A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Shamarao V. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay and Others (1952 SCR 683) revolved around the constitutionality and legality of extended preventive detention under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Amendment Acts of 1951 and 1952. The petitioners challenged the continued detention orders served on them before the expiration of the Act in April 1952, asserting that their confinement post-expiration violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The Court had to address whether Parliament could retrospectively validate detentions via amendments and whether such continuations were consistent with constitutional safeguards against arbitrary detention.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the amending provisions, particularly Section 3 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952, were intra vires. It reasoned that once the principal Act is amended, it must be read as if the amended text had always been part of the original enactment. Thus, orders made under the prior Act continue to be valid as per the extended timelines. The Court dismissed the notion that this amounted to indefinite detention or violated the equality clause, reinforcing the legislative power of Parliament to extend and structure preventive detention laws.

The case established pivotal principles of statutory construction, particularly the rule that an amended statute must be read with the amendments embedded unless doing so causes repugnancy. It also clarified the permissible scope of preventive detention under the Constitution and the interpretation of legislative competence under Article 22(7)(b).

Keywords: Preventive Detention, Constitutional Validity, Article 22, Amending Act, Retrospective Legislation, Rule of Statutory Construction

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Shamarao V. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay and Others

ii) Case Number: Petition No. 86 of 1952

iii) Judgement Date: 26 May 1952

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Patanjali Sastri C.J., Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das, and Vivian Bose JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Vivian Bose

vii) Citation: 1952 SCR 683

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 14 of the Constitution of India

• Article 22(4) and 22(7) of the Constitution of India

• Section 3 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952

• Preventive Detention Act, 1950 as amended

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None

x) Case is Related to: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Preventive Detention, Statutory Interpretation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arose in the context of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which permitted detention without trial in the interest of state security and public order. Initially set to expire in 1951, it was extended by amendment acts in 1951 and later again in 1952. The 1952 amendment, Act XXXIV of 1952, prolonged the life of the 1950 Act to 1 October 1952. Several detainees including the petitioner Shamarao V. Parulekar, detained in November 1951 under the amended Act, challenged the legality of their detention post 1 April 1952—the original expiry date—claiming that continued detention violated constitutional protections.

They argued that unless a fresh order was passed, continued detention beyond the original expiry date could not be justified. The State, defending its position, invoked Section 3 of the 1952 Amendment, claiming that it validated and extended the detentions automatically in accordance with the extended duration of the principal Act.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Shamarao V. Parulekar, was detained on 15 November 1951 under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended in 1951. He was served with a detention order and the grounds for detention were provided the next day. His case was reviewed and confirmed by the Advisory Board in February 1952, pursuant to Section 11(1) of the Act.

The law at that time provided for expiry of the Preventive Detention Act on 1 April 1952. However, before this date, Parliament enacted the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952, which extended the life of the original Act to 1 October 1952, and also provided in Section 3 that any detention orders already in force shall remain valid for as long as the principal Act remained in force.

The petitioner challenged this statutory extension, arguing that the extension could not retrospectively validate or continue detentions already nearing expiry.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Section 3 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952, violates the constitutional guarantees under Article 14 and Article 22?

ii. Whether the extension of the Preventive Detention Act automatically extended detention orders made under the previous amendments?

iii. Whether such continued detention required a fresh order or reference to the Advisory Board under Article 22(4)?

iv. Whether Parliament can extend the maximum period of detention under Article 22(7)(b) after having once exercised the power?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The original detention order was under a statute due to expire on 1 April 1952. Therefore, any continued detention beyond that date required a new order based on new statutory authority. As no new order was passed, the detention post-April 1952 became illegal and contrary to Article 22(4) which limits preventive detention to three months unless extended under proper procedural safeguards[1].

They contended that Section 3 of the 1952 Amendment Act violated Article 14, as it created an unreasonable classification among detainees—those whose detention was confirmed before the amending Act and those whose detention was pending confirmation. They argued that this discriminatory treatment lacked a rational nexus with the objective of maintaining public order or state security[2].

Further, they argued that the words “any person” in Article 22(7)(b) implied individual consideration and not blanket legislative action. Hence, Parliament could not authorize group-wise extended detention without a fresh evaluation of each case[3].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

Parliament had the constitutional authority to extend the duration of detention laws under Article 22(7)(b). The legislative intent was clear in Section 3, which explicitly provided for continuation of existing detention orders in line with the extended life of the Act. The extension was valid and did not amount to a fresh detention, thus obviating the need for a new order or review[4].

They argued that classification under Section 3 was rational and based on objective criteria—whether the case had been confirmed by the Advisory Board. Such classification did not offend Article 14, as it preserved fairness by allowing the government to revoke or modify detention orders at any time under Section 13 of the Act[5].

The respondent further maintained that the rule of statutory construction mandates that once an Act is amended, it must be read as if the amended provisions were always present, unless repugnancy occurs. Hence, all references to the principal Act must include the amendments of 1951 and 1952[6].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Right to Equality

ii. Article 22(4), 22(7)(b) – Safeguards against preventive detention

iii. Section 3 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952

iv. Section 11(1) and Section 13 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Court held that when Parliament amends a law, the amended version becomes the new statute for interpretation. Therefore, references to the principal Act must be read as references to the 1950 Act as amended in 1951 and 1952. This includes the duration up to 1 October 1952. Detention orders valid on 31 March 1952 automatically continue to remain in force till the new expiry date.

The judgment clarified that the phrase “principal Act” in Section 3 includes all subsequent amendments, based on the legal maxim lex posterior derogat priori, and the canon of embedded textual substitution. The Court cited Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal Mallick [(1927) 54 I.A. 152] to affirm this rule of construction[7].

b. OBITER DICTA

i. The Court remarked that it is the duty of courts to interpret statutes to avoid absurdity. The judiciary must apply common-sense interpretations that further legislative intent. Even if the same words are used in different contexts within a statute, they may need different constructions to preserve the efficacy of the law[8].

c. GUIDELINES 

• Statutes must be read with amendments embedded.

• Parliament may extend preventive detention periods via amendment, even successively.

• “Any person” in Article 22(7)(b) does not necessitate individual legislative attention.

• Preventive detention orders remain valid if issued under a valid statute at the time and extended by valid legislative act.

• There is no constitutional prohibition against Parliament authorizing indefinite preventive detention via sequential legislative extensions.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court judgment in Shamarao V. Parulekar laid down a critical precedent in Indian constitutional law on preventive detention. It cemented the power of Parliament to enact amendments to extend preventive detention and validated legislative provisions that preserved past detention orders. This case reemphasized the doctrine of reading statutes with their amendments integrated and rejected the notion that such legislative structuring inherently violates fundamental rights.

The decision struck a balance between individual liberties and state security by allowing legislative discretion within constitutional bounds, provided procedural safeguards like the power of revocation remain intact. It paved the way for subsequent interpretations of preventive detention laws and influenced future jurisprudence on Article 22.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred i. Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal Mallick, (1927) 54 I.A. 152
ii. S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras, [1951] SCR 621
iii. Rex v. Basudev, [1949] F.C.R. 657
iv. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284
v. Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47
vi. Grey v. Pearson, [1857] 6 HLC 61

b. Important Statutes Referred i. Preventive Detention Act, 1950
ii. Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952
iii. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 22(4), 22(7)(b)