Swiss Ribbon Pvt Ltd vs Union of India

By – Punya Rai

In the Supreme Court of India

NAME:-Swiss Ribbon Pvt Ltd vs Union of India
CITATION:-2019 SCC Online SC 73
DATE OF JUDGEMENT:-25 January 2019
PETITIONER:-Swiss ribbon Pvt.Ltd
RESPONDENT:-union of India and ors
BENCH/ JUDGES:-R. Nariman,  Navin Sinha
SECTION/ ARTICLES:-art 226, Section 60 and 61 , art 14, sec 18 with regulations 10, 12 , 13 and 14 of cirp regulations Section 29 a, Section 53, Section 24  Section 391 of companies act

INTRODUCTION: –

Swiss Ribbons Pvt Ltd. versus Union of India manages the established legitimacy of the different existing arrangements in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter IBC Code). The case has been at last chosen by the Supreme Court on 25 January 2019. Since the institution of the IBC Code, it is constantly changing, and revisions were made ordinarily to add key changes to facilitate the goal cycle. The most recent Amendment has been made in 2020. This is the fourth Amendment being made to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court, for this situation, held the IBC Code to be unavoidably legitimate completely. The Court thinks about different financial variables of the country to decide its legitimacy in the current case. The current case includes numerous cases moved from different High Courts like Calcutta and Gujrat.

The Court depended on the reports of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (2016), Joint Parliamentary Committee (2016), Insolvency Law Committee (2018) and the Statement of Objects and Reasons on different events to choose the current case. The Court additionally depended on the basic discourse of the finance minister while moving the IBC (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017 and suggestions of the Siddiqui Working Group, 1999 on Credit Information Companies and the insights of the adequacy of the IBC code since its sanctioning before giving the last judgment for this situation

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: –

The Insolvency Code is an enactment that manages financial issues and, in the bigger sense, manages the economy of the nation all in all. Prior tests, as we have seen, as far as enactments having fizzled, preliminary having prompted rehashed blunders’, at last, prompted the authorization of the Code. Be that as it may, in various matters [1] the Constitutional legitimacy of the different arrangements of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 have been tested. These various assaults testing the legitimacy of the Code just as the established legitimacy of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) provoked the Apex Court to guide the Gujarat High Court not to enter the discussion relating to the legitimacy of the Code or the sacred legitimacy of the NCLT

FACTS OF THE CASE

A few writ petitions and exceptional leave petitions were recorded under the watchful eye of the Supreme Court for testing the sacred legitimacy of different arrangements of the Code. Since the judgment managed the topic of law identifying with the established legitimacy of the Code, it did not accommodate the individual realities of any case

ISSUES RAISED: –

1)     Whether nclt and class is as per madras bar affiliation administering

2)     Whether 29 An is in opposition to the target of expedient goal

3)     Whether councils ought to be working under the authoritative control of the service of law

4)     Whether the separation between monetary leasers and functional loan bosses is violative of Article 14 of the constitution

ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANTS

  1. The  High  Court  erred  in  not  considering  the  fact  that  the  Respondent  had  no  right  to  move  an  application under  Sections  11  and  15  of  the  Arbitration  Act,  in  the  light  of  the  agreement  between  the  parties  and  the competence of the arbitral tribunal to adjudicate the dispute between the parties.
  2. The Respondent could have only challenged the order by an appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
  3. The  arbitrator  could  not  make  progress  since  the  Respondent  was  either  not  present,  or  continually  taking adjournments,  and  when  the  arbitrator  was  proceeding  with  the  matter  in  right  earnest,  the  Respondent could not have approached the High Court seeking appointment of an independent arbitrator.

ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT: –

  1. If the arbitrator is an employee/ advisor or has any past or present business relation or being the manager/ director  then  he  cannot  be  appointed  as  an  arbitrator  and  not  qualified  to  decide  the  dispute  and  therefore, the High Court has rightly appointed the fresh independent arbitrator.
  2. When there is failure  on  the  part  of  the  arbitral  tribunal  to  act  and  unable  to  perform  its  functions,  it  is  open  to a  party  to  the  arbitration  proceedings  to  approach  the  court  for  termination  of  the  mandate  of  the  arbitrator and seek appointment of the substitute arbitrator. Since for a long period of about ten years, no award had been  passed  and  that  the  arbitrators  were  kept  on  changing  for  one  reason  or  other;  the  Respondent  was justified  in  approaching the High Court for substitution or appointment of fresh arbitrator.

JUDGEMENT:

At long last with the Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Association of India,[2] the Supreme Court has at long last settled the difficulties which mounting against the established legitimacy of the Code.

1. Contrast between Financial Creditor and Operational bank

The Legislative plan that is contained under Section 7 of the Code was tested for the way that there is no understandable differentia between the monetary and the functional lender in Code, respect being had to the item tried to be accomplished by the Code, specifically, indebtedness goal, assuming that is conceivable, at last, liquidation. As just the monetary leaser has the spot in the Committee of loan bosses (“COC”) and subsequently it was satisfied that this administrative plan added up to segregation under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court maintained the Constitution legitimacy expressing in Para 28 of the judgment which likewise attempted to determine the polarity between the financial leaser and the Operational Creditor.

1. “In particular, monetary leasers are, from the earliest starting point, associated with surveying the practicality of the corporate debt holder. They can, and along these lines do, participate in the rebuilding of the advance just as rearrangement of the corporate account holder’s business when there is monetary pressure, which are things functional banks do not and cannot do. Hence, saving the corporate borrower as a going concern, while guaranteeing greatest recuperation for all leasers being the target of the Code, monetary banks are plainly not the same as functional loan bosses and along these lines, there is clearly a comprehensible differentia between the two which has an immediate connection to the items tried to be accomplished by the Code.”

BLRC report was additionally talked about while conveying the judgment for examining the reasoning behind the differentiation between the Operational and the monetary lender. The Supreme Court in para 27 additionally recognize the Financial Creditor and the Operational Creditor expressing:

27. “Monetary Creditor for the most part loan finance on a term advance or working capital that empowers the corporate account holder to set up the business. Then again, contracts with functional lenders are relatable to the supply of labour and products in the activity of the business. Monetary agreements for the most part include huge amounts of cash by the method of difference, functional agreements have a duty whose quantum is by and large 65 less. In the running of a business, functional banks can be numerous rather than monetary loan bosses, who loan finance for the setup or working of business”

The Apex Court noticed that the Operational Creditor or their agents can be available in the COC if the measures of their total contribution were at least 10% of the obligation. Moreover, it was seen that there is no indisputable information to propose that the Operational Creditors are unfavourably influenced by being incorporated from the COC. Further, Supreme Court noticed that the NCLTs, while examining reasonability and practicality of goal plans ought to consistently go into whether Operational Creditor is given generally similar treatment as the Financial Creditors, and in case they are not, such plans are either altered or dismissed to protect the privileges of the functional lender.

2. Defendability of Section 12A

Defendability of Section 12A [3] of the Code was tested in the current case expressing that the limit of 90% of the COC for permitting the withdrawal of utilization is absurd. Notwithstanding, Supreme Court maintained the Constitutionality of the said segment while talking about the ILC report [4] that clarified the justification this high edge the Apex Court was of the view that they did not perceive any trouble in the requirement for such high edge for the withdrawal as the procedure under the code is the aggregate procedures. High Court in Para 53 of the case held that the COC do not triumph ultimately the final word regarding the matter. As under Section 60 of the Code if the COC discretionarily dismisses the withdrawal guarantee the NCLT/NCLAT can generally save such choice. Furthermore, in this way Section 12A passes the Constitutionality.

It was additionally held that at any stage where the board of trustees of lenders is not yet established, a gathering can move toward the NCLT straightforwardly, which Tribunal may, in the exercise of its inborn forces under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, permit or forbid an application for withdrawal or settlement.

3. Sacred Validity of Section 29A

a) Retrospective Effect

The Defendability of Section 29A [5] of the Code was likewise tested. Area 29A rundown down the individual who is not qualified to be a goal candidate. The First issue which came into the picture was whether there was a Retrospective Application of Section 29A. it was satisfied that Section 29A of the Code had reflectively disregarded the privileges of the past advertisers to take part in the recuperation interaction for the Corporate Debtor.

While choosing for the Retrospective utilization of a resolution Supreme Court alluded to the Judgment of Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors.,[6] while holding that goal candidates have no vested right to be considered as such in the goal interaction. In this manner, the Supreme Court saw that a resolution is not reflectively appropriate just because it influences the current rights. A goal candidate who applies under Section 29A(c) has no vested right to apply for being considered as a goal candidate and accordingly holding that Section 29A is not review in nature.

b) Section 29A(c) Not Restricted to Malfeasance

It was additionally tested on the premise that it treats inconsistent with equivalents and in this manner, it abuses Article 14 of the Constitution. It was fought that a decent past chief cannot be lumped with a terrible recent supervisor for the situation where a recent administrator is not liable of impropriety or of acting in opposition to the premium of the corporate borrower, there is no motivation behind why he ought not to be allowed to partake in the goal interaction. The Supreme Court held that there is no vested right in a past advertiser of a corporate debt holder to offer for the steadfast/portable property of the Corporate Debtor in liquidation. It noted in Para 60 of the judgment that the authoritative motivation behind Section 29A is with the end goal that it “incorporates people who are improper, or people who have fallen foul of the law here and there, and people who can’t pay their obligations in the effortlessness time frame permitted are further, by this stipulation, prohibited from buying resources of the corporate debt holder whose obligations they have either unshakably not paid or have been not able to pay.”

c) Related Party

Defendability of Section 29A (j) read with the meaning of “Related gathering” under area 5 (24A) of the Code was tested. It was battled that simple reality that someone turns out to be a relative of an ineligible individual cannot be a sufficient motivation to expel such individual from turning into a goal candidate in case he is generally qualified. High Court while depending on Attorney General for India and Ors. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and Ors.[7], for regulation of Nexus held that:

75. “We are of the view that people who act mutually or working together with others are associated with the business activities of the goal candidate. Essentially, every one of the classifications of people referenced in Section 5(24)A) show that such people should be “associated” with the goal candidate inside the significance of Section 29A(j). This being the situation, the said classifications of people who are aggregately referenced under the subtitle “relative” clearly need to have an association with the business movement of the goal candidate. Without showing that such individual is “associated” with the matter of the action of the goal candidate, such individual cannot in any way, shape or form be precluded under Section 29A (j)… “

The Apex Court saw that every one of the people referenced in Section 5 (24A) of the Code unmistakably shows that such classification of people should be associated with the goal candidate inside the importance of segment 24A(j) of the Code. Segment 29A(j) manages the classification of people who are associated with the business movement of the goal candidate. In this way, Supreme Court held that the articulation “Related Party”, accordingly, and “relative” contained in the definition segments should be perused noscitur a sociis with the classifications of people referenced in Explanation I, which would incorporate just individuals who are associated with the business movement of the goal candidate. The Court held that without showing that such individual is associated with the matter of the goal candidate cannot exclude such individual under Section 29A (j)

CONCLUSION: –

Equity Rohinton Fali Nariman while conveying the decision evidently expressed that, “The investigation contained in the Code, decided by the consensus of its arrangements and not by purported crudities and disparities that have been called attention to by the candidates, passes sacred gather.” Therefore, the Code has passed the established legitimacy which will positively put rest to a portion of the vexed inquiries encompassing the translation of the arrangements of the Code. The Judgment emphasizes the commitment of the Code in expanding the progression of the monetary assets to the business area because of reimbursement of monetary obligation. Additionally, the heading to Union of India to set up circuit seats of the NCLAT in various urban communities inside the time of a half year from the day of Judgment to guarantee faster removal of requests