A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Chatra re-affirmed conviction for rape of a three-year-old child under Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court set aside the acquittal order of the Rajasthan High Court, which had reversed the trial court conviction mainly due to the child victim’s silence in court and minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimony. The Court held that no rigid formula governs competency or evidentiary value of a child witness, and that the silence of a traumatised child cannot automatically favour the accused. The Bench emphasised that when medical and circumstantial evidence form a complete chain, conviction can stand even without direct testimony of the prosecutrix.

The judgment discussed principles on appreciation of child-witness evidence drawn from precedents like Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, Panchhi v. State of U.P., Hari Om v. State of U.P. and State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar. The Court also applied the “panchsheel” tests for circumstantial evidence from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra.

Further, the Bench criticised the High Court’s casual approach as first appellate court and its use of the prosecutrix’s name despite privacy jurisprudence under Nipun Saxena v. Union of India. The medical testimony identifying genital injuries on the child and compatible injuries on the accused, coupled with prompt FIR, conduct of parties and absence of credible motive for false implication, created a conclusive chain pointing to guilt. The Court therefore restored the trial court judgment and directed the accused to surrender and serve the remaining sentence.

Keywords: child rape conviction; evidence of child witness; Section 376 IPC; circumstantial evidence in rape; medical evidence in sexual assault; minor victim; appellate re-appreciation of evidence; prosecutrix anonymity; trauma-induced silence; chain of circumstances.

B) CASE DETAILS – STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. CHATRA CHILD RAPE APPEAL

The Judgment Cause Title is State of Rajasthan v. Chatra. The Case Number is Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2017. The Judgment Date is 18 March 2025. The Court is the Supreme Court of India, exercising Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction. The Quorum comprised Vikram Nath, J. and Sanjay Karol, J., with Sanjay Karol, J. as the author judge. The principal Citation is [2025] 4 S.C.R. 95 : 2025 INSC 360.

The central Legal Provision involved is Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860, dealing with rape and prescribing minimum custodial punishment. The case also implicates principles under Section 118, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, on competency of witnesses, including children. It engages appellate standards of re-appreciation of evidence recognised in Atley v. State of U.P. and Geeta Devi v. State of U.P.. The judgment does not expressly overrule any earlier decision, but it distinguishes and refines attitudes seen in Mange v. State of Haryana on disabled witnesses.

The case relates to Criminal Law, Law of Evidence, Child Rights, Sexual Offences, and Human Rights and Dignity of Women and Children. It interacts with international norms on child protection and access to justice, although it mainly relies on domestic jurisprudence while echoing concerns recognised in instruments like the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT – CHILD WITNESS EVIDENCE IN RAPE

The incident dates back to 3 March 1986, when a three-year-old girl, anonymised as ‘V’, was found unconscious and bleeding from her private parts in a rural village in Rajasthan. She had allegedly been sexually assaulted by the respondent Chatra, a young man of about twenty-one years, who resided in the same locality. The first informant Gulab Chand discovered the child, noticed the accused fleeing with his dhoti open, and immediately undertook efforts to move the victim for medical aid. The FIR was lodged the next day at Police Station Uniyara, about fourteen kilometres away, due to logistical difficulties and the urgency to secure medical treatment for the grievously injured child.

The Sessions Judge, Tonk, in Sessions Trial No. 26/1986, after examining fifteen prosecution witnesses and medical documents, convicted the accused under Section 376 IPC and imposed seven years’ rigorous imprisonment along with fine, granting some leniency due to youth and first-offender status. On appeal, the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, reversed the conviction in 2013, primarily because ‘V’ remained silent in court, because of perceived inconsistencies in PW-2 Gulab Chand’s versions, and owing to absence of semen in forensic samples.

