A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment examines the scope of the expression “person aggrieved” under Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and determines whether purchasers claiming title through sale deeds executed under a General Power of Attorney possess locus standi to challenge a decree cancelling an agreement to sell to which they were not parties. The Supreme Court clarifies that appellate rights are not automatic and accrue only where a decree prejudicially affects legal rights. The Court holds that a decree cancelling an agreement to sell is not a judgment in rem and binds only the parties to the suit. Purchasers deriving title independently through GPA-based sale deeds, when such sale deeds are neither questioned nor adjudicated upon in the suit, cannot be said to be aggrieved persons. The judgment reinforces the doctrinal distinction between judgments in personam and judgments in rem, and reiterates settled jurisprudence that psychological, speculative, or remote injury does not confer appellate standing. The ruling strengthens procedural discipline in civil litigation by preventing collateral challenges by strangers to proceedings and preserves the finality of decrees confined to limited declaratory reliefs.

Keywords:
Person aggrieved; Judgment in rem; Locus standi; Section 96 CPC; Section 100 CPC; Agreement to sell; General Power of Attorney.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The dispute arose from competing claims over immovable property situated in Village Jakkur, Bengaluru North Taluk. The recorded owners executed agreements to sell in favour of a cooperative housing society and simultaneously executed a General Power of Attorney authorising society office bearers to alienate the property. Acting under the GPA, sale deeds were later executed in favour of third-party purchasers. Subsequently, certain co-owners instituted civil suits seeking declarations that the agreements to sell were time-barred and unenforceable, along with injunctions restraining interference with possession.

Crucially, the suits did not challenge the GPA-based sale deeds nor seek any relief against the purchasers. The Trial Court decreed the suits by declaring the agreements to sell unenforceable and granting injunctions against the society. During pendency, the purchasers sought impleadment, which was rejected. After the suits were decreed, they sought leave to appeal as non-parties, contending that the decree adversely affected their interests.

The High Court declined leave, holding that the purchasers’ rights flowed from independent sale deeds and were unaffected by the declaratory decree. The matter reached the Supreme Court, presenting a narrow yet significant procedural question concerning appellate standing of strangers to a suit and the meaning of “person aggrieved” under the CPC.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The lands involved comprised Survey Nos. 105/3, 105/9, and 105/4B at Jakkur village. Respondents 5 and 6, as recorded owners, executed registered agreements to sell dated 31.10.1989 and 05.08.1992 in favour of Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Workers’ House Building Co-operative Society Ltd. Alongside, a General Power of Attorney was executed conferring wide authority to sell the land.

Acting under the GPA, the society’s office bearers executed sale deeds in favour of the appellants on various dates. The appellants entered possession based on these conveyances. Later, respondents claiming co-ownership filed multiple suits alleging that the property was ancestral and that the agreements to sell were executed without their consent. They pleaded that the agreements were barred by limitation and unenforceable.

The reliefs sought were confined to cancellation of the agreements to sell and injunctions against the society and its agents. Significantly, no relief was claimed against the sale deeds nor were the purchasers arrayed as defendants.

The Trial Court decreed the suits, declaring the agreements time-barred and restraining the society from interfering with possession. During the suits, the appellants’ application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC was rejected. After the decree, the appellants filed Regular First Appeals with applications for leave to appeal as non-parties. The High Court rejected the applications, prompting the present appeals.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether purchasers under GPA-based sale deeds, who were not parties to the suit, qualify as “persons aggrieved” under Sections 96 and 100 CPC?
ii. Whether a decree cancelling an agreement to sell operates as a judgment in rem binding third parties?
iii. Whether the High Court was justified in refusing leave to appeal to the appellants?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants submitted that the appellants had acquired absolute title through registered sale deeds and were in possession of the sites. It was argued that the declaratory decree holding the agreements time-barred and granting injunctions indirectly clouded their title and possession. The appellants contended that their interests were directly affected and that denial of leave to appeal resulted in grave prejudice.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents submitted that the appellants’ rights flowed exclusively from independent sale deeds executed under the GPA and not from the agreements to sell which were the sole subject matter of the suits. It was argued that the decree neither referred to nor adjudicated upon the sale deeds. Hence, the appellants were neither bound by nor aggrieved by the decree and lacked locus standi to appeal.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 96, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
ii. Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
iii. Order I Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s refusal to grant leave. The Court held that appellate remedies under Sections 96 and 100 CPC are available only to persons whose rights are prejudicially affected. The appellants failed to demonstrate any legal injury. The decree was confined to cancellation of agreements to sell and injunctions against the society. It did not adjudicate upon the appellants’ sale deeds nor bind them.

The Court emphasised that the decree was not a judgment in rem but operated strictly in personam. Mere apprehension or speculative prejudice was insufficient. The appellants were free to protect their possession or title through independent proceedings.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

A non-party can appeal against a decree only with leave and only if the decree prejudicially affects his legal rights. A decree cancelling an agreement to sell, without adjudicating upon GPA-based sale deeds, is not a judgment in rem and does not confer appellate standing on purchasers claiming under independent conveyances.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that leave to appeal should not be granted to every person remotely or indirectly affected. The appellate process must not be converted into a forum for collateral challenges by strangers.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Leave to appeal is exceptional and not routine.
ii. Courts must examine whether the decree binds the applicant.
iii. Psychological or speculative injury does not constitute grievance.
iv. Independent remedies remain available to third parties.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd., [1971] 3 SCR 247
ii. State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, [1974] 3 SCR 152
iii. Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 43
iv. A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., [2011] 9 SCR 453
v. Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, [1975] 1 SCR 550
vi. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, [1978] 1 SCR 1
vii. Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras, 66 Law Weekly 136

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908