Act XXXVI of 1955)

iii. Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 81

iv. Religious Endowments Act, 1863, Section 7