The State of Rajasthan invoked the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, contending that the High Court failed to discharge its duty as first appellate court and ignored the compelling medical and circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court, conscious that almost forty years had passed and that the High Court had delayed the appeal for twenty-six years, decided not to remand but to finally re-appreciate the entire evidence and determine guilt.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE – CHILD RAPE PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 376 IPC

The prosecution case narrates that on 3 March 1986, around 1:30 p.m., PW-2 Gulab Chand went towards a well near the hut of Khadda in village Sureli. As he passed the house of the respondent Chatra, he allegedly heard the cries of a small girl and immediately entered the house to investigate. Inside, he claimed to see the accused over the child ‘V’, with his dhoti open, after which the accused allegedly ran away on seeing him, leaving the minor unconscious and bleeding from her private parts. A blood-stained cloth lay beneath her body.

Because the child’s parents were not present in the village at that moment, PW-2 placed the child on a camel cart with the help of PW-10 Prabhu, transported her to another location, and arranged medical attention from a nurse and a private doctor. Her mother PW-3 Savitri had earlier gone to a neighbouring village for a funeral, after entrusting the child’s care to the accused, and she later reached Sureli, where the nurse informed her that the child had been raped. The FIR was lodged on 4 March 1986, describing the events, the accused’s conduct, the child’s unconscious condition and visible genital bleeding, along with explanation for the one-day delay due to lack of transport and focus on emergency care.

During trial, PW-14 Dr. Vasudev examined ‘V’ and found fresh rupture of hymen, lacerations to the vaginal canal, and blood stains around the genital area, consistent with forceful sexual intercourse with a minor girl and incompatible with simple accidental injury from a nail or pin. He also examined the accused and noted abrasions, swelling and scratches on the penile region, opining that such injuries are typically caused by forceful intercourse with a minor female. The defence suggested false implication due to tenancy disputes with the child’s father ‘X’, alleged that PW-2 had bribed the doctor, and claimed the injuries might have a non-sexual cause.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED – CHILD WITNESS SILENCE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The first key issue concerns whether conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC can rest primarily on medical and circumstantial evidence where the child victim does not narrate the assault in court and remains largely silent. This raises questions under Section 118 Evidence Act on the competency and evidentiary value of a child witness who understands truth and lies but cannot verbally recount traumatic events. The Court had to decide whether such silence should benefit the accused or instead be interpreted in light of child psychology and trauma, consistent with earlier decisions like Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, where a minor prosecutrix turned hostile.

The second issue relates to appellate re-appreciation of evidence. The question was whether the Rajasthan High Court correctly exercised its duty as first appellate court, as mandated in [Atley v. State of U.P.] and reaffirmed in [Geeta Devi v. State of U.P.], to independently evaluate evidence rather than casually overturning a reasoned trial court conviction. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court gave disproportionate weight to minor testimonial inconsistencies, the absence of semen in forensic reports, and alleged motive for false implication, while downplaying the strong medical and circumstantial chain.

A third issue involved the standards for circumstantial evidence in rape cases, invoking the panchsheel from [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda], especially whether the chain of circumstances excluded every hypothesis except guilt and created a moral certainty compatible with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Finally, the Court addressed the duty to protect identity and dignity of the prosecutrix, particularly after [Nipun Saxena v. Union of India], and criticised the High Court for repeatedly naming the child victim in its judgment.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS – STATE OF RAJASTHAN ON CHILD RAPE CONVICTION

The State contended that the trial court had correctly appreciated the oral, medical and documentary evidence and that the High Court’s reversal lacked proper analysis and ignored binding principles on appeals against conviction. It argued that PW-2 Gulab Chand’s testimony, though containing minor omissions between the written FIR and deposition, remained substantially consistent regarding material aspects: discovery of ‘V’ in an unconscious, bleeding state, the accused’s presence in the room, and his hasty escape with his dhoti open. The State submitted that non-mention of the “sitting over the girl” detail in the FIR was not fatal because FIR is not an encyclopaedia, and such discrepancies must be judged in the light of medical corroboration and the rural context, consistent with reasoning in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P..

