A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court judgment in Srimati Oramba Sundari Dasi v. Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jieu (1954 AIR 95, 1954 SCR 988) delivered a seminal interpretation of Section 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, delineating the boundaries of judicial power in reopening decrees. The apex court decisively held that under Section 36 proceedings, the court has no jurisdiction to investigate whether the decree-holder is merely a benamidar for another person. This clarification narrowed the scope of relief that borrowers may obtain and protected the sanctity of judicial decrees, even when factual doubts exist about the identity of the real creditor. The ruling further interpreted the legislative intent of restoring debtor property under certain conditions and emphasized the finality of names recorded in decrees. This case stands as a precedent, highlighting the need to distinguish substantive equity from procedural rigidity. It balances the power of courts under the Act with the necessity of procedural certainty in decree enforcement.

Keywords: Bengal Money-Lenders Act, Section 36, Benami, Decree-holder, Debutter property, Reopening decree, Execution sale, Shebait, Installment decree.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Srimati Oramba Sundari Dasi v. Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jieu

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeals Nos. 130 and 131 of 1951

iii) Judgement Date:
12th March, 1954

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justices B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, and T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar

vi) Author:
Justice B.K. Mukherjea

vii) Citation:
AIR 1954 SC 95; [1954] SCR 988

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:
Section 36(2) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940
Sections 109(a) and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any):
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Civil Law, Property Law, Procedural Law, Money Lending Regulation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeals arose out of a judgment by the Calcutta High Court affirming the reopening of two money decrees under Section 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940. The decrees related to loans obtained ostensibly by the managing Shebait of a family deity for the upkeep and religious purposes of the deities. The appellants challenged the High Court’s affirmation that allowed the court to not only reopen the decrees but also restore possession of the execution-sold properties to the deities. The central legal contention was whether the court could inquire into the identity of the real decree-holder in such proceedings, especially if the decree-holder on record was merely a benamidar.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The case revolved around advances made to the managing Shebait, Adwaita Charan Roy, by Nanitosh Chakraborty between 1928 and 1929. Following Adwaita’s death in 1930, his successor Satish Chandra Roy renewed the debt. Nanitosh’s sons, Aditya and Dhirendra, later obtained compromise decrees in 1933 for ₹5,800 and ₹2,200 respectively. These decrees were executed over the years through successive property auctions, culminating in all properties being acquired by either the decree-holders or the appellant Oramba Sundari Dasi, wife of Aghore Nath Roy, Adwaita’s son.

In 1941, co-Shebaits representing the deities filed applications under Section 36(6)(a)(ii), asserting the decrees were in fact benami for Aghore Nath Roy and praying for reopening of the decrees and restitution of the sold properties to the deities.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether under Section 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, the court could enquire into whether a decree-holder was a benamidar.
ii) Whether properties sold under execution could be restored to the deities if the real purchaser was not the decree-holder.
iii) Whether the court had jurisdiction to undo alienations if found to be sham transactions.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that Section 36 did not empower the court to go behind the decree and examine the real nature of ownership. Mr. N.C. Chatterjee, appearing for Oramba Sundari Dasi, argued that courts must treat recorded decree-holders as final for proceedings under the Act. He emphasized that inquiries into benami nature of decrees fall outside the jurisdiction of Section 36 and allowing such would undermine legal certainty. The appellant also contended that the conveyances and sales were valid and the properties, especially Schedule Ga, were acquired independently of the decrees. The property was not purchased by the decree-holders and thus could not be restored under Section 36(2)(c).

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the decrees were merely benami and a fraudulent device by Aghore Nath Roy to usurp religious properties. They urged the court to lift the veil and treat Aghore Nath Roy as the real creditor and beneficiary of execution proceedings. Relying on equitable principles and the purpose of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, they contended that allowing benami holders to benefit would defeat the statutory objective of protecting debtors and religious endowments.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 36(1)(a), (2)(a) to (e) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 – It allows reopening of decrees to provide relief from usurious interest rates and restoration of properties sold in execution, subject to certain conditions.
ii) Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code – Governs appeals to the Supreme Court.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The court ruled that proceedings under Section 36 must treat the recorded decree-holder as final. It has no jurisdiction to identify the real lender or examine benami contentions. The court emphasized that relief under Section 36 does not annul decrees entirely but allows recalculation of interest and, in limited situations, restitution of properties. Consequently, only if the decree-holder himself purchased the property can Section 36(2)(c) apply. As Oramba Sundari purchased Schedule Ga properties, the court held these could not be restored, even if purchased with her husband’s funds. However, Schedules Ka and Kha were held to be benami purchases in the name of decree-holders, who later executed a fictitious kabala to Oramba, hence restitution was ordered.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The court commented that the object of Section 36 is to protect borrowers, but its powers are confined to decree records. Even if equity favors deeper investigation, statutory limitations bind the court. The judiciary cannot read into the law what the legislature has not granted.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Section 36(2) allows reopening only for recalculation of dues and granting of installment relief.

• Restoration of property under clause (c) can occur only if the decree-holder himself purchased the property.

• Courts cannot go behind the decree to identify real parties or benami arrangements.

• Only the named decree-holder may receive instalments or record satisfaction.

• Properties transferred via fictitious conveyances post-execution do not acquire protection under clause (b) unless acquired bona fide by third parties.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment in Oramba Sundari Dasi v. Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jieu profoundly impacts the interplay of substantive equity and procedural formality in Indian civil law. The court’s refusal to lift the corporate veil in Section 36 proceedings underlines a conservative approach. The ruling signals that while equity and intent may merit scrutiny, legislative limitations restrict the judiciary from expansive interpretations in special statutes like the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The decision protects decree finality but potentially denies equitable relief in benami-driven execution. The ruling emphasizes the importance of aligning relief with statute—an essential message in judicial restraint.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Renula v. Manmatha, 72 I.A. 156 [Privy Council]

2. Bank of Commerce Ltd. v. Amulya Krishna Basu Roy Chowdhury, [1944] FCR 126

3. Frank Bowman v. Edward Lewis, 101 US 22

4. Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, [1951] SCR 127

5. State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, [1953] SCR 254

6. Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar, RLW 1954 p. 1

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, Sections 36(1) and 36(2)(a)–(e)

2. Civil Procedure Code, Sections 109 and 110

3. Constitution of India, Article 14 (in the subsequent State of Rajasthan case)