A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This case Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras and Another deals with the revisional authority of the State Government under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948. The appellant challenged the decision of the State Government, which overturned orders of the subordinate transport authorities and granted both stage carriage permits to a competing applicant, citing better operational facilities. The appellant sought judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, questioning both the jurisdiction exercised under Section 64-A and the correctness of the order. The Supreme Court upheld the State Government’s action, affirming its revisional power to ensure legality, regularity, or propriety of subordinate orders. It held that the government’s satisfaction on these points constituted a legitimate exercise of statutory discretion. The judgment highlights the principle that courts should not interfere in administrative discretion merely on erroneous appreciation of facts unless there is manifest illegality or lack of jurisdiction. The decision also discusses the scope of certiorari, limits of judicial review, and legislative competence in empowering administrative authorities.
Keywords: Section 64-A Motor Vehicles Act, Judicial Review Article 226, Certiorari, Revisional Jurisdiction, Road Transport Permits
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title
Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras and Another
ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1956
iii) Judgement Date
March 15, 1956
iv) Court
Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum
Vivian Bose, Jagannadhadas, B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.
vi) Author
Justice Jafer Imam
vii) Citation
(1956) 1 SCR 256
viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (as amended by the Madras Amendment Act, 1948); Article 226 of the Constitution of India
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Transport Law
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The legal contention in this case arises from a dispute over stage-carriage permits for two town service routes in Mayuram. Initially, the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Tanjore, granted separate permits to Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sathi Vilas Bus Service for Routes No. 1 and No. 2 respectively. Dissatisfied with the division, both applicants appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board, which upheld the RTA’s decision. Subsequently, both parties invoked the State Government’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 64-A, resulting in a total reversal in favour of Sathi Vilas. This prompted Raman & Raman to seek a writ of certiorari under Article 226, which a Single Judge of the High Court allowed. On appeal, however, the Division Bench overturned that decision. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court, involving two constitutional questions—scope of State Government’s power under Section 64-A and limits of judicial review under Article 226. The case sits at the intersection of administrative discretion and constitutional oversight.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
Both Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sathi Vilas Bus Service had longstanding experience in town bus operations in Kumbakonam. When the RTA opened applications for stage-carriage permits in Mayuram Town Service, they each applied for two routes. The RTA distributed the routes between them, citing equitable allocation and experience. The Board, on appeal, approved the arrangement and justified it on grounds of public interest and healthy competition.
Despite no specific finding on operational superiority, both parties escalated the matter to the State Government under Section 64-A, which holds the power to revise subordinate authority orders on grounds of legality, regularity, or propriety. The State Government, without explicitly holding the prior orders illegal or irregular, found them improper. It justified this finding by noting that Sathi Vilas Bus Service had better operational facilities and would better serve the public.
Raman & Raman contested the State Government’s action, alleging misuse of power and violation of principles of administrative law. The High Court initially sided with them but reversed its view on appeal. The Supreme Court was called to settle whether the State Government acted within its revisional competence and if courts could intervene in such administrative decisions through certiorari.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether the State Government had valid jurisdiction under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act to revise the orders of subordinate authorities.
ii) Whether the State Government’s action was arbitrary, illegal, or improper within the constitutional framework.
iii) Whether a writ of certiorari under Article 226 could quash the State Government’s decision based solely on a different appreciation of facts.
iv) Whether Section 64-A was constitutionally valid and within legislative competence.
F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that the State Government lacked jurisdiction under Section 64-A to interfere with subordinate orders unless they were demonstrably illegal, irregular, or improper. They argued that the orders of the RTA and Board reflected balanced consideration of facts, particularly both operators’ experience. The Government’s action, based on a mere difference of opinion, did not meet the statutory threshold of “impropriety”.
They contended that propriety under the Act implies something more than alternate factual interpretation. It must entail a procedural or substantive irregularity. The counsel urged that the State Government had arbitrarily substituted its own judgment for that of expert authorities, without pointing to any flaw in their findings. They also argued that the affidavit filed in the High Court revealed that the Government misapprehended the scope of its power, treating itself as a super-appellate authority rather than exercising limited revisionary scrutiny.
Furthermore, the petitioner questioned the validity of Section 64-A, stating it conferred unguided, arbitrary power on the executive, which violated constitutional norms of reasonableness and fairness under Article 14. They referenced Halsbury’s Laws of England to reinforce that collateral facts must condition jurisdiction, and courts can review such errors under certiorari.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the State Government was statutorily competent to examine whether the order passed by its subordinates was legal, regular, or proper. They asserted that Section 64-A was enacted to empower the government to safeguard public interest in transport services. The decision to prefer one operator over another, if based on operational merit, fell squarely within the executive discretion contemplated by the provision.
They argued that the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that certiorari does not lie to correct factual errors unless the order is ultra vires or patently illegal. The State’s conclusion about better facilities of Sathi Vilas was based on available materials, and since no malafide or arbitrariness was alleged, courts had no power to substitute their judgment.
On the question of constitutional validity, they defended Section 64-A as a reasonable legislative provision, essential for supervising quasi-judicial authorities. They distinguished between judicial review and appellate scrutiny, asserting that the former must be limited to jurisdictional and procedural errors, not mere disagreement over factual inferences.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
View provision on Indian Kanoon
ii) Article 226 of the Constitution of India
View provision on Indian Kanoon
iii) Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act—Criteria for grant/refusal of permits
View provision on Indian Kanoon
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Supreme Court held that Section 64-A validly empowered the State Government to examine orders of subordinate transport authorities on the grounds of legality, regularity, or propriety. The provision was within legislative competence and served a legitimate policy objective. The State Government, in considering the comparative facilities and public benefit, acted within the boundaries of propriety.
The Court further clarified that judicial review under Article 226 does not extend to correcting factual assessments by an administrative body unless there is manifest error or legal infirmity. The interpretation of “propriety” lies within the domain of executive satisfaction unless the conclusion is perverse or unsupported by material evidence. Hence, courts should not intervene unless jurisdiction is clearly exceeded.
b. OBITER DICTA
i) The Court observed that even if subordinate authorities believe two parties are equally capable, the State Government is entitled to exercise its discretion where the statute empowers it to do so in the public interest. The mere fact that both parties are experienced does not preclude the government from favoring one based on operational advantages.
c. GUIDELINES
i) Section 64-A grants revisional authority to the State Government, provided the review is based on one of three grounds—illegality, irregularity, or impropriety.
ii) Courts will not issue certiorari unless the decision suffers from jurisdictional error, perversity, or absence of legal foundation.
iii) Legislative powers conferred on the State Government must be interpreted contextually within the scheme of public interest and administrative discretion.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
This judgment strikes a balance between administrative efficiency and judicial oversight. It strengthens the principle that public interest can guide executive discretion in regulatory matters, particularly in transport governance. The Supreme Court’s affirmation of limited judicial review under Article 226 reaffirms the constitutional balance between courts and government agencies. It also validates the State’s revisional competence, provided decisions are neither capricious nor arbitrary. This case thus offers a nuanced reading of administrative law in India and stands as a guiding precedent in understanding the interface between delegated legislation and constitutional remedies.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i. None specifically cited in the judgment text.
b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (as amended by Madras Amendment Act, 1948)
ii. Constitution of India – Article 226
