A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, 1960 (1) SCR 909, constitutes a pivotal legal pronouncement on the interpretation of Section 123(7)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The case arose from allegations of corrupt electoral practice involving the appointment of lambardars as polling and counting agents. The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret whether a lambardar—a traditional village revenue officer—falls within the category of “revenue officers including village accountants” under the aforementioned clause. The appellant had contended that such appointments constituted a corrupt practice, as lambardars wield influence over villagers due to their revenue-related functions and association with the State. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this interpretation, drawing a distinct line between “village accountants,” such as patwaris and talatis, and other village officers, like lambardars. The judgment clarified that lambardars, though revenue officers in a broader administrative sense, were explicitly excluded from the scope of disqualification under Section 123(7)(f). This distinction was anchored in both the statutory construction and the historical functions of these roles. The Court further highlighted the legislative intention behind the amendment of the 1951 Act in 1956 and subsequent amendments that clarified the exclusion of lambardars. This ruling reaffirmed the narrow construction of corrupt practices under electoral law, cautioning against judicial overreach in interpreting disqualifying criteria.

Keywords: Lambardar, Corrupt Practice, Representation of the People Act, Section 123(7)(f), Village Accountant, Election Petition

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon
ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 324 of 1959
iii) Judgement Date: September 30, 1959
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: S.R. Das, C.J., S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, K. Subba Rao, and M. Hidayatullah, JJ.
vi) Author: Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Subba Rao
vii) Citation: 1960 (1) SCR 909
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 123(7)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None
x) Case is Related to: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appellant, Sardar Gurmej Singh, challenged the election of Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, who had been declared elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Sarhali constituency in the general elections of 1957. The gravamen of the appellant’s claim was that the respondent had committed a corrupt practice as defined under Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 by appointing several lambardars—a category of village revenue officers—as his polling and counting agents. This, the appellant contended, amounted to soliciting assistance from a government servant, a practice forbidden by the Act. The Election Tribunal accepted this contention and framed an issue on the point. The Punjab High Court, however, reversed this view. The matter then came before the Supreme Court on special leave, where the primary legal issue was the proper construction of Section 123(7)(f), particularly the phrase “revenue officers including village accountants…but excluding other village officers”.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The elections were conducted in February 1957. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, the Chief Minister of Punjab, emerged victorious from the Sarhali constituency. The appellant filed an election petition on April 11, 1957, under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, challenging the validity of Kairon’s election. The crux of the allegation was that Kairon had appointed lambardars as polling and counting agents, thereby securing assistance from individuals deemed to be in government service. The Tribunal agreed that lambardars functioned as village accountants and were government servants, thus falling within the mischief of Section 123(7)(f). The Punjab High Court, in writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, disagreed and held that lambardars were excluded from this disqualification clause. The Supreme Court had to finally decide whether appointing lambardars as agents amounted to a corrupt practice under electoral law.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether a lambardar is a “revenue officer including village accountant” under Section 123(7)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
**ii) Whether the appointment of lambardars as polling/counting agents by the respondent constituted a corrupt practice under the Act
**iii) Whether lambardars are persons in the service of Government within the meaning of the statutory provision
**iv) Whether the High Court erred in reversing the Tribunal’s finding on Issue No. 8

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the respondent had violated Section 123(7) by procuring assistance from lambardars, who were revenue officers and village accountants under the clause. They contended that lambardars, appointed by the State, were remunerated by a statutory commission from revenue collection, thereby making them government servants. The appellant relied on the statutory interpretation that village revenue officers included those engaged in land revenue collection, like patwaris and lekhpals, and hence lambardars must be considered part of this class. It was argued that, because patwaris and lambardars shared overlapping functions in land administration, both should attract the same statutory disqualification. 

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that lambardars were not village accountants, nor did they fall under the class of government revenue officers as intended under the Act. The respondents pointed out that Section 123(7)(f) explicitly excludes “other village officers” and that lambardars fell under this excluded category. They referred to legislative intent behind the 1956 amendment which removed all village officers except for a narrow subset of “village accountants” such as patwaris, karnams, and talatis. The respondent further relied on the legislative history and comparative statutory roles to argue that lambardars, though involved in revenue collection, performed a quasi-community role and were not integrated into the formal bureaucratic structure of the government. 

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 123(7)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
“The obtaining or procuring or abetting to obtain or procure by a candidate…any assistance…from any person in the service of the Government…such as patwaris, lekhpals, karnams and the like but excluding other village officers.”

ii) Explanation to Section 123(7):
Defines agent to include polling and counting agents, making any such appointment from disqualified classes a corrupt practice.

iii) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 and Punjab Land Records Manual:
Outlined duties of lambardars and patwaris, establishing functional distinctions. Patwaris maintain land records; lambardars act as village intermediaries for revenue collection.

iv) Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India:
Empowered High Courts to review the decision of Election Tribunals on jurisdictional and legal grounds.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that lambardars were expressly excluded from the ambit of Section 123(7)(f). The clause defines revenue officers to include “village accountants such as patwaris… but excluding other village officers.” The Court reasoned that the use of both inclusion and exclusion indicates legislative clarity—lambardars, as other village officers, were outside the definition. Historical distinctions between lambardars and patwaris further cemented this classification. While patwaris maintained detailed land records, lambardars acted more as traditional intermediaries and were not part of the formal accounting machinery. Thus, the respondent’s appointment of lambardars as polling agents did not amount to a corrupt practice under the statute.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court noted that although a lambardar has influence in rural areas due to his intermediary role, legislative policy may choose not to disqualify such individuals. The Court remarked that interpreting laws to impose disqualification without clear statutory language would be judicial overreach.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Revenue officers under Section 123(7)(f) must be interpreted narrowly to include only those explicitly stated or similar to them.

• Village officers, even if they perform revenue functions, do not fall under “village accountants” unless they maintain records like patwaris.

• Legislative intent behind amendments must be respected, particularly in the realm of electoral disqualifications.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon delineates the fine boundaries between similar-sounding administrative roles in Indian rural governance and election law. The Court emphasized a strict and textualist approach to electoral disqualification, refusing to extend the meaning of “revenue officers” to include all those who perform revenue-related duties. By doing so, the Court protected the sanctity of electoral processes from expansive interpretations that might penalize legitimate political behavior. At the same time, the judgment left open a broader discussion on the legislative rationale of excluding powerful rural actors like lambardars from disqualification, a concern Parliament appeared to acknowledge in subsequent amendments.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
[1] Raja Bahadur K.C. Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra, 19 E.L.R. 1
[2] Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, 1960 (1) SCR 909

b. Important Statutes Referred
[3] Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 123(7)(f)
[4] Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, Full Text
[5] Punjab Land Records Manual
[6] Articles 226 and 227, Constitution of India