Author: Supragya Singh

Edited by: Biraj Kumar Sarkar

ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appellants in the case were private bus owners who used to ply their buses on public for passenger service through permits granted under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, though the state had an exemption. The state of Uttar Pradesh decided to nationalize the road transport business. It attempted to do so – First, by order [later held unjustified under Art. 19(6) and violative of Art. 14 & 19(1)(g) by the state High Court]; later, through passing the U.P. State Road Transport Act, 1950. The Act excluded private bus owners from plying their vehicles on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. The High Court, this time, did not hold the act violative of either Art. 14, 19(1)(g) or Art. 31. The matter came on appeal before the Supreme Court of India to direct a writ against the state for violation of their rights under Art. 14, 19(1)(g) and 31 of the Constitution. The court held the Act to violate Art. 19(1)(g) and 31 but not Art. 14 in any manner. The Hon’ble Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the state by way of a writ not to implement any part of the U.P. State Road Transport Act against appellants or anyone working under them.

Keywords: right, freedom, occupation, property, restriction, violation

CASE DETAILS:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Constitution of India came to be entirely enforced in 1950. At its inception, it laid out specific rights in its territory for its citizens and persons in Part III of the Constitution as Fundamental Rights. With time, the interpretation relating to the rights bestowed in the provisions of Part III has also evolved. Some crucial amendments have also been made to Part III.

Article 14 in the Constitution gives the right to equality to all its citizens irrespective of their caste, religion, sex, place of birth, or any other such ground. The duty is thereby bestowed upon the state to treat all equally before the law and protect them equally under the law.

Article 19, on the other hand, provides several freedoms that the citizens in India would have. Art. 19(1)(g) specifically gives the citizens the freedom to carry out any occupation or trade. The freedoms in the article are not unrestricted; hence, Art. 19(6) lays certain reasonable restrictions upon Art. 19(1)(g). Laying reasonable restrictions upon freedom means that any restriction cannot be arbitrary, and the court would be fit to decide if it’s arbitrary by considering the context and facts.

Article 31 of the constitution, later removed from the fundamental rights by the forty-fourth amendment, initially had its place as a fundamental right, and it bestowed upon citizens the property right.

Initially, the Indian state had to juggle balancing the rights of its citizens and the general development and public interest. The state also often sought to nationalize specific industries so disputes concerning fundamental rights would reach the court’s doors to seek justice.

1. FACTS OF THE CASE

Procedural Background of the Case

1. Writ petitions were filed by the appellants, private bus operators, before the Allahabad High Court due to the non-issuing and canceling of the permits granted to them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as the state attempted to have a monopoly over road transport. The court opined such a procedure is violative of Art. 14 & 19(1)(g) and unjustified under Art.16(6) of the Constitution. The Transport Authorities were directed to deal with the application of permits by private vehicle owners.
2. In 1951, the state passed the U.P. Road Transport Act, which later prohibited private bus operators on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. Private bus owners again filed several petitions before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the constitution. The court did not find the U.P. Road Transport Act to conflict with Art. 14, 19(1)(g) and 31 of the constitution. As a result, the matter came before the Supreme Court of India as an appeal challenging the Act’s constitutionality, especially its section 3. The different appeals were clubbed on the matter, and the matter was up for hearing before a 5-judge constitutional bench.

Factual Background of the Case

1. The appellants, private bus owners, and public bus operators carried on the business of plying motor vehicles for passenger service on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. This was regulated by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, under which one could get a permit to run a vehicle by the Transport Authorities. The Motor Vehicles Act also provided an exemption for state vehicles under section 42(3) from getting a compulsory permit unless these vehicles are used concerning the Indian State Railway’s business.
2. After 1947, the Uttar Pradesh government started running public buses alongside private operators. Later, the government ordered a state monopoly over the road transport system, and section 42(3) would allow it to run as many buses as it wanted. However, the permits issued to the private bus operators were stopped, and previously issued permits were canceled. As a result, petitions were filed, and the matter came up before the Allahabad High Court.
3. The court opined that such a procedure conflicts due to section 42(3) contradicting Art. 14 of the constitution and that the state’s order is unjustified under Art.19(6). Following the court’s order, the issuing of permits resumed.
4. The Uttar Pradesh state legislature passed the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 to nationalize the road transport business. Subsequently, several other notifications were issued following the notification dated 25th March 1953 that prohibited private operators as passenger service on the Bulandshahr-Delhi highway.
5. The matter came up before the Allahabad High Court, but the private bus owners were provided no relief. As a result, the private operators approached the Supreme Court of India through an appeal, and the matter was up before a 5-judge constitution bench challenging the constitutionality of the U.P. Road Transport Act, specifically its section 3.

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 violated Art. 19(1)(g) of the constitution and is not justified under Art.19(6)?

1. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act,1951 violate Art. 31 of the constitution?
2. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 violate Art. 14 of the constitution?

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

1. The counsel for the Appellant submitted that the U.P. Road Transport Act violates Art. 19(1)(g) of the constitution guaranteeing the right to carry on any occupation, trade, or business; the appellants under this right can carry onto their business of plying buses on hire on a public highway.
2. The counsel for the Appellant argued that the U.P. Road Transport Act violates Art. 31 of the constitution as their ‘property,’ i.e., the beneficial interest involved in the business of plying buses on hire is violated without conforming to any requirements of compensation under Art. 31.
3. The counsel for the Appellant also contended that the Act violates Art.14 in making a different classification for the state against ordinary citizens. However, the state stands in the same position as private traders when it engages in some industry.

1. The counsel for the Appellant also put forth that the Act violates Art. 14 by allowing the state to discriminate among citizens by bestowing unregulated discretion upon the state to ‘associate such person as it likes’ in the business of transport with no rules laid upon which this discretion would be based.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

• . The counsel for the Respondent submitted that the U.P. State Road Transport Act does not violate Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution since the said article gives the right to carry any profession, trade, or business but not to carry it ‘anywhere;’ private operators can’t to use a public highway to ply their vehicle unless permitted by the state.

1. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that in certain instances, a restriction, as given in Art. 19(6) would also include a prohibition on something under which the U.P. State Road Transport Act would be justified.
2. The counsel for the Respondent put forth that the state would choose the routes and portion of it where private owners could operate and the number of persons to be given permits, which is regulated under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, making the discretion bestowed upon the state-regulated, hence not violative of Art. 14.

RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. Article 14: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”[1]
2. Article 19(1)(g): All citizens shall have the right- “to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.”[2]
3. Article 31 (Compulsory acquisition of property[3]): Omitted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.

JUDGEMENT

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Any public member can use a public route within permissible limits under Art. 19(1)(g).
2. The intangible commercial interest involved in plying buses on hire is property under Art. 31.
3. The different classification of the state against private traders in a monopoly through law is reasonable under Art. 14.

OBITER DICTA

1. The nature of the long and uninterrupted user of a passage tells the extent of the right to pass over it.  The right to passage extends to all usual traffic forms and others that are reasonably similar and incidental. The court drawing from the English Law said the Bulandshahr-Delhi route (part of Grand Trunk Road), being a public highway, does not mean it could be used just as a foot passage, and other uses or users would need permission from the State. The Grand Trunk Road has existed since the 15thcentury and has historically been used by all prevailing vehicles. The passage of modern motor vehicles is incidental to its historical use, though the state can regulate the traffic as per the requirement under Art. 19(6). Hence, it can’t be said that the right of passing of any user over a public route doesn’t exist before some act. A route may vest in the state and have a public nature, but it is meant for the use of members of the public, and it can be restricted only through a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6). Since members of the public can use their vehicles on a public route within permissible limits, they can also ply their vehicles on a public route for passenger hire. The court emphasized that the Act is not a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6), as it stated, “Restrictions would normally pre-suppose the continued existence- no matter even in a very thin and attenuated form- of the thing upon which the restrictions were imposed.” The court made this observation as it referred to the observations made by the learned judges in A.K. Gopalan v. The State on the interchangeability of the term ‘restriction’ and ‘deprivation.’ The court pointed out that even if the term ‘restriction’ meant ‘prohibition’ in certain instances, it would still have to be a reasonable restriction and not an unreasonable restriction over a trade or occupation that is not perceptually harmful. The court examined whether the restriction was in the public’s general interest. It concluded that it wouldn’t be considered a reasonable restriction and would leave hundreds of private bus owners without a livelihood. The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 is not a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6), hence violates Art. 19(1)(g).
2. The property under Art. 31(2) would include in its ambit the commercial interest involved in plying buses on hire by the appellants. The appellants were deprived of this property, and the state made no compensation. Hence, the Act also violates Art.31.

• The legislature can make a classification provided it is not arbitrary, and if it is reasonable, it would not violate the Art. 14. The different classification of the state from that of citizens won’t mean a violation of Art. 14 per se. In creating a monopoly, different classifications of the state are inherent, and the classification would have a rational relation to the sought object. Hence, it would be reasonable. Hence, such would not be considered a violation under Art. 14 per se, though it could be invalid because it violates other crucial constitutional provisions. The court also analyzed and said that the state doesn’t stand in the same position as a private trader when it engages in an industry as the state would still be performing sovereign functions required of it while engaging in it since the functions of the state include more in contemporary times than what has been conventionally included. The Act cannot be said to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. The court, on the argument of the state having unfettered discretion, expressed that the arguments pertain to how the provision would be implemented. Even if it is assumed that the provision would give the state unfettered discretion, that would make the provision violative of Art. 14 and not the entire act. Considering the argument by the respondent’s counsel, it can be said that in this situation, the state would not have unregulated discretion. Hence, neither the Act nor the provision are violative of the Art. 14.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

In its decision, the court set aside the earlier judgment of the Allahabad High Court. It issued a writ of mandamus directing the state not to implement any provision of the U.P. State Road Transport Act, 1951, against the appellant or any person working under them.

The court served right in its reasoning, especially on the Art. 19(1)(g) that freedom to occupation or business, etc., would not only include the right to carry that occupation but also to use the public routes, whose benefits are meant for the larger public, for carrying out that occupation or business.

Art. 19(1)(g) indeed serves as a crucial fundamental right, as can be seen through the case that the violation of this right can affect one’s livelihood and standard of life.

REFERENCES

Important Cases Referred

1. S.S. Motor Services v. The State of Madras
2. Cooverjee v. The Excise Commissioner, 1954 SCR 873
3. West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, 1954 SCR 587
4. Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 1954 SCR 674
5. Packard v. Banton, 68 LE 596, 264 US 140
6. Frost v. Railroad Commission, 70 LE 1101
7. Stephenson v. Binford, 77 LE 288
8. Motilal v. Uttar Pradesh Government, I.L.R. 1951 All 257
9. Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, 1896 AC 88
10. K. Gopalan v. The State, 1950 S.C.R. 88
11. Lokanath Misra v. The State of Orissa, AIR 1952 Orissa 42
12. Commonwealth of Australia and Others v. Bank of New South Wales and Others, 1950 AC 235
13. P&O Steam Navigation Co. v. The Secretary of State, 1861 5 B.H.C.R. Appendix 1

Important Statutes Referred

1. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g)
2. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 31
3. The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951
4. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14

ENDNOTES:

[1] Article 14, Constitution of India (1950).

[2] Article 19(1)(g), Constitution of India (1950).

[3] Article 31, Constitution of India (1950)