The appellant emphasised PW-14 Dr. Vasudev’s findings on the child’s genital injuries and the accused’s penile abrasions, which pointed strongly to forceful intercourse and effectively ruled out trivial accidental causes like nail injury. It relied on precedents such as State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash on the need for stern judicial response to child rape, and [State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar] on survivor-centric approaches and the reality that most child sexual offences occur in familiar environments. The State argued that the child’s silence in court reflected deep trauma rather than falsity and that conviction can rest on other credible evidence, as recognised in State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat, where a disabled prosecutrix could not testify. It urged the Court to restore the original conviction, stressing the long ordeal faced by the victim and her family.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS – DEFENCE CHALLENGE TO CHILD RAPE FINDINGS

The respondent-accused maintained that he had been falsely implicated due to a tenancy dispute with the child’s father ‘X’, who occupied a house belonging to the accused’s family and allegedly refused to vacate it. He argued that PW-2 Gulab Chand’s accounts were inconsistent: the FIR mentioned only the accused’s open dhoti and escape, whereas the later deposition claimed that he saw the accused sitting on ‘V’, with allegations about a cloth gagging her mouth appearing only at trial. The defence contended that these improvements indicated embellishment or tutoring and undermined credibility, particularly because the prosecution failed to examine any scribe or explain why such critical facts were omitted from the written report.

Further, the accused relied on the Forensic Science Laboratory report which did not detect semen on the child’s frock, on the lungi used to place her, or on the soil samples from the scene. He argued that absence of semen weakened the rape charge in a case supposedly involving penile penetration and bleeding and ought to raise reasonable doubt, especially when coupled with the child victim’s complete failure to narrate any assault in court despite prompting. The defence stressed that ‘V’ knew the difference between truth and falsehood yet gave no account, suggesting that the prosecution version might be concocted.

The respondent also attempted to discredit PW-14 Dr. Vasudev by alleging that he demanded bribes from the accused’s brother to manipulate the medical report, although such claims remained uncorroborated by independent evidence. The defence invoked the presumption of innocence and argued that the High Court had correctly granted benefit of doubt, emphasising that criminal convictions require high standards of proof and any crucial inconsistency must tilt the balance in favour of the accused, in line with decisions like Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. on reasonable doubt.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS – SECTION 376 IPC AND EVIDENCE RULES IN CHILD RAPE CASES

The central penal provision is [Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860], which criminalises rape and, at the material time, prescribed a minimum period of rigorous imprisonment for sexual assault, subject to judicial discretion in sentencing. In child rape cases, courts usually treat the offence as aggravated, following principles articulated in [State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash], which emphasised that child rape represents a crime against humanity and demands a stringent judicial approach. Although the offence predates the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Court’s reasoning aligns with later child-protective legislative philosophy, particularly regarding vulnerability, trauma and the need for sensitivity.

On the evidentiary side, [Section 118, Indian Evidence Act, 1872] declares that all persons are competent to testify unless the court considers they cannot understand questions or give rational answers due to tender age, extreme old age, mental infirmity or other similar reasons. Indian courts have repeatedly held that child witnesses are competent if they satisfy this rational-understanding test, as seen in [Dattu Ramrao Sakhare], [Panchhi v. State of U.P.], and [Hari Om v. State of U.P.]. The Court reiterated that non-administration of oath to a child does not invalidate testimony, and that corroboration, though prudent, is not a hard legal rule.

The decision also draws heavily on circumstantial evidence doctrine, relying on [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda], which sets out five conditions for conviction based purely on circumstances. Additionally, the Court revisits standards for proof beyond reasonable doubt discussed in [Ramakant Rai], [K. Gopal Reddy], and State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, stressing that doubts must be real and substantial, not fanciful or speculative. Finally, confidentiality of the victim’s identity draws support from [Nipun Saxena v. Union of India], which elaborates statutory and constitutional foundations for protecting the anonymity of sexual-offence survivors.

I) JUDGMENT – RATIO DECIDENDI, OBITER DICTA AND GUIDELINES ON CHILD WITNESS EVIDENCE

a. RATIO DECIDENDI – SILENCE OF CHILD WITNESS AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The Supreme Court held that there is no hard and fast rule governing the competency or evidentiary value of a child witness and that trial courts must evaluate each child’s capacity, intelligence, and understanding of truth versus falsehood through preliminary questioning, as illustrated by the examination of ‘V’. It found that the trial judge had correctly assessed her basic competence under Section 118 Evidence Act, but that her silence when asked about the incident reflected severe trauma rather than unreliability or fabrication. The Court stressed that a traumatised child’s silence cannot automatically benefit the accused, and that equating such silence with the silence of an adult prosecutrix ignores child psychology and realities of abuse, consistent with reasoning in [Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi] and [State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar].

Further, the Court held that conviction for rape can validly rest on medical and circumstantial evidence even when the prosecutrix does not narrate the incident, provided that the chain of circumstances satisfies the [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda] criteria. In this case, the medical evidence showed recent forceful penetration causing serious genital injuries to the three-year-old and corroborated by injuries on the accused’s penis, which PW-14 linked specifically to forceful intercourse with a minor female, thereby ruling out trivial accidental explanations. The presence of the accused in the room, his flight with his dhoti open, the child’s unconscious condition, the prompt effort to obtain medical aid and the absence of a credible motive for false implication together formed a complete chain consistent only with guilt. The Court thus restored the trial court conviction under Section 376 IPC and set aside the High Court’s acquittal as legally unsustainable.

b. OBITER DICTA – APPELLATE DUTY AND PROTECTION OF PROSECUTRIX IDENTITY

In important observations, the Court criticised the Rajasthan High Court for delivering a six-page appellate judgment that failed to systematically re-appreciate the evidence as required of a first appellate court in a criminal case. Relying on [Atley v. State of U.P.], [Geeta Devi v. State of U.P.], and related authorities, it reminded High Courts that appeals against conviction demand careful, independent analysis of the entire evidence, and that summary treatment undermines both fairness and public confidence in criminal justice. The Court underscored that delay of twenty-six years in disposal of the appeal aggravated hardship for the victim and her family and weighed against remanding the matter, thus justifying direct re-appreciation by the Supreme Court.

The Bench also expressed strong disapproval of the High Court’s use of the child’s real name throughout the judgment, even though Supreme Court jurisprudence for at least a decade has urged anonymisation of rape survivors, including minors. It referred to cases like Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P., State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja, Dinesh v. State of Rajasthan, and especially [Nipun Saxena v. Union of India], which mandated strict protection of identity in sexual-offence cases. The Court therefore redacted the victim’s name even in quoted portions of the record and reaffirmed that protecting the dignity and privacy of sexual-offence survivors remains a continuing judicial obligation, regardless of whether statutory provisions explicitly bind superior courts.

c. GUIDELINES – APPRECIATION OF CHILD WITNESS AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN RAPE CASES

First, the Court reiterated that trial judges must carefully assess the competence of a child witness through simple preliminary questions that test understanding of truth and lies, as well as the ability to give rational answers, following the approach suggested in Pradeep v. State of Haryana and earlier authorities. Such preliminary examination should ideally be recorded, so that appellate courts may review whether the trial court rightly accepted the child as a competent witness. Second, the Court emphasised that absence of oath does not invalidate child testimony, but courts must remain vigilant about the risk of tutoring and should look for corroboration as a matter of prudence, not as a strict legal requirement, in line with [Dattu Ramrao Sakhare], [Panchhi], and Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka.

Third, the Court clarified that prosecutrix testimony is not the exclusive foundation for conviction in sexual offences. Where the prosecutrix is unable to testify due to trauma, disability or other justifiable reasons, courts may convict based on reliable medical and circumstantial evidence, as seen in [State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat] and Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P., provided the chain of circumstances is complete and consistent with guilt only. Fourth, in cases based substantially on circumstances, courts must explicitly apply the five tests from [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda] and must guard against speculative doubts that lack foundation in the evidence, drawing guidance from [Ramakant Rai], [K. Gopal Reddy], and [Krishna Gopal] regarding the nature of reasonable doubt. Finally, the Court reaffirmed the necessity of protecting victim identity, directing that courts at all levels follow the anonymisation practice evolved in [Nipun Saxena] and subsequent jurisprudence.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS – IMPACT ON CHILD WITNESS EVIDENCE AND RAPE JURISPRUDENCE

The decision in State of Rajasthan v. Chatra significantly strengthens Indian jurisprudence on child witness evidence in rape prosecutions, particularly where the victim is extremely young and unable to narrate events due to psychological trauma. By holding that the child’s silence cannot be weaponised in favour of the accused, the Court recognises the complex ways in which trauma manifests in young survivors and breaks from rigid expectations of verbal disclosure. This approach aligns with broader survivor-centric principles articulated in [State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar], where the Court urged sensitivity to the realities of sexual violence, including fear, stigma and familial dynamics. The judgment therefore promotes a more nuanced understanding of credibility that integrates medical evidence, behavioural responses and contextual factors, rather than treating testimony in isolation.

The ruling also sends a strong institutional message to High Courts about their duties as first appellate courts in criminal cases, especially serious offences like child rape. By criticising the perfunctory six-page reversal and emphasising the need for comprehensive re-appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court reinforces earlier exhortations in [Atley], [Geeta Devi], and more recent appellate decisions that demand reasoned scrutiny rather than mechanical grant of benefit of doubt. At the same time, the Court’s insistence on applying circumstantial evidence panchsheel and robust standards of reasonable doubt preserves the integrity of criminal safeguards while preventing acquittals based on speculative or trivial doubts.

Finally, the judgment furthers the discourse on privacy and dignity of sexual-offence survivors, particularly children, by reproaching the High Court’s use of the victim’s name and reaffirming the anonymisation practice laid down in [Nipun Saxena]. It thus integrates substantive justice with procedural and symbolic protections, recognising that naming survivors may perpetuate secondary victimisation and societal stigma. The decision will likely guide future courts in balancing protection of accused rights with the imperative to respond effectively to child sexual abuse, using medical, circumstantial and contextual evidence responsibly while maintaining survivor-centric sensitivity and constitutional values of dignity and equality.

K) REFERENCES

1. State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 95 : 2025 INSC 360 (India).
2. Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341 (India).
3. Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177 (India).
4. Hari Om v. State of U.P., (2021) 4 SCC 345 (India).
5. State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar, (2017) 2 SCC 51 (India).
6. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 (India).
7. Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 (India).
8. Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 (India).
9. Geeta Devi v. State of U.P., [2022] 1 S.C.R. 428 (India).
10. Mange v. State of Haryana, (1979) 4 SCC 349 (India).
11. Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 17 SCC 523 (India).
12. Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., (2015) 11 SCC 69 (India).
13. State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745 (India).
14. State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat, (2018) 11 SCC 163 (India).
15. Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 (India).
16. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 (India).
17. Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P., (2003) 8 SCC 551 (India); State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja, (2004) 1 SCC 475 (India); Dinesh v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771 (India).
18. Pradeep v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 777 (India).
19. Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129 (India).
20. Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P., (2021) 16 SCC 225 (India).
21. Important Statutes Referred
22. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 376 (sexual offences and punishment for rape).
23. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 118 (competency of witnesses including children).
24. Constitution of India, Article 136 (special leave to appeal by Supreme Court).
25. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, arts. 19, 34, 39 (child protection from sexual abuse and right to recovery).