A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Raghunath (D) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs & Ors. authoritatively settles the controversy concerning the temporal scope and limitation of the right of pre-emption under the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the limitation period prescribed under Section 21 of the Act read with Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 commences afresh upon every subsequent sale of the same immovable property, or whether such right is confined to the first post-statute transfer where the pre-emptor consciously refrains from exercising it.

The Court undertook a detailed doctrinal and statutory analysis of the nature of pre-emption, reiterating its settled position as a weak and defeasible right, traceable to Mohammedan law and subsequently incorporated into statutory frameworks. Emphasis was laid on the distinction between the primary right to offer and the secondary right of substitution. The Court rejected the interpretation that the right of pre-emption is recurring or perpetual, holding that such a construction would undermine certainty of title and destabilize property transactions.

By harmoniously construing Sections 3, 6, 8, 9 and 21 of the 1966 Act with Article 97 of the Limitation Act, the Court concluded that once a pre-emptor waives or fails to exercise the right at the earliest statutory opportunity, Section 9 operates as a permanent bar. The judgment restores primacy to transactional certainty and reinforces consistent High Court jurisprudence, while setting aside the contrary view adopted by the Rajasthan High Court.

Keywords:
Pre-emption, Limitation, Waiver of Right, Article 97 Limitation Act, Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act 1966, Weak Right

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The controversy addressed in the present judgment arises from long-standing litigation concerning the enforcement of the statutory right of pre-emption in Rajasthan. The case presents a recurring conflict between individual statutory privileges and the need for certainty in property transactions. The Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 was enacted to codify and regulate a right historically rooted in custom, primarily to prevent intrusion of strangers into closely held property arrangements.

The dispute gained complexity due to multiple historical sale transactions of the same immovable property spanning from 1945, 1946, and 1966, culminating in a challenged transaction in January 1974. The plaintiff sought to invoke pre-emption based on shared amenities, asserting violation of Section 8 for want of statutory notice.

Trial and first appellate courts rejected the claim on limitation, holding that failure to challenge the 1966 sale, which occurred after the Act came into force, extinguished the right. The Rajasthan High Court reversed this reasoning, treating each subsequent sale as a fresh cause of action. This divergence necessitated authoritative clarification by the Supreme Court on whether Article 97 of the Limitation Act supports a recurring right or merely fixes the outer temporal limit for the first exercisable opportunity.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The suit property forms part of a building bearing AMC No. XV/290, situated in Kayasth Mohalla, Ajmer, and allegedly shares a common entrance, staircase, and lavatory with the plaintiff’s portion. The lineage of title reveals three historical transfers prior to the disputed transaction, the most significant being a registered sale deed dated 05.11.1966, executed after the enforcement of the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966.

The plaintiff’s predecessor did not challenge this 1966 transaction. Subsequently, respondents 5 and 6 sold part of the property to respondent 4 on 10.01.1974, who then transferred it to the appellant on 21.01.1974. The plaintiff instituted a suit for pre-emption on 10.01.1974, asserting a superior right under Section 6(1)(ii) of the Act.

The defendants contested the claim on multiple grounds, including absence of commonality, existence of separate lockable premises, and crucially, bar of limitation. The trial court initially decreed the suit, but upon remand and consideration of earlier sale deeds, reversed its position, holding the suit barred due to non-challenge of the 1966 sale.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the limitation for enforcing the right of pre-emption under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 begins afresh on each subsequent sale of the same property?
ii. Whether failure to exercise the right of pre-emption at the first statutory opportunity amounts to waiver under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966?
iii. Whether the right of pre-emption is a recurring or one-time exercisable right?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the right of pre-emption is inherently weak and exists only to prevent intrusion of strangers at the earliest opportunity. It was argued that waiver by conduct extinguishes the right permanently. Reliance was placed on Prahlad Kumar v. Kishan Chand, Mangti Ram v. Onkar Sahai, and Rukmani Devi v. Prabhu Narayan, where consistent judicial opinion held that failure to act at the first instance precludes later assertion.

It was further contended that permitting recurring claims would create a cloud on title, depress property values, and defeat the legislative intent behind Section 9.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent submitted that Article 97 clearly prescribes limitation from the date of the sale sought to be impeached, thereby recognizing each sale as a separate cause of action. It was argued that Section 9 only governs loss of right in relation to a specific transaction and does not impose a permanent bar.

The respondent emphasized that pre-emption involves substitution, not annulment, and therefore does not require challenge to earlier sales. Reliance was placed on Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh and Barasat Eye Hospital v. Kaustabh Mondal.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s interpretation and restored the findings of the trial and first appellate courts. The Court held that construing pre-emption as a recurring right would transform a weak right into a perpetual encumbrance, contrary to settled doctrine.

The Court undertook a conjoint reading of Sections 3, 6, 8, 9 and 21 of the 1966 Act with Article 97. It held that Section 9 embodies the principle of waiver, and once the right is consciously not exercised at the first opportunity, it stands extinguished permanently.

The Court emphasized that limitation provisions cannot be read in isolation from the substantive nature of the right. Article 97 merely fixes the timeframe for exercise and does not resurrect a waived right.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The right of pre-emption under the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 is exercisable only once, at the first post-Act transfer giving rise to such right. Failure to exercise or waiver at that stage permanently extinguishes the right. Section 9 operates as a bar, and Article 97 does not create a recurring cause of action.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that treating pre-emption as perpetual would destabilize property markets and undermine transactional certainty. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with modern constitutional and economic realities.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Right of pre-emption must be exercised at the first statutory opportunity.
ii. Non-exercise amounts to waiver under Section 9.
iii. Article 97 governs limitation but does not revive extinguished rights.
iv. Courts must discourage interpretations that cloud title or promote stale claims.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity by harmonizing limitation law with substantive property rights. It preserves certainty in land transactions while preventing misuse of an archaic right. The decision aligns statutory interpretation with commercial reality and constitutional values, ensuring that pre-emption remains an exception rather than a perpetual restraint.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 838
ii. Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore, (1990) 4 SCC 668
iii. Barasat Eye Hospital v. Kaustabh Mondal, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1351
iv. Kutina Bibi v. Baikuntha Chandra Dutta, AIR 1961 Assam 1

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966
ii. Limitation Act, 1963