Author: Krishang Sharma
Edited by: Shadrack Chai
ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The case “T. Barai vs Henry Ah Hoe And Another”[1] by the Supreme Court of India on 7 December 1982, addresses important issues regarding the relationship between central and state laws in the context of food safety regulations. This case arose from a conflict between the West Bengal Amendment Act, which imposed stricter penalties for food adulteration and the Central Amendment Act which introduced reduced penalties. The Court ruled that the Central Amendment Act superseded the West Bengal Amendment Act due to the principle of repugnancy as outlined in Article 254 of the Indian Constitution.
The judgment emphasized the importance of applying laws that favour the accused The Court determined that individuals charged with offences should benefit from the lighter penalties introduced by the Central Amendment Act, even if the offence occurred before the new law was enacted.
CASE DETAILS
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i) Judgment Cause Title / Case Name |
T. Barai vs Henry Ah Hoe And Another |
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ii) Case Number |
Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 1979 |
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iii) Judgement Date |
7 December 1982 |
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iv) Court |
The Supreme Court of India |
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v) Quorum / Constitution of Bench |
A.P. Sen., E.S. Venkataramiah, R.B. Misra |
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vi) Author / Name of Judges |
A.P. Sen |
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vii) Citation |
1983 AIR 150 |
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viii) Legal Provisions Involved |
Constitution Of India – 254(1) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – sec 16(1)(a), sec 21 |
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The case here deals with the conflict which arose between the two statutes the one which is centrally amended and the one amended by the West Bengal state legislature. These cases are based on the provision of section 16[2] of the food and Adulteration Act. And also Article 254 of the Indian constitution. Which talks about the relation between the state and the centre?
This case also shows the humane approach of the judicial system of the country and tries to impose less harsh provisions on the accused when there are alternative provisions which are less harsh present.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Procedural Background of the Case
Initial complaint was made on 24 September 1975, against the respondents in the Court of Senior Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta.
The magistrate, following a precedent by Justice Anil Kumar Sen in B. Manna and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal held that the case was triable by the Court of Sessions due to the punishment of life imprisonment under the West Bengal Amendment Act.
The case was then taken to the Calcutta High court
The High Court held that after the Central Amendment Act came into force on 1 April 1976, all pending proceedings would be governed by the new Act.
The High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order and directed him to proceed with the trial under the new provisions.
The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of India.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the High Court’s interpretation.
The Court ruled that the accused has the right and should be benefited from the reduced punishment provided in the Central Amendment Act.
The case was sent back to the previous court to continue the proceedings by the new provisions.
Factual Background of the Case
On 16 August 1975, the appellant, who is a Food Inspector of the Corporation of Calcutta, purchased a sample of Hyacinth’s ground white pepper (compound) with fried rice powder from Chungwa Restaurant which is located in Calcutta.
After analysing the sample was found to be adulterated as it contained wheat powder instead of rice powder.
A complaint was filed against the owner of the restaurant (respondent) for committing an offence under section 16(1) (a) read with section 7 of the Food Adulteration Act 1954 by the appellant on 24 September 1975.
At the time of the commission of the alleged offence, the law in force in West Bengal was the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act of 1973, which provided for life imprisonment for such offences.
The central government enacted the Prevention of Food adulteration Act (amendment) 1976 which reduced the maximum punishment to 3 years imprisonment and introduced summary trial procedures. On 1 April 1976.
LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
Whether the Central Amendment Act (Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, 1976[3]) impliedly repeal the West Bengal Amendment Act (Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics, 1973[4]) with effect from April 1, 1976.
Should the pending proceedings be governed by the change of procedure brought in by Section 16A[5] of the Act as introduced by the Central Amendment Act?
PETITIONER ARGUMENTS
The counsels for Petitioner argued that the punishment for food adulteration offences enhanced to life imprisonment by the West Bengal amendment should stay applicable. The rationale given by the appellant was that the previous operations of a repealed law are preserved by section 8[6] of the General Clause Act.
The petitioner contended that they must be liable for punishment of life imprisonment enhanced by the West Bengal Amendment Act.
It was contended by the petitioner that the West Bengal amendment was not repealed impliedly by the later central amendment where the punishment was reduced to up to 3 years of imprisonment. It was argued that according to article 254(1) of the Indian constitution[7], the state amendment should not be considered repealed as two amendments can co-exist
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for Respondent submitted that the supremacy of the central law (Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1976)[8] must prevail over the West Bengal Amendment Act, 1973. By taking reliance on the doctrine of repugnancy. Which states that when there is a conflict between state and central legislation, the central law will prevail over any of the state legislation by Article 254[9] of the Indian constitution.
It was further asserted by the respondent that when the Central Amendment Act[10] is present there with more lenient punishments for the accused it must be applied retroactively. This was supported by the idea that the accused must not be punished and tried under harsher provisions when there are more lenient laws present.
The respondent improvised on the fact that the new amendment was brought into existence to simplify the procedures and to ease the punishment given under the food adulteration the law intends to provide more humane provisions.
It emphasized the principle of beneficial construction of laws. Asserting that the offender should be tried and dealt with the law or provision which is less harsh to them. Further, he advocated the right of fair trial of the accused.
They advocated that the amendment of the new provisions in the old ones is to eliminate the faults and thus it should be necessitated over old provisions.
RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
Section 16(1) (a) – “Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1A) if any person—
- a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, imports into India or manufacturers for sale or stores, sells or distributes any article of food-
(I) which is adulterated within the meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (a) of section 2 or misbranded within the meaning of clause (ix) of that section or the sale of which is prohibited under any provision of this Act or any rule made there under or by an order of the Food (Health) Authority;
(ii) Other than an article of food referred to in subclause (I), in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made there under”[11]
Section 16A- “Power of court to try cases summarily
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under sub-section (1) of section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered on this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial:
Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year:
Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code.”[12]
Constitution of India
Article 20(1)- “No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence”[13].
Article 254- “Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States.
(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of existing law concerning one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void
(2)Where a law made by the Legislature of a State concerning one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law concerning that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law concerning the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying, or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.”[14]
The Bengal General Clause Act
Section 8 –. “Where this Act, or any Bengal Act ‘[or West Bengal Act] repeal. Made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hi there to made o_- hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not—
(a) Revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal t; Ikes effect; or
(b) Affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there under; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) Affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) Affect any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy, in respect of any such right privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid;
Any such investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been. Passed. (General Rules of Construction. —Sea lions SA & 9—13.) ‘8A. Where any Bengal Act *|or West Bengal Act] made after (the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any former enactment was amended by the express omission, insertion or subscription of any matter, [hen, unless a different of 1899.]
The intention appears the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repeated and in operation at the time of such repeal.”[15]
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court of India dismissed this appeal and upheld the decision of the Calcutta High Court.
The Supreme Court in its judgment directed that the case against the respondents (owners of Chunghwa Restaurant) should be tried under the provisions of the Central Amendment Act, which provided for a summary trial procedure and a reduced punishment. This decision effectively overruled the initial order which was given by the Magistrate who earlier held that the case was triable by the Court of Sessions due to the life imprisonment provision in the West Bengal Amendment Act.
The Court further decided that the accused should have been given the benefit of reduced punishment which is provided in the Central Amendment Act. The maximum punishment was reduced from life imprisonment (under the West Bengal Amendment Act) to three years imprisonment (under the Central Amendment Act).
The Court also ruled that the new procedure introduced by Section 16A of the Central Amendment Act should also apply to pending cases. This meant that the offence in question would be tried summarily by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate, rather than by the Court of Sessions which was previously required under the West Bengal Amendment Act.
CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The ruling of the case T. Barai vs Henry Ah Hoe and Another[16] depicts the relationship between judicial insight and the legislative framework. And also embarks the importance of the basic constitutional provisions which are kept in mind by the judiciary and ensure the right to be treated freely to every accused. The case will be a precedent for many cases as it asserts the legislative supremacy, individual rights, and principled application of law.
This case marked the hierarchy of the central legislation over the state legislation in instances of repugnancy, which reinforces the central government’s primacy in legislative matters about subjects in the Concurrent List.
This case also reflects the humane approach of the judicial system of India where the less harsh provisions and penalties are applied to the accused.
It also highlights the necessity for lawmakers to be mindful of existing legislative frameworks and the implications of their amendments on ongoing cases.
REFERENCES
Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics, 1973(West Bengal Amendment Act)
The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 (Ben. Act I)
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1976
Section 16(1) (a), Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
Section 16A, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
Article 20(1), Constitution of Republic of India, 1950.
Article 254, Constitution of Republic of India, 1950.
[1] 1983 Air 150
[2] Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act 1976
[3] Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act 1976(Centrally Amended)
[4] Prevention Of Adulteration Of Food, Drugs And Cosmetics, 1973(West Bengal Amendment)
[5] The Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
[6] Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 (Ben. Act I)
[7] Article 254, Constitution of India.
[8] Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1976(Centrally Amended)
[9] Article 254, Constitution of India.
[10] Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1976
[11] Section 16(1)(A), Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
[12] Section 16a, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
[13] Article 20(1), Constitution of Republic Of India, 1950.
[14] Article 254, Constitution of Republic Of India, 1950.
[15] Section 8, the Bengal General Clause Act, 1899.
[16] 1983 Air 150
