A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This case addresses the legality of a preventive detention order issued under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders, and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (“Act 1986”). The judgment examines whether the actions of the detenu amounted to a disturbance of public order or merely law and order. It emphasizes that habitual criminal acts do not justify preventive detention unless they substantially disturb public order.

Keywords: Preventive detention, Public order, Telangana Prevention Act, Advisory Board, Goonda.

B) CASE DETAILS

• Judgment Cause Title: Nenavath Bujji Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Ors.
• Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1738-1739 of 2024.
• Judgment Date: 21 March 2024.
• Court: Supreme Court of India.
• Quorum: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud (CJI), J.B. Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra JJ.
• Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.
• Citation: [2024] 3 S.C.R. 1181; 2024 INSC 239.
• Legal Provisions Involved: Sections 3(2), 9, 10, and 12 of Act 1986; Article 22 of the Indian Constitution.
• Judgments Overruled by the Case: None.
• Case is Related to Law Subject: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law (Preventive Detention).

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal challenged a preventive detention order issued against the detenu, Nenavath Ravi, labeling him as a “Goonda” under Section 2(g) of the Act 1986. The case focused on the distinction between acts that disturb “law and order” and those that disrupt “public order.” The High Court had upheld the detention order, prompting the detenu to appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal emphasized procedural lapses and substantive errors in the detention order.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was accused of habitual criminal activities, including gold chain snatching, leading to four FIRs registered against him. However, only two FIRs fell within the jurisdiction of the detaining authority. The detaining authority cited these two FIRs as evidence of the appellant’s habitual activities that allegedly disturbed public order.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Does habitual criminal conduct justify preventive detention under Section 3(2) of the Act 1986?
2. Is there a distinction between “law and order” and “public order” in preventive detention cases?
3. Was the procedural safeguard of subjective satisfaction fulfilled in this case?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

1. Insufficient Grounds for Preventive Detention: The appellant argued that mere registration of FIRs for theft and robbery does not amount to public disorder. The alleged offenses, even if true, pertain to law and order, not public order.

2. Subjective Satisfaction of Detaining Authority: The detention order failed to establish a connection between the detenu’s actions and a threat to public order. Habituality cannot justify detention without direct evidence of public disruption.

3. Procedural Flaws: The detaining authority considered irrelevant material, such as out-of-jurisdiction FIRs, undermining the legality of the detention order.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

1. Public Fear and Panic: The State claimed that the appellant’s repeated offenses created fear among women in the area, disturbing public order.

2. Adequacy of Evidence: The detaining authority relied on substantial material, including FIRs, witness statements, and CCTV footage, to justify detention.

3. Preventive Measure: Preventive detention was necessary to curb the appellant’s recurring criminal behavior, which ordinary penal laws failed to deter.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court ruled that habitual offenses, in isolation, do not disturb public order unless they affect the community at large. The detaining authority failed to demonstrate how the detenu’s actions disrupted public tranquility or caused widespread alarm.

b. Obiter Dicta

The Court observed that the State should exercise preventive detention powers sparingly and ensure procedural rigor. Advisory Boards under Article 22 must critically examine the necessity of detention orders.

c. Guidelines

1. Habitual criminal activities must substantially disrupt public order to justify preventive detention.
2. Detaining authorities must clearly establish the nexus between individual actions and public order disturbances.
3. Courts should closely scrutinize preventive detention orders for procedural compliance and substantive justification.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment underscores the fine distinction between “law and order” and “public order,” emphasizing that preventive detention cannot serve as a substitute for ordinary penal laws. The State’s reliance on subjective satisfaction must be backed by compelling evidence of public disorder. This decision reinforces constitutional safeguards against arbitrary detention.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal (1969) 1 SCC 10.
2. Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal 1974 Cri LJ 1479.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986.
2. Constitution of India (Articles 21, 22).