A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This case addresses the critical issue of whether legal proceedings initiated under a repealed enactment can survive and continue post-repeal, particularly under the Indian corporate legal framework. The Supreme Court of India in The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni and Ors., [1960] 3 SCR 85, reaffirmed the principle that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 preserves rights, liabilities, and legal proceedings instituted under repealed laws, unless a contrary intention is evident in the repealing statute. The dispute arose when the shareholders filed an application under Section 153-C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and during its pendency, the Companies Act, 1956 repealed the earlier law. The appellant contended that the District Judge lost jurisdiction due to the repeal. The apex court, rejecting this argument, upheld the continued jurisdiction under the saved provisions, notably applying Section 658 of the 1956 Act, which explicitly referenced Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The case sets a foundational precedent on the survivability of rights and jurisdiction under a repealed enactment and delineates the harmonious interaction between special statutes and general saving clauses in Indian law.

Keywords: Repeal of statute, saving clause, Section 6 General Clauses Act, Companies Act 1913, Companies Act 1956, jurisdictional continuity, corporate proceedings.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni and Others

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 513 of 1958

iii) Judgement Date
22 February 1960

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Hon’ble Justices S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, and M. Hidayatullah

vi) Author
Justice A.K. Sarkar

vii) Citation
[1960] 3 SCR 85

viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Section 153-C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913
Section 10, Section 647, Section 658 of the Companies Act, 1956
Section 6 and Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case 
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Corporate Law, Procedural Law, Interpretation of Statutes

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case reflects the tension between transitional legal regimes and the safeguarding of procedural and substantive rights when statutes are repealed and replaced. The conflict arose due to the repeal of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, by the Companies Act, 1956, while an application under Section 153-C was pending before the District Judge of Poona. The appellant company contested the jurisdiction of the District Judge, asserting that the repeal divested the judge of authority. This prompted the Supreme Court to interpret the interaction of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and the savings provisions under the new Companies Act, particularly Section 658, which preserved such jurisdiction despite repeal. The issue had far-reaching implications for ensuring the continuity of legal proceedings and protecting vested rights amidst legislative transitions.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondents, shareholders of the appellant company, filed an application under Section 153-C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, seeking relief against alleged mismanagement by the directors. The application was made before the District Judge of Poona, who was authorized under a notification issued by the Government of Bombay under Section 3(1) of the 1913 Act. Before adjudication, the Companies Act, 1956 came into force, repealing the 1913 Act. The appellant then moved the court seeking dismissal of the application, arguing that the District Judge ceased to have jurisdiction post-repeal. Both the District Judge and the Bombay High Court dismissed this plea, which led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The case centered around the continuing applicability of the repealed Act and the notification empowering the judge, within the framework of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether proceedings initiated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, could continue after its repeal by the Companies Act, 1956.
ii. Whether the jurisdiction of the District Judge of Poona, authorized under a 1913 Act notification, remained valid post-repeal.
iii. Whether Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, preserves procedural rights and jurisdiction following a statutory repeal.
iv. Whether the notification under Section 3(1) of the 1913 Act empowering District Judges survives after the repeal, in light of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that
The appellant contended that the repeal of the 1913 Act by the 1956 Act stripped the District Judge of Poona of the legal competence to continue adjudication under Section 153-C, since the new law significantly altered jurisdictional mandates. They relied heavily on Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, which limited jurisdiction to High Courts for companies with a paid-up capital exceeding Rs. 1,00,000, which applied in the present case. Further, they argued that the notification issued under the 1913 Act empowering the District Judge had ceased to be effective under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, due to inconsistency with the new legal provisions. Lastly, they insisted that the application must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and procedural invalidity post-repeal, implying that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was not applicable due to contrary intention expressed in Section 647 of the Companies Act, 1956.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that
The respondents countered that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act preserved all rights, obligations, and legal proceedings under the repealed law unless a specific intent to the contrary was manifested. They emphasized that Section 658 of the Companies Act, 1956, explicitly safeguarded such proceedings by reinforcing the applicability of Section 6. Furthermore, they pointed out that the reliefs sought under Section 153-C were also substantially re-enacted in Sections 397 to 407 of the new Act, indicating legislative continuity. Hence, there was no express or implied intent to invalidate pending proceedings. They also argued that the notification empowering the District Judge survived under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, since it was not expressly revoked and was not inconsistent with the saving clauses or the repealing provisions.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897 – Preserves rights, obligations, and legal proceedings under repealed enactments unless contrary intent appears.
ii. Section 24, General Clauses Act, 1897 – Preserves the continuity of notifications issued under repealed laws unless inconsistent.
iii. Section 153-C, Indian Companies Act, 1913 – Provided remedies for shareholder oppression and mismanagement.
iv. Section 10, Companies Act, 1956 – Defines jurisdiction of courts under the new Act.
v. Sections 647 and 658, Companies Act, 1956 – Contain savings provisions and reinforce the application of the General Clauses Act.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The Supreme Court held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applied in full force, preserving both the rights under Section 153-C of the Companies Act, 1913, and the legal proceedings initiated thereunder. The notification empowering the District Judge of Poona to hear such matters did not lapse merely due to repeal, and the Companies Act, 1956, did not exhibit any contrary intention to destroy such rights or proceedings. Section 658 of the 1956 Act reinforced this interpretation by expressly preserving the applicability of the General Clauses Act. The court concluded that even though Section 10 of the new Act restructured jurisdiction, it did not nullify ongoing proceedings initiated under the older enactment.

b. OBITER DICTA 
The Court observed that the continuation of proceedings does not depend on whether the new law re-enacts identical provisions but rather on whether it demonstrates a clear intention to extinguish previously acquired rights. Merely altering jurisdiction does not amount to extinguishing procedural validity under a repealed law.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Legal proceedings under a repealed Act can continue unless the new enactment clearly intends to terminate them.

2. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act continues to govern the effect of repeal, irrespective of specific saving clauses in the new statute.

3. Notifications under repealed statutes continue unless explicitly revoked or rendered inconsistent by the new law.

4. Reenactment of similar provisions under a new statute indicates legislative intent to preserve existing rights.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, [1955] 1 SCR 893 – Reaffirmed the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act even when new legislation replaces old law.

2. The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni and Others, [1960] 3 SCR 85 – Main case decided on this principle.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. The Indian Companies Act, 1913 (Act VII of 1913) – Section 153-C

2. The Companies Act, 1956 (Act I of 1956) – Sections 10, 647, 658

3. The General Clauses Act, 1897 – Sections 6, 24