A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar, [1952] SCR 89 marks a pivotal moment in Indian constitutional law. This judgment was the first authoritative interpretation of Article 368 concerning Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, and more specifically, the interaction of this power with fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. The petitioners challenged the First Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951, alleging it curtailed fundamental rights and thus violated Article 13(2). The Supreme Court rejected the petition, upholding Parliament’s authority to amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights, via Article 368, as a distinct exercise of constituent power, not ordinary legislative power. The Court also upheld the validity of the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. 2, issued by the President under Article 392. The ruling settled multiple critical legal controversies surrounding the scope of Parliament’s amending power, federal structure, judicial review, and the entrenchment of fundamental rights.

Keywords: Constitutional Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Article 368, Article 13(2), First Amendment, Judicial Review, Constituent Power, Article 392

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar

ii) Case Number
Multiple Petitions under Article 32 including Nos. 166, 287, 317–319, 371–372, 374–395, 418, 481–485 of 1951

iii) Judgment Date
5 October 1951

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Harilal Kania, C.J., Patanjali Sastri, Mukherjea, Das, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.

vi) Author
Justice Patanjali Sastri

vii) Citation
[1952] SCR 89

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Article 368 – Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution

• Article 13(2) – Restriction on the State to make laws infringing Fundamental Rights

• Articles 31A & 31B – Inserted by First Amendment Act, 1951

• Article 226, Articles 132 & 136 – Jurisdiction of High Courts and Supreme Court

• Article 392 – Removal of Difficulties Order

• Article 379 – Power of Provisional Parliament

• Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 18 – State subject (Land)

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None. This was the first major constitutional amendment judgment.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Fundamental Rights, Constitutional Amendment, Judicial Review, Land Reforms Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment addressed the constitutional validity of the First Amendment Act, 1951, which sought to protect land reform laws—especially Zamindari Abolition Acts—from being invalidated on the ground of violating fundamental rights, particularly the right to property under Article 31. Various landowners challenged these legislative measures in courts, resulting in inconsistent High Court rulings. In response, the Central Government introduced the First Amendment, inserting Articles 31A and 31B to shield specific laws from challenge. This triggered constitutional petitions challenging the amending power of the Parliament, questioning whether it could abridge or eliminate fundamental rights, and if Article 13(2) restricted Parliament’s constituent power.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners, including Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo, were Zamindars affected by land reform legislations enacted in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. These legislations were struck down or upheld inconsistently across High Courts. In Bihar, the High Court declared the law unconstitutional, while in other states, similar laws survived judicial scrutiny. To cure this legal inconsistency and to provide a constitutional shield to agrarian reforms, the Government of India passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which added Articles 31A and 31B to the Constitution.

The petitioners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging the amendment on the ground that it violated Article 13(2) by taking away or abridging fundamental rights. They also challenged the President’s Order under Article 392, adapting Article 368 to enable the Provisional Parliament to pass constitutional amendments.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Parliament, under Article 368, has the power to amend Part III of the Constitution, particularly fundamental rights?

ii) Whether Article 13(2) restricts the amending power of Parliament?

iii) Whether the First Amendment Act, 1951 is ultra vires because it was passed by the Provisional Parliament, not the duly constituted Parliament?

iv) Whether the President’s Order under Article 392 adapting Article 368 is valid?

v) Whether the amendment required ratification by half of the States under the proviso to Article 368?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The First Amendment Act violated Article 13(2). Article 13 prohibits the State from making laws that infringe upon fundamental rights, and the term “law” includes constitutional amendments. Therefore, Parliament cannot amend Part III, even through Article 368, as it would infringe rights conferred under Part III[1].

They contended that Article 368 only provides procedure, not power. The power to amend must be derived from a substantive provision. The Provisional Parliament, created under Article 379, had no authority to act under Article 368[2].

The amendment also violated federal principles because land is a State subject under Entry 18, List II of the Seventh Schedule, and Parliament cannot validate laws it has no competence to enact[3].

Additionally, Articles 31A and 31B curtailed the powers of the judiciary under Articles 226, 132 and 136, thus requiring ratification by at least half of the States under the proviso to Article 368[4].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

Parliament was competent to amend any part of the Constitution, including Part III, under the clear mandate of Article 368. The term “law” in Article 13(2) applies only to ordinary legislation, not constitutional amendments passed under Article 368[5].

The Provisional Parliament was fully empowered to amend the Constitution under Article 379, which allowed it to exercise “all powers” conferred on Parliament. The adaptation made by the President under Article 392 was valid and necessary to remove transitional difficulties[6].

Articles 31A and 31B did not alter the powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court. They merely excluded certain laws from judicial review under Part III, not from judicial scrutiny entirely[7].

Even if land is a State subject, Parliament can pass constitutional amendments affecting State List subjects under Article 368. Thus, the laws validated by Article 31B could be upheld through an amendment, even if Parliament lacked competence to originally enact them[8].

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that amendments under Article 368 are not “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2). Therefore, Parliament can amend fundamental rights, including rights under Part III, by following the special procedure under Article 368[9].

ii) The Provisional Parliament had full authority under Article 379 to exercise all constitutional powers, including the amending power, and hence the First Amendment was validly enacted.

iii) The President’s Order under Article 392, which adapted Article 368 to suit the single-chamber Provisional Parliament, was within his powers and constitutionally valid.

iv) The First Amendment did not require ratification by States because it did not affect provisions specified in the proviso to Article 368. Articles 31A and 31B did not alter High Courts’ or Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 226, 132 or 136.

v) Articles 31A and 31B were constitutional amendments, not ordinary laws, and Parliament could validate laws it otherwise lacked legislative competence to enact, through constitutional amendment.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that constitutional law must be distinguished from ordinary law. While ordinary laws are subject to Article 13(2), constitutional amendments are made in exercise of constituent power, not legislative power[10].

ii) The Court emphasized that there is no complete code in Article 368, and legislative procedure under Articles 107–111 can be borrowed to the extent consistent.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Article 368 provides constituent power distinct from legislative power.

• Amendments to the Constitution do not constitute “law” for Article 13(2).

• Fundamental Rights can be amended or abridged via Article 368.

• President’s adaptation power under Article 392 includes modification to facilitate constitutional functioning during transition.

• Provisional Parliament had amending power equivalent to future Parliament under Article 379.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India laid down the first definitive exposition of the constitutional amending power under Article 368. It established the supremacy of Parliament’s constituent power over limitations imposed by Part III. The Court’s narrow interpretation of Article 13(2) enabled Parliament to curtail fundamental rights via constitutional amendments, a view later challenged and eventually reversed in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, which propounded the Basic Structure Doctrine. Nonetheless, this case remains foundational in Indian constitutional jurisprudence as it marked the first judicial engagement with the scope and limitations of Parliament’s amending power.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] AC 120
ii) Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (for future development)
iii) Thakur Rudreshwari Prasad Sinha v. Srimati Rani Probhabhati Kumari, (1951)

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Constitution of India, Articles 13(2), 31A, 31B, 368, 392, 379, 132, 136, 226
ii) Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
iii) Seventh Schedule, Entry 18, List II