A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in Narhari and Others v. Shankar and Others (1950 SCR 754) adjudicated upon a crucial procedural question related to the doctrine of res judicata, maintainability of multiple appeals from a common judgment, and the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The case arose out of a property dispute where two sets of defendants filed separate appeals against the same trial court judgment, which were disposed of by a common appellate judgment but resulted in two distinct decrees. The plaintiffs, aggrieved by the decision, challenged only one of the decrees within limitation and subsequently filed another appeal against the second decree after limitation had expired. The High Court dismissed both appeals on the ground that the second appeal was time-barred and the first was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court overruled the High Court, holding that since the matter involved one suit and one common judgment, separate appeals were not necessary, and that res judicata did not apply. The Court emphasized that estoppel under res judicata is based on judgment and not on the decree. The Supreme Court also granted relief under Section 5, recognizing the conflicting decisions on the issue and finding sufficient cause for delay.

Keywords: Res judicata, Common Judgment, Multiple Appeals, Section 5 Limitation Act, Maintainability of Appeals, Estoppel, Procedural Law

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Narhari and Others v. Shankar and Others

ii) Case Number
Appeals Nos. 22 and 23 of 1950

iii) Judgement Date
October 13, 1950

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India (Hyderabad Bench)

v) Quorum
Mehr Chand Mahajan J., R.S. Naik J., and Khaliluzzaman J.

vi) Author
Justice R.S. Naik

vii) Citation
1950 SCR 754

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 5, Limitation Act, 1908

• Doctrine of Res Judicata

• Article 374(4) of the Constitution of India

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any)
The Court declined to follow the decision of the Hyderabad Judicial Committee in Jethmal v. Ranglal (22 D.L.R. 322).

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects

• Civil Procedure

• Limitation Law

• Doctrines of Estoppel and Res Judicata

• Appellate Procedure

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case presents a pivotal issue surrounding appellate procedural law where separate appeals arise out of a common judgment. The appellants (Narhari and others) challenged a decision rendered by the High Court of Hyderabad, which held their first appeal as barred by res judicata due to the second appeal being time-barred. This judgment invoked conflicting precedents regarding whether separate appeals are mandatory when multiple decrees stem from a single common judgment. The suit, initially for possession of a two-thirds share in agricultural land, brought forth a nuanced legal debate on the nature of judgments and decrees, their interrelation, and how procedural rules should adapt in such contexts. It ultimately invoked not only procedural law but interpretative jurisprudence regarding limitation, res judicata, and the essence of justice delivery in appeals.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiffs (appellants herein) filed a suit seeking possession of two-thirds share in survey No. 214, claiming it as inam land belonging exclusively to them as the senior line of the family. The defendants (respondents), divided into two sets (Nos. 1–4 and 5–8), each claimed a one-third share asserting equal rights and denied the exclusive claim of the senior branch. The trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiffs.

Subsequently, both sets of defendants filed separate appeals, which the first appellate court (Sadar Adalat, Gulbarga) disposed of by a common judgment, but prepared two separate decrees, one for each appeal. The plaintiffs then filed two second appeals to the Hyderabad High Court. The first appeal was filed within the limitation period with the correct court fee. The second appeal was filed 29 days late, with only a token court fee of Re. 1, citing that the full court fee had already been paid in the first appeal.

The High Court, however, dismissed both appeals, holding that the second was time-barred, and hence the first appeal was barred by the principle of res judicata as it pertained to the same subject matter already adjudicated.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether two separate appeals are mandatory when a single common judgment results in multiple decrees?

ii) Whether the principle of res judicata applies in such cases where appeals arise from a common judgment but are filed separately?

iii) Whether the delay in filing one of the appeals could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the High Court erred in applying res judicata to appeals arising from a common judgment. They argued that both decrees stemmed from a single judgment, and hence the filing of separate appeals should not be mandated. They relied on the Lahore High Court’s decision in Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli, AIR 1927 Lah 289, where it was held that what determines estoppel is the judgment, not the decree itself[1].

Further, appellants cited Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti, AIR 1932 Mad 689, asserting that when a single judgment governs multiple decrees, a party can prefer one consolidated appeal if all the parties and issues are already represented[2].

They also emphasized that Section 5 of the Limitation Act should have applied, as there was a bona fide mistake owing to conflicting rulings from Hyderabad High Court in Nandlal v. Mohiuddin Ali Khan (22 D.L.R. 400), Nizamuddin v. Chatur Bhuj (23 D.L.R. 457), and Gayajee Pant v. Habibuddin (28 D.L.R. 1094).

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that since the two decrees were drawn up separately, each warranted a separate appeal. They contended that since the second appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation, and not properly stamped with court fees, it should be dismissed. Consequently, they argued that the doctrine of res judicata barred consideration of the first appeal, as the decision in the second appeal attained finality due to its dismissal.

Reliance was placed by the High Court on the precedent from the Hyderabad Judicial Committee in Jethmal v. Ranglal (22 D.L.R. 322), where a similar procedural lapse resulted in the bar of res judicata being upheld.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908: Allows for the condonation of delay where sufficient cause is shown. See full provision here.

ii) Doctrine of Res Judicata: Bars re-litigation of issues already decided between the same parties. Embedded in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 link.

iii) Article 374(4) of the Constitution of India: Enabled appeals from decisions of courts in Indian States to be heard by the Supreme Court after its formation.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that where there is one suit and a common judgment, the preparation of multiple decrees does not mandate multiple appeals. The Court ruled that the real determining factor is the judgment, not the decree. Accordingly, the delay in the second appeal did not affect the maintainability of the first, and res judicata could not apply in such a case.

ii) The Supreme Court affirmed that when all issues were resolved in one judgment and that judgment was appealed, even if only one of the two decrees was attached, it sufficed. Filing a second appeal with a different decree copy was only a technical variation.

b. OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)

i) The Court remarked that estoppel or res judicata is not created by the decree but only by the judgment. A decision delivered simultaneously in cross-appeals or multiple connected appeals cannot be considered former or latter to invoke res judicata. Hence, the technical creation of two decrees should not defeat substantial justice.

c. GUIDELINES (IF ANY – WRITE IN DETAIL AND IN POINTERS AS THE CASE MAYBE)

• A single appeal is maintainable when multiple decrees arise from one judgment.

• Estoppel under res judicata applies only when multiple suits exist, not where the same judgment governs multiple decrees.

• Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally construed when conflicting precedents create ambiguity.

• Court must look at the substance of the matter, not mere procedural technicalities.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Narhari and Others v. Shankar and Others clarified long-standing confusion in appellate procedural law. It harmonized conflicting judicial opinions and reaffirmed the precedence of substance over form. The Court rightly gave primacy to the judgment over technical requirements like separate decree appeals. The interpretation promotes judicial efficiency, prevents multiplicity of proceedings, and aligns with equitable principles. Moreover, the liberal application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act reaffirms the Court’s commitment to substantial justice. The judgment is a beacon for litigants and lower courts in handling appeals arising from common judgments.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli, AIR 1927 Lah 289

2. Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti, AIR 1932 Mad 689

3. Jethmal v. Ranglal, 22 D.L.R. 322

4. Nandlal v. Mohiuddin Ali Khan, 22 D.L.R. 400

5. Nizamuddin v. Chatur Bhuj, 23 D.L.R. 457

6. Gayajee Pant v. Habibuddin, 28 D.L.R. 1094

7. Jagannath v. Sonajee, 29 D.L.R. 108

8. Bansilal v. Mohanlal, 33 D.L.R. 601

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Section 5, Limitation Act, 1908

2. Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

3. Article 374(4), Constitution